


ISLAMIC STATE IN SOMALIA

GENERAL PRESENTATION OF THE GROUP

The differences between **Al-Shabaab** and the **Islamic State in Somalia** are numerous, particularly in terms of:

IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Al-Shabaab plays a more significant role in the global Al-Qaeda network than the Islamic State in Somalia does within the Daesh network. This is notably because Al-Shabaab is one of only two Al-Qaeda affiliates on the African continent, whereas there are five active IS provinces in Africa[1].Furthermore, while the Islamic State advocates a global jihadist agenda, Al-Shabaab focuses primarily on a national and regional agenda[2]. Al-Shabaab also derives its ideological orientation, logistical support and financial resources from Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)[3].






MATERIAL RESOURCES

Since the establishment of the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), Al-Shabaab has maintained a superior military arsenal. The group possesses a diverse and well-developed range of weapons, acquired through its battles against AMISOM and subsequently ATMIS forces.[4].

STRATEGIC APPROACH

Al-Shabaab seeks to assume state-like functions by exploiting the structural weaknesses of the Somali state. It provides basic services to the population in exchange for payment, particularly in the area of dispute resolution[5]. Unlike Al-Shabaab, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) effectively controls and administers only a limited number of towns and villages[6].





PLAN GÉOGRAPHIQUE

Si l'EIS aurait tenté de s'implanter sporadiquement à Mogadiscio et dans les environs de la capitale somalienne ainsi que dans le Jubaland, la zone d'activité principale du groupe demeure le Puntland. Les relations avec les shebabs, présents dans le nord de la Somalie, ont toujours été conflictuelles depuis 2015, bien qu'il faille noter un apaisement fin 2018, illustré par la libération de plusieurs sympathisants de l'État islamique par Al-Shabaab[7]. Les affrontements entre les deux groupes ont rapidement repris au début de 2019, ce qui a contraint l'EIS à entrer en clandestinité dans ses implantations près de Mogadiscio[8]. En janvier 2019, les shebabs ont tué plusieurs sympathisants de l'Etat islamique dans le Jubaland ainsi qu'au Puntland. Les affrontements plus ou moins directs ont perduré durant les mois de février et mars 2019 au Puntland[9].

1. CIVIL WAR AND POLITICAL ISLAMISATION (1991-2006)

1991

The fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre led to the fragmentation of the country among various warlords.

1993

The Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, which resulted in the defeat and withdrawal of US forces.

1990–2000

Between 1991 and the early 2000s, the country experienced widespread chaos due to the absence of a central authority, creating favourable conditions for the development of local Islamic networks.

2006

The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), comprising eleven local courts implementing Sharia law. These courts were organised along clan lines and were primarily based in the south of the country.

END OF 2006

The Ethiopian intervention, backed by the United States, ousted the UIC from power. The group subsequently fragmented, with its **most radical faction regrouping under the name Al-Shabaab.**

2. AL-SHABAAB'S HEGEMONY AND INTERNAL DIVISIONS (2006-2015)

2007

The group emerged as the leading force opposing the Ethiopian military presence and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), adopting guerrilla tactics and carrying out suicide bombings and ambushes in Mogadishu and across southern Somalia.[11].

2008

Al-Shabaab expanded its control over large parts of southern Somalia, including the regions of Bay, Bakool and Gedo[12]. The group's organisational structure became more clearly defined with the establishment of a consultative council (the Shura)[13]. Ties with Al-Qaeda, established through Sudan and Yemen, grew stronger[14].

AUGUST 2008

The group managed to seize control of the port of Kismayo, a strategic hub through which it financed its activities by levying taxes on imports and exports.[15].

FEBRUARY 2009

Al-Shabaab seized control of the city of Baidoa, a stronghold of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) [16].

MAY-JULY 2009

Offensive in Mogadishu and partial control of the city[17].

OCTOBER 2009

Suicide attack targeting the African Union headquarters in Mogadishu[19].

AUGUST 2009

Open conflict between Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam in Kismayo, despite their fragile alliance [18].

NOVEMBER 2009

Attack on a graduation ceremony at the Shamo Hotel in Mogadishu, killing more than 20 people, including three government ministers[20].

JULY 11, 2010

Twin bombings in Kampala, Uganda, during the FIFA World Cup final, killing 74 people[21].

FEBRUARY 2011

Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam officially merge under the Al-Shabaab banner[22].

AUGUST 6, 2011

Al-Shabaab's tactical withdrawal from Mogadishu in the face of AMISOM military pressure [24].

SUMMER OF 2011

Major famine in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab bans foreign NGOs from operating in the area, worsening the humanitarian crisis [23].

OCTOBER 16, 2011

Intervention militaire kényane (opération Linda Nchi) contre al-Shabaab [25].

FEBRUARY 9, 2012

Al-Shabaab pledges allegiance to Al-Qaeda in a video message released by Ayman al-Zawahiri [26].

SEPTEMBER 29, 2012

Fall of Kismayo, a strategic port and a major source of revenue for the group[27].

JANUARY - JUNE 2013

A series of targeted assassinations in Mogadishu targeting parliamentarians, journalists and government officials [28].

JUNE - AUGUST 2013

Al-Shabaab eliminates its dissident leaders, including Ibrahim al-Afghani and supporters of Mukhtar Robow [30].

21-24 SEPTEMBER 2013

Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi - 67 killed[29].

SUMMER OF 2014

Campaign of attacks targeting locations in Kenya (Mpeketoni, Lamu and the east coast) - dozens of civilians killed.

SEPTEMBER 1-6, 2014

Death of Godane, the group's longstanding leader, in a US airstrike. Ahmed Diriye (Abu Ubaidah) is appointed as his successor [31].

APRIL 2, 2015

Attack on Garissa University in Kenya, killing 148 people, most of them students [32].

3. EMERGENCE OF THE ISLAMIC STATE (2015-2020)

FEBRUARY 2015

The first writings by Al-Shabaab members emerge, calling on the group to join the Islamic State organisation and establish the Somalia Province (Wilayat Somalia).

SEPTEMBER 2015

Internal Al-Shabaab memorandum reaffirming its allegiance to Al-Qaeda and stating that any position opposing this allegiance would be "dealt with in accordance with Islamic law."

OCTOBER 2015

Abdulqadir Mumin, a former Al-Shabaab ideologue, pledges allegiance to the Islamic State, leading to the emergence of the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), while media outlets affiliated with five Islamic State provinces call on Al-Shabaab to join the organisation. [33].

NOVEMBER 2015

Al-Shabaab spokesperson Ali Mohamud Rage issues a further warning to members seeking to join the Islamic State.

EARLY 2016

Al-Shabaab cracks down on defectors joining the Islamic State, while clan dynamics shape recruitment patterns. The Islamic State, in turn, favours recruiting members of the Darod clan.

OCTOBER - DECEMBER 2016

On 25 October 2016, approximately 50 Islamic State-affiliated fighters seized control of the port town of Qandala, in Puntland. Following brief clashes, local security forces were forced to retreat, allowing the jihadists to take over this strategically important town of approximately 20,000 inhabitants. In early December 2016, Puntland forces launched an offensive that resulted in the recapture of Qandala. Regional Governor Yusuf Mohamed Waceys declared the situation under control following the militants' withdrawal [34].

EARLY 2017

Limited activity but a sustained presence in the Puntland region, particularly around Qandala. The group continues to recruit locally in Puntland and in southern Somalia[35]. It begins to emulate ISIS's communication strategies in Iraq and Syria, producing videos and rallying chants in Somalia to encourage the continuation of jihad[36].

APRIL 2017

First official claims of responsibility for assassinations in Mogadishu by the Amaq News Agency, affiliated with ISIS, marking an attempt to establish an urban presence.

MAY 2017

Attack on a police station in Bosaso. The group seeks to expand its local presence[37].

SUMMER OF 2017

Reports of tensions between ISS cells and Al-Shabaab in the Mudug region. The targeted assassination of two police officers in Mogadishu illustrates an attempt to challenge Al-Shabaab on its own sphere of influence[38]. Release of a propaganda video filmed in the Miskat Mountains, featuring training exercises and foreign recruits, primarily from Ethiopia and Djibouti[39].

OCTOBER 2017

Increase in small-scale attacks in Bosaso and Mogadishu, primarily targeting security forces and installations[40]. Al-Shabaab executes several members suspected of defecting to the Islamic State.

LATE 2017

The Islamic State claims responsibility for several assassinations in Mogadishu, including that of a government official. Armed clashes between Al-Shabaab and ISS are documented in the Bari region [41] ; clashes are reported in the vicinity of Af-Urur.

FEBRUARY 2018

ISS claims responsibility for at least nine assassinations in Afgooye, a suburb of Mogadishu, targeting individuals accused of collaborating with the Somali government [42]. These attacks mark an expansion of ISS's presence in southern Somalia.

AUGUST 2018

Reports indicate that ISS has begun collecting taxes from several businesses in Bosaso, Puntland's commercial capital. This activity is reportedly generating tens of thousands of dollars per month for the group, demonstrating its ability to operate in urban areas[43].

DECEMBER 2018

ISS claims responsibility for eight attacks in Beledweyne, in central Somalia, an area traditionally controlled by Al-Shabaab. ISS also claims to have carried out an ambush against Al-Shabaab near Qandala, reportedly killing 14 of its members.
ISS is also believed to have established cells in parts of Mogadishu, including Bakarra Market, as well as in Ceelasha Biyaha and Afgoye[44]. Defections among mid-level commanders are reported, reportedly driven by financial difficulties and poor living conditions within the group.

2022

The group has claimed responsibility for 32 similar attacks, maintaining an active presence despite ongoing counterterrorism efforts[51]. The group plays a central role in facilitating the transfer of funds to Afghanistan (IS-K) and Yemen.[52]. The group continues its extortion activities in Bosaso, reportedly generating approximately USD 360,000 per month through illicit taxation. ISIS also begins using cryptocurrencies and hawala networks.

JANUARY 2023

US special forces kill Bilal al-Sudani, a senior ISS operative responsible for the group's financing and expansion across Africa[53].

MARCH-APRIL 2023

ISS carried out three attacks, two in Mogadishu and one in Bili Tadan, targeting security forces and African Union convoys [54].

LATE 2023

Intensification of operations in the Golis Mountains, particularly in the Al-Madu and Miskaad ranges. ISS claims control over areas including Daari Madu, Wadi Arar and Shibab[55].

SUMMER 2024

Clashes with Al-Shabaab become more direct. Mumin operates from Buur Dhexaad, a strategic base protected by caves, enabling the establishment of defensive positions sheltered from offensives and providing protection for the group's operational command centre[56].

EARLY 2024

ISS leader Mumin travels to Yemen to strengthen logistical and financial networks. [57]. Drones are deployed in sensitive areas, including Tuurmasaale and Jeceeleed.

DECEMBER 31, 2024

ISS launches a sophisticated attack on a military base in Dharjaale, claiming to have killed 22 soldiers [58].



FROM JANUARY 2025

Puntland security forces launch a counter-offensive towards Cal Miskaat, supported by UAE drone strikes. According to government sources, around 20 militants were killed, while Al-Naba reported 15 fatalities. Security forces reportedly recaptured the villages of Dhaban'ado, Digaale and Kaadile from ISS in the Al-Miskaat Mountains, before eliminating additional militants in Balidhidi.[59],[60].

HIGH COMMAND OF ISLAMIC STATE IN SOMALIA



ABDULQADIR MUMIN
ISS LEADER

British-Somali, based in Buur Dhexaad, and head of the General Directorate of Provinces and affiliated groups within ISS. His whereabouts remain unknown.

(Darod/Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan)



ABDIRAHMAN FAHIYE ISSE MOHAMUD
ISS EMIR

ADMINISTRATION



KILLED IN OCTOBER 2018

MAHAD MOALIM
ISS DEPUTY LEADER

(Darod/Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan/Ismail Ali)

Preacher



ADIQANI LUQMAAN
COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

(Darod/Leelkase)
In 2020, he reportedly became head of proselytisation and indoctrination.



ABU HASFA
DEPUTY COMMANDER

(Hawiye/Galjaal)

Deputy to Luqmaan, a former Al-Shabaab member from the Hiraan region and a potential recruiter.

ABU YASIR AL-YEMENI
Commander
KILLED IN 2024

ABDI SHARIF
Commander

ABU YAHYA
Commander

OTHMAN SALIM
Administrator

HAMZA FAREY
Ideologue and Preacher

ALI DHUHA
Recruitment

ABU JANDAL
Immigration

FINANCES

BILAL AL-SUDANI
HEAD OF FINANCE AND LOGISTICS, DEPUTY LEADER

Responsible for finances and coordination of regional branches through the Al-Karrar office (ISCAP/ISIM/IS-KP).



KILLED IN JANUARY 2023

ABDULRAHMAN FAHIYE ISSE
HEAD OF FINANCE AND DEPUTY LEADER

(Darod/Harti/Deshishe)

(alias Abu Abdallah Al-Hashimi or Abu Musam al-Sharqaw)

He succeeded Bilal al-Sudani.



ABDIWALI WARAN WALAC
ISS HEAD OF FINANCE



CAPTURED IN JULY 2025

WEAPONRY

ABDIBASID (ALIAS MUKHTAR)

(Darod/Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan)

Intelligence operative and arms dealer.



ISSE MOHAMUD YUSSUF (ALIAS YULLUX)

Mumin's cousin, an arms dealer and former pirate based at the port of Qandala.
He reportedly helped supply weapons to the group.



ABDIRAHMAN SHIRWAC AW-SACIID
HEAD OF THE ASSASSINATION UNIT

He surrendered to security forces in February 2025.



CAMPS & GEOGRAPHICAL PRESENCE


May 23, 2017
A suicide bomber detonated himself at a checkpoint in Bosaso, killing five people.

25 October - 16 December 2016
Capture and occupation of the town of Qandala

Launch of Operation Hilaac ("Lightning") by Puntland security forces in December 2024, which significantly reduced ISS's manpower and capabilities during 2025. The operation also came at a high cost for Puntland security forces, which lost 241 soldiers, while a further 900 were wounded. In response to the offensive, the Al-Karrar office was reportedly relocated to Mozambique. [71]

In 2017, the UN estimated that Mumin led a faction of 200 fighters operating from the Golis and Galgala mountains, as well as from Bosaso. Abu Namaam led another faction of 100 to 150 fighters reportedly operating in Jubaland [68].

31 December 2024
Attack on a military base in Dharjaale. The Islamic State claimed that 22 soldiers had been killed.



MAP KEY

- Key cities
- Large-Scale Attacks
- Islamic State in Somalia camp

From late 2018 onwards, ISS appears to have established a small-scale presence in Mogadishu, as evidenced by the targeted assassinations of local figures. The group is reportedly operating two cells in Ceelasha Biyaha and Bakara Market. A presence in Afgooye has also been reported. [69].

The Iskushuban region reportedly serves as a training base and a weapons storage site for arms delivered from Yemen [70].



RECRUITMENT

EARLY RECRUITS

In early 2017, ISS's strength was estimated at **between 300 and 400 members, the majority of whom were Somali**, alongside a small number of recruits from neighbouring countries. The group was reportedly made up of **70% former Al-Shabaab members, including mid-ranking operatives and intelligence agents, who had been attracted by more lucrative pay** [71],[72].



UNITED NATIONS WARNING

In 2018, the **UN warned of a possible large influx of Somali fighters seeking to join ISS** following the group's territorial losses in the Levant and Libya[73].

Recruitment continued between 2019 and 2021.[74] However, **membership levels remained stagnant and even declined in 2022,** despite the growing role and influence of the Islamic State's Somali province in managing the finances of the wider organisation [75].

Following the death of finance chief Bilal al-Sudani in January 2023, the group **expanded its recruitment strategy across East and North Africa.** The UN reported an **increase in the number of recruits from these regions, as well as from Yemen**[76]. Throughout 2024, ISS focused its recruitment efforts on countries in the region and Yemen, while also making **efforts to integrate foreign fighters into its hierarchical structures** [77].

- **2017 : 300 TO 400 MEMBERS** [78]
- **2019 : MULTIPLE DEFECTIONS** [79]
- **2021 : 260 TO 300 MEMBERS** [80]
- **2022 : 200 TO 280 MEMBERS** [81]
- **LATE 2022 : 200 TO 250 MEMBERS** [82]
- **2024 : 300 TO 400 MEMBERS** [83]
- **LATE 2024 : 600 TO 700 MEMBERS** [84]

NETWORKS AND RECRUITMENT CHANNELS



Recruitment relies on a **network of facilitators who put recruits in contact with logisticians responsible for organising and paying for their transfers** until they reach Puntland [85].



Most **recruits transit through Ethiopia before joining one of the foreign fighter training camps** at Buurta Istiqbaalka, travelling via Jijiga in Ethiopia and Somaliland [86].



The Islamic State leadership and its propaganda apparatus have made every effort to raise the profile of its Somali branch, while pro-IS groups in Somalia have produced **a large volume of media content to spread the group's message in Somali, Amharic, Oromo and Swahili,** with the aim of **boosting recruitment and funding by exploiting ethnic and linguistic ties** [87].



ISS has relied heavily on **support from members of the Darod clan.** While Mumin initially appears to have prioritised recruitment within his own clan (Darod) and its sub-clans (Majeerteen/Ali Salebaan), particularly given the group's establishment in Puntland, in the Iskushuban region, a stronghold of the Ali Salebaan clan, **he subsequently broadened his recruitment base** [88].

INTERNAL FUNDING

In 2018, ISS faced a financial crisis attributed to the ineffectiveness and lack of sustainability of its strategy of seizing supply hubs, such as ports. As a result, in an effort to diversify its sources of funding, it was forced to turn to other forms of criminal activity, particularly as financial and material support from the Islamic State in Yemen remained limited [89].

EXTORSION & ILLEGAL TAXATION

Extortion of businesses provides the group with a regular source of income. Like Al-Shabaab, ISS has attempted to impose taxes on telecommunications companies, particularly Amtel and Golis Telecom, **creating a climate of fear in response to the companies' reluctance to comply.** As a result, several Amtel employees were assassinated between August and November 2018. The deputy director of Golis Telecom was also killed in Bosaso in August 2018, as was the owner of Saabir General Trading Company in November 2022 [90].
In 2018, the group's extortion revenues were estimated at **USD 72,000 per month.** Money extorted from businesses was transferred through two companies in Dhasaan, a locality under ISS control [91].



SMUGGLING

Thanks to its presence in Puntland, located between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, ISS derives part of its income from involvement in **various forms of trafficking (arms, human trafficking and piracy).** The group is also reportedly involved in **the export of small quantities of gold extracted in the Bari region** [92].



EXTERNAL FUNDING

REGIONAL HUB

In 2023, ISS's revenues were estimated at **USD 100,000 per month**, of which **USD 25,000 was reportedly transferred to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in cryptocurrency** [93],[94] This illustrates **ISS's role as a regional and global financial hub for the Islamic State.** Through its Al-Karrar office, the group is responsible for coordinating the Islamic State's strategy across its Central and East African provinces (ISCAP/ISIM). In this capacity, it oversees some of the **fund transfers to these provinces and allied groups.** To ensure discretion, the group relies on the ***hawala system*** for cross-border money transfers.





Afghanistan



Mozambique



Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)

YEMEN





IRAN





As early as 2016, links between ISS and Yemen were reported. These were reportedly facilitated by Khalil Dheere, a former Al-Shabaab member who had travelled to Yemen in 2013. **He was allegedly responsible for acting as an intermediary between Mumin and the Islamic State in the Levant.** In late 2017, material and training support from the Islamic State in Yemen was confirmed, although it should be noted that this support remained limited [98]. Since 2021, **relations between ISS and the Houthis, driven by opportunistic rather than ideological considerations, have grown stronger**, particularly in terms of drone-related expertise transfers, including technical training and logistical support. **These interactions are facilitated by specialised brokers operating across Yemeni and Somali networks.** They oversee **arms shipments, the falsification of documents for dhows, and the management of commissions.**

Among the key figures involved in this coordination are Abu Mohammed al-Murtadha and Abu Ibrahim al-Hadi, who are responsible for deployments in Africa and negotiations with the Quds Force. Ansar Allah's physical presence on the ground in Somalia is becoming increasingly apparent, with its involvement in **human trafficking networks, fuel smuggling and Somali coastal logistics, which form key arteries of the informal economy.** The ports of Bosaso, as well as those of Hobyo, Baraawe, Merca and Berbera, show **numerous signs of overlapping activity** [99]. Between January and March 2024, Mumin reportedly travelled to Yemen to strengthen the group's financial infrastructure [100] **to expand his network and acquire new weapons, including reconnaissance drones that could potentially be used in suicide attacks** [101].

LIBYA



In 2017, the UN highlighted **potential links between ISS and several groups in Libya, including Magafe's group** [95]. Beyond financial support, **the group also sources weapons through Yemen**, while several instructors and trainers have reportedly arrived from Libya [96].

REVENUE IN 2023
$100 000/ month

REVENUE IN 2024
$360 000/ month

MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS

ISS has access to **Amaq News Agency, the Islamic State network's central news outlet**, as well as **its own publication, Al-Naba.** These two main media outlets enable the group to **claim responsibility for its attacks and disseminate its propaganda.**

In April 2016, the Islamic State, through i**ts Al-Furat media outlet**, released a video showing the training camp of commander Sheikh Abu Numan, located in Puntland. The video shows **around a dozen fighters training at what is presented as the "first caliphate camp in Somalia".** It also enabled the group to claim responsibility for its **first attack in Somalia**, stating that it had detonated an improvised explosive device against a military vehicle belonging to the "Crusader African forces" in Mogadishu.[102].

In July 2021, the group's media outlets published **a photo report documenting the fighters' daily activities, alongside a tribute praising Mumin.** In November 2021, they released **photographs of fighters undergoing training in Puntland,** while in March 2022, the group **pledged allegiance to the new Islamic State caliph in a six-minute video.**[103]. These media outlets are also used by the group as part of **its recruitment strategy, particularly to attract foreign fighters.** In July 2022, a 25-minute video in Amharic with Arabic subtitles was released. It depicts **the military training and daily lives of ISS fighters, with particular emphasis on Ethiopian recruits.** It also highlights **the multidisciplinary nature of the training provided to fighters, covering theoretical, religious and jurisprudential instruction.** Similarly, in January 2023, the group released a 14-minute video featuring a Kenyan fighter praising the various training programmes and attacks carried out by the group.[104].

ISS also has access to other media outlets, including Munasir Radio, Fatwa Media, l'Lam Foundation, Al-Furat Media, Al-Bayan Radio, Ahlul Khilafa Media, Fatawa Min Sugur Media and Qirat Media (in Amharic), as well as Raadiyoo al-Hijrateyn (in Oromo, Somali and Swahili).

Munasir Radio - publishes a wide range of media content, including **audio recordings covering theological and religious topics, jurisprudence, current affairs, weekly updates on political and geopolitical developments, news about the Islamic State, and explanations of historical and religious events.**
Voice of Munasir Radio also broadcasts **official Islamic State audio recordings translated into Amharic, accounts of martyrs, and readings of ideological and religious books.**
The channel's **main media product is a weekly programme entitled "A Mirror on the World"**, lasting between 60 and 90 minutes and generally divided into five or six segments covering various topics. During Ramadan, however, a purely religious programme lasting approximately seven minutes is broadcast every morning [105].

Al-Bayan regularly broadcasts audio content in Amharic. One of its most popular and widely followed programmes is entitled **"Fatwa from the Stronghold of the Muslims".** It is an **ideological and religious programme covering Islamic fatwas, as well as issues relating to Sharia, hijra and jihad.** The Amharic-language radio programme generally lasts 25 minutes. **The Amharic version of Al-Bayan Radio is distributed via Facebook, Telegram, WhatsApp and YouTube**[106].

The new collective includes the Al-Hijrateyn Foundation, which specialises in **propaganda production and translation into Somali, alongside 14 other groups covering at least 18 languages.** Halummu, an **English-language translation and propaganda outlet, has been active since at least 2016** and is one of the main driving forces behind the pro-Islamic State propaganda coalition. Al-Hijrateyn also produces content in Oromo and Swahili [107].


أكثر من ٣٠ قتيلا وجريحا من قوات نيجيريا والنيجر والكاميرون وتدمير وإعطاب ١٤ آلية بهجمات لجنود الخلافة بولاية غرب إفريقية
فزت وربّ الكعبة
٢٢ قتيلا من قوات النيجر المرتدة بكمينين لجنود الخلافة في ولاية الساحل

On 12 December 2024, Al-Naba newspaper published an article entitled "Somalia: The Land of Hijra and Support", outlining the group's ambitions in East Africa. The article **encourages migration to the region and highlights the group's intention to establish Somalia as a central hub for its global jihadist network.**

In addition to claiming responsibility for and boasting about the group's attack on a military base, which reportedly killed 19 soldiers and nine jihadists, the article highlights the **diversity of the fighters' nationalities**, including some reportedly from Gulf countries. Somalia is portrayed as a land of tamkin (territorial consolidation). Since its inception, the Islamic State has exploited the concepts of hijra and tamkin to legitimise its expansion and recruit fighters worldwide.

Following the loss of its strongholds in Iraq and Syria, the group redirected this rhetoric towards new territories, particularly Somalia. The country is now presented as a **"land of emancipation"** where fighters can fulfil their **religious duty.** This ideological adaptation helps sustain the group's recruitment efforts. **Alongside migration (hijra), support (madad) is presented as an obligation for those unable to fight** [108].

SOURCES

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
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