{"id":6507,"date":"2025-11-27T13:02:08","date_gmt":"2025-11-27T13:02:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/?p=6507"},"modified":"2026-01-29T07:01:11","modified_gmt":"2026-01-29T07:01:11","slug":"qui-sont-les-responsables-du-jnim-qui-imposent-un-blocus-pour-asphyxier-bamako-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/2025\/11\/27\/qui-sont-les-responsables-du-jnim-qui-imposent-un-blocus-pour-asphyxier-bamako-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Episode 1: Qui sont les responsables du JNIM qui imposent un blocus pour  asphyxier Bamako?"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-post\" data-elementor-id=\"6507\" class=\"elementor elementor-6507\" data-elementor-post-type=\"post\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-26d4243 e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"26d4243\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-72b4d44 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"72b4d44\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"266\" src=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-1024x341.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-6513\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-1024x341.png 1024w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-300x100.png 300w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-768x256.png 768w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-1536x512.png 1536w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH-2048x683.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5777bea3 e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"5777bea3\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-375fd373 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"375fd373\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"p1\"><img decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-medium wp-image-6513\" src=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/Banner-JNIM-episode-1-FRENCH.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"1\" height=\"1\" \/>Le Jama\u2019at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) s\u2019est impos\u00e9 comme l\u2019un des acteurs djihadistes les plus structur\u00e9s du Sahel, articul\u00e9 autour d\u2019un conseil central puissant et d\u2019un maillage territorial en constante expansion.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"p1\">Dans ce premier \u00e9pisode de la s\u00e9rie \u201cGroupes politico-militaires islamistes radicaux au Sahel\u201d, nous revenons sur la structure interne du mouvement, l\u2019organisation r\u00e9gionale en Mantiqa, l\u2019expansion transfrontali\u00e8re et ses figures cl\u00e9s tels que Jafar Dicko, Hamza al- Tabankorti, Abou Hamza al-Shinguiti et d\u2019autres responsables dont les positions \u00e9clairent les dynamiques internes et les alliances du groupe.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"p1\">Une analyse d\u00e9taill\u00e9e pour mieux comprendre l\u2019architecture op\u00e9rationnelle du JNIM et les reconfigurations en cours dans l\u2019espace sah\u00e9lien.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-837c9cd e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"837c9cd\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-192e1aa elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"192e1aa\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"1000\" src=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/1st-infographic-FRENCH-819x1024.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-6719\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/1st-infographic-FRENCH-819x1024.png 819w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/1st-infographic-FRENCH-240x300.png 240w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/1st-infographic-FRENCH-768x960.png 768w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/1st-infographic-FRENCH.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-40ca0ee e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"40ca0ee\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-ecccca7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"ecccca7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"1000\" src=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/2nd-infographic-FRENCH-819x1024.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-6720\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/2nd-infographic-FRENCH-819x1024.png 819w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/2nd-infographic-FRENCH-240x300.png 240w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/2nd-infographic-FRENCH-768x960.png 768w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/2nd-infographic-FRENCH.png 1080w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-523edec e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"523edec\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-5733bf7 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"5733bf7\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p class=\"p1\"><b>Walleidine Sacko, responsable mantiqa Sikasso<\/b><b><\/b><\/p><p class=\"p1\">Walleidine Sacko est un v\u00e9t\u00e9ran du djihad d&#8217;Ansar dine du sud (Katibat Khalid Ibn Al-Walid). C&#8217;est un compagnon de longue date de Souleymane Keita. Il a \u00e9t\u00e9 lib\u00e9r\u00e9 en octobre 2020 (\u00e9change JNIM, Sophie Petronin et feu Soumaila Ciss\u00e9). Il a un ancrage communautaire fort car il est lui-m\u00eame originaire de la zone de Koutiala-Karangasso.<\/p><p class=\"p1\"><b>Hamza al-Tabankorti, responsable de la r\u00e9gion (mantiqa) de Gao<\/b><b><\/b><\/p><p class=\"p1\">De son vrai nom Himama Ould Lehweir, Hamza al Tabankorti, un arabes de la tribu Lamhars de Gao. Himama Ould Lekhweir a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9sign\u00e9 pour succ\u00e9der \u00e0 Mohamed Ould Nouini, cerveau des attentats de Bamako, Ouagadougou et Grand-Bassam, \u00e9limin\u00e9 par l\u2019arm\u00e9e fran\u00e7aise en 2018. Lui-m\u00eame a \u00e9t\u00e9 vis\u00e9 quelques mois apr\u00e8s, en ao\u00fbt, par une frappe de l\u2019arm\u00e9e fran\u00e7aise \u00e0 laquelle il avait \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9clar\u00e9 sauf.\u00a0\u00a0Hamza al Tabankort appartient d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e0 la tribu des Lemhars fait de lui un chef \u00ab l\u00e9gitime \u00bb, mais \u00e9galement son entr\u00e9e dans la galaxie jihadiste depuis plus d\u2019une dizaine d\u2019ann\u00e9es. Il est un ancien d\u2019Almourabitoune, fond\u00e9 en 2013 par l\u2019Alg\u00e9rien Mokhtar Belmokhtar et le Malien Ahmed al Tilemsi et le Mauritanien Hamada Ould Mohammed Heirou (deux anciens du MUJAO).<\/p><p class=\"p1\"><b>Abou Abderrahmane al-Jazairi, responsable de la r\u00e9gion (mantiqa) de Tombouctou (membre du CCC)<\/b><b><\/b><\/p><p class=\"p1\">C\u2019est un Alg\u00e9rien, v\u00e9t\u00e9ran du Jihad au Sahel dont filtre peu d\u2019information qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 nomm\u00e9 pour remplacer le mauritanien Abou Abderrahmane al Libi ou Abou Talha al Mauritani, destitu\u00e9 pour son absence de r\u00e9sultat. Sa destitution est intervenue juste apr\u00e8s l\u2019\u00e9chec des attaques de Ber en octobre 2024. Abderrahmane Al-Jazairi est connu au sein du JNIM depuis au moins 2018 o\u00f9 il \u00e9voluait avec Jamel Okacha dit Yahya Abou Al-Hamam apparu aux c\u00f4t\u00e9s d\u2019Iyad Ag Ghali, de Mohamed Ould Nouini, d\u2019Aly Maychou et de Amadou Kouffa lors de l\u2019annonce de la naissance, en mars 2017, du JNIM. Il est tr\u00e8s ancr\u00e9 dans les communaut\u00e9s Touareg, arabe et peule. C&#8217;est d&#8217;ailleurs lui qui a restructur\u00e9 Al-Furqan (Emirat de Tombouctou) o\u00f9 Mantiqa Tombouctou comme conseiller adjoint de Talha.<\/p><p class=\"p1\"><b>Abou Hamza Al-Shinguiti, responsable mantiqa Aribanda \/ Gourma<\/b><b><\/b><\/p><p class=\"p1\">Lui aussi mauritanien, il s\u2019appelle Mohamed Salem Ould Mbarek. Il a su imposer son leadership dans le gourma malien ou la r\u00e9gion d&#8217;Aribanda pour le JNIM, jouant parfois de tampon entre le centre du Mali et le Burkina. Il a un acc\u00e8s direct \u00e0 Iyad Ag Ghali et peut m\u00eame jouer les interm\u00e9diaires entre l&#8217;\u00e9mir du JNIM et certains autres sous-chefs comme Walleidine de Sikasso.<\/p><p class=\"p1\">Comme beaucoup d\u2019\u00e9trangers, Abou Hamza Al- Shinguiti b\u00e9n\u00e9ficie d\u2019un statut de djihadiste reconnu pour son engagement durable ou anciennet\u00e9 au sein des groupes locaux qui lui conf\u00e8re une certaine l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 aussi bien aux yeux de la direction centrale qu\u2019aux yeux des fantassins. Ici, direction centrale ne veut pas forc\u00e9ment dire uniquement Iyad Ag Ghali, mais \u00e9galement le CC qui est l\u2019organe d\u00e9cisif du JNIM qui d\u00e9signe les diff\u00e9rents \u00e9mirs des Mantiqa ou r\u00e9gions.<\/p><p class=\"p1\"><b>\u00c0 noter\u00a0<\/b>que parmi les \u00e9mirs ci-dessus, Abou Hamza Al-Shinquiti, Abderrahmane Al-Jazairi et Himama ont un acc\u00e8s direct \u00e0 Iyad Ag Ghaly via Sedan Ag Hitta, \u00e9mir de Kidal qui joue le r\u00f4le du secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l\u2019organisation. Quant \u00e0 lui, Walleidine Sacko n&#8217;a pas un acc\u00e8s direct au chef supr\u00eame, il passe par le Mauritanien Abou Hamza Al-Chingueti ou par un peul proche de Kouffa.<\/p><p class=\"p1\"><b>S\u2019appuyant sur les travaux men\u00e9s par le HSGO\/ASSN et le LAAM \u00e0 propos des figures cl\u00e9s \u00e0 la t\u00eate du JNIM, le magazine\u00a0<\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/\"><span class=\"s1\"><b>\u00ab Jeune Afrique \u00bb<\/b><\/span><\/a><b>\u00a0a publi\u00e9 un article intitul\u00e9\u00a0<\/b><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jeuneafrique.com\/1746250\/politique\/les-strateges-de-lombre-diyad-ag-ghaly-le-chef-du-groupe-jihadiste-jnim\/\"><span class=\"s1\"><b>\u00ab Les strat\u00e8ges de l\u2019ombre d\u2019Iyad Ag Ghaly, le chef du groupe djihadiste Jnim \u00bb<\/b><\/span><\/a><b>. Leur contribution vient compl\u00e9ter les enseignements tir\u00e9s de nos recherches pour offrir une lecture claire des dynamiques internes du groupe.<\/b><b><\/b><\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-dd025e6 e-flex e-con-boxed e-con e-parent\" data-id=\"dd025e6\" data-element_type=\"container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"e-con-inner\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-e189e4f elementor-widget elementor-widget-image\" data-id=\"e189e4f\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"image.default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"266\" src=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-1024x341.png\" class=\"attachment-large size-large wp-image-6725\" alt=\"\" srcset=\"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-1024x341.png 1024w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-300x100.png 300w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-768x256.png 768w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-1536x512.png 1536w, https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/11\/banner-jeuneafrique-2048x683.png 2048w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le Jama\u2019at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) s\u2019est impos\u00e9 comme l\u2019un des acteurs djihadistes les plus structur\u00e9s du Sahel, articul\u00e9 autour d\u2019un conseil central puissant et d\u2019un maillage territorial en constante expansion. Dans ce premier \u00e9pisode de la s\u00e9rie \u201cGroupes politico-militaires islamistes radicaux au Sahel\u201d, nous revenons sur la structure interne du mouvement, l\u2019organisation r\u00e9gionale en [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":6494,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[36],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6507","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-groupes-politico"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6507","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6507"}],"version-history":[{"count":16,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6507\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6982,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6507\/revisions\/6982"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6494"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6507"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6507"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/africansecuritynetwork.org\/HSGO4\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6507"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}