



*African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)*

**REPORT OF  
PARLIAMENTARY WORKSHOP**

**HELD ON  
15 – 16 MARCH 2010  
AT THE  
ELMINA BEACH RESORT**  
Theme

**WHAT IS PARLIAMENT’S ROLE  
IN SECURITY SECTOR GOVERNANCE?  
HOW DOES PARLIAMENT BUILD CAPACITY FOR THIS ROLE?**

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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

<b>ASDR</b>	-	African Security Dialogue and Research
<b>ASSN</b>	-	African Security Sector Network
<b>BNI</b>	-	Bureau of National Investigations
<b>CEPS</b>	-	Customs Excise and Preventive Service
<b>CHRAJ</b>	-	Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
<b>CHRI</b>	-	Commonwealth Human Rights Institute
<b>DOVVSU</b>	-	Domestic Violence and Victims Support Unit
<b>GAFSCC</b>	-	Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College
<b>IGP</b>	-	Inspector General of Police
<b>MP</b>	-	Member of Parliament
<b>NACOB</b>	-	Narcotics Control Board
<b>NADMO</b>	-	National Disaster Management Organisation
<b>NGO</b>	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>SSR</b>	-	Security Sector Reform
<b>UK</b>	-	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	-	United Nations

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report covers proceedings of a two-day parliamentary workshop held from the 15<sup>th</sup> – 16<sup>th</sup> of March, 2010 at the Elmina Beach Resort under the theme *What is Parliament's Role in Security Sector Governance? How does Parliament Build the Capacity for this Roles?*

It brought together members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior, representatives of the Ministry of Interior, security agencies, civil society, and three members of the Defence and Security Committees in the Liberian Congress. The workshop was proudly supported by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).

Major General Nii Carl Coleman, the Associate Executive Director of ASDR, gave the opening remarks to commence the workshop. He welcomed all members and indicated that the purpose of the workshop was to critically examine how parliament, especially, the Select Committee on Defence and Interior oversees the operations and activities of the security sector.

Prof Eboe Hutchful gave the first presentation of the day on the topic *"Parliamentary Oversight of Security: the Broader Picture"*. He noted that the challenge confronting parliament with respect to security sector oversight and how to build capacities for same has hitherto had a narrow focus. He recommended a broader approach that would engage all the institutions and actors *outside* the legislature itself, whose input are nevertheless essential to the very efficacy of parliamentary oversight of the security sector. He argued that successful democratic governance of security institutions was the most challenging dimension of any democratic transition and ultimately, democratic consolidation. Oversight, he said, must be seen as a partnership and a process performed by a multiplicity of external and internal agencies. These agencies had to be able to collaborate. There was the need for a clear division of labour among all the civilian agencies involved in oversight including parliament. He observed that responsive and accountable security institutions and agencies that were compliant to oversight and see oversight as not only legitimate but also in their corporate interest were essential. Parliament must therefore, be seen as a useful ally by security institutions.

Lt Col E W Kotia of GAFSC was the next to present on the topic *"Desirable Roles of the Legislature over Defence"*. He explained the separation of powers among the arms of government and contended that legislatures were responsible for debating and passing defence legislations after the executive had submitted proposals for consideration. Some areas of defence legislations he enumerated included; military laws to regulate the Armed Forces, procurement of major defence equipment, approval to participate in foreign/international operations, enactment of a defence policy to protect the national interest and defence strategic reviews. According to him, Defence Committees were created in most legislatures to support the work of the legislature with jurisdiction almost matching the Defence Ministry. He identified the right of declaration of a State of Emergency and the deployment of the military internally at the request of the executive as one of the emerging roles of the legislature in modern democracies. This notwithstanding, the legislature was placed at a disadvantaged position over its oversight role because it lacked access to expertise and information on defence issues. He ended his presentation with some recommendations on how to strengthen the overall role of the legislature over defence.

Nana Oye Lithur also gave a presentation on *Police Oversight and Accountability*. She traced the historical perspectives of policing in Ghana, touched on the legal framework that established the police service in Ghana and noted that Article 200 of the 1992 Constitution clearly spells out the mandate of the police service. She further assessed the extent to which the police service has been equipped to execute their mandate and indicated that the Constitution sets out the procedure for appointing the IGP and creates the Police Council that was a general oversight institution. She reiterated the need for police accountability and expressed concern about the amount of power vested in the IGP.

She analyzed some of the ills of the police service including, routine disobedience to procedural law, countless instances of police brutalities and torture, acts of extra-judicial killings and corruption. She mentioned some of the challenges encountered by the police service as lack of equipment, human resources and capacity building training. For instance, the UN ration of police to civilian was 1:500 whilst that of Ghana as at 2005 was 1:1160.

Mrs Mina Mensah took over from Nana Oye Lithur and spoke on the achievements of *Enhancing Police Accountability in Ghana*, a project the CHRI (Africa Office) commenced in 2005. The project aimed at initiating reform in the Ghana Police Service (GPS) in accordance with modern principles of democratic governance and international human rights. Its main activities included identifying the legal framework in the Ghanaian context that best ensure human rights and the rule of law as guiding principles for governing the police and developing and disseminating educational and advocacy materials, campaigning for policy reform and building a network of civil society organizations committed to police accountability.

The impact of the project had been enormous: increased knowledge of current specific obstacles to police accountability, acceptance among stakeholders of new arrangements to improve accountability, demand for Police Reform and the Georgina Wood Committee in paragraph 9.4 of its final report included CHRI's recommendations, appointment of a new Police Council for specific reform initiatives and increased media discourse on issues relating to Policing in a democratic dispensation are all part of the success story of the project. She expressed delight at the fact that over the past years, civil society consciousness on issues of policing and the need for change has been increased.

Ms Ecoma Alaga gave the last presentation for the first day on *The Role of Parliament in Gender Sensitive Security Oversight*. She touched on the changing pattern of warfare over the years and established a nexus between intra-state conflicts vis-à-vis the recent focus on human security. She demystified the concept of gender and explained that gender was not a woman's issue but a basic tool of analysis that says what the particular priorities of the particular groups in the society are. She noticed that security, particularly because of our cultural background, has been the preserve of men but parliament does have a significant role to play in generating people-centred security narratives that inform security policy making.

She argued that if parliament could play their oversight role on the security sector, (approving budget, reviewing legislations, etc), then it needs to critically understand and incorporate gender issues into its processes. She further called on parliament to monitor the level of implementation of

international, regional and national commitment concerning full and equal participation of women in the security environment. Her concluding appeal to parliament was for them to identify and address issues relating to gender based violence and pass a legislation encompassing all issues of gender based violence and include gender based violence in the mandate of truth and reconciliation commissions and special courts.

Mr Ernest Ansah set the ball rolling for proceedings of the second day with a presentation on *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector – Lessons from Ghana* which focused on a paper he co-authored with Dr Kwesi Aning in 2008. He described the actors in the security sector in Ghana and traced the evolution of security sector reform in Ghana to the colonial days with the occurrence of the 1948 riots.

He used the 3A's approach (Authority, Ability and Attitude) to address the topic. In terms of authority, he looked at the legal framework within which parliament carried out its oversight roles over the security sector and mentioned Article 200 (2) of the 1992 Constitution as the legislative instrument that empowers parliament to be the sole institution to raise an army or police force in the country.

On Parliament's ability, he considered issues of human, financial and technical resources. He questioned the gender composition of the parliament Select committee on Defence and Interior and how many of them had the technical know-how for oversight of the security sector.

On the third A – Attitude; he touched on the political will of parliament to check accountability and transparency. According to him, political polarization, morality, ethics were necessary issues to consider if parliament could perform its parliamentary oversight role effectively.

In his conclusion, he identified party loyalty and secrecy of information as the major challenges to parliamentary oversight of the security sector and called for a balance of interplay of parliamentary authority, ability and attitude.

A Liberian MP shared his experience with the Ghanaians and highlighted some of the differences between the two parliaments. He indicated that in Liberia, the ruling party did not dominate parliament, Liberian legislature had the power of contempt and had exercised that power to discipline executive members following due process (some were jailed for up to 48 hours for contempt). They also had the power to subpoena members of the executive when need be and that members of the legislature were well resourced perform their duties (good salaries, fuel and not less than 14 staff) as compared to the Ghanaian case. He added that the president could not declare a state of emergency without the consent of the speaker and this must be brought before parliament within 7 days for approval or otherwise. He however expressed two issues of concern: they were challenged by the power of veto vested in the presidency though a two-third majority of parliamentary vote can override it; capacity was also a huge challenge as members of parliament usually employ not based on qualification but party affiliation and support during campaign. Besides, most of the MPs were novices and therefore, lacked experience.

The workshop ended with presentation of the group works in which laudable recommendations were made. The chairperson charged all the participants to take up the recommendations seriously to the appropriate quarters.

## INTRODUCTION

In pursuance of the ASDR's agenda of building parliamentary capacities for security sector oversight, it held another parliamentary workshop at the Elmina Beach Resort from the 15<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> of March 2010. This two-day workshop was made possible with financial support from the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). The workshop was under the theme, "*What is Parliament's Role in Security Sector Governance? And how does Parliament Build the Capacity for those Roles?*"

The two-day workshop brought together members of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior, representatives of the Ministry of Interior, security agencies, civil society, and three members of the Defence and Security Committees in the Liberian Congress.

## PROCEEDINGS

### DAY 1

#### *Opening Remarks*

Maj General Nii Carl Coleman (Rtd), the Associate Executive Director of ASDR welcomed all participants and registered his appreciation for their presence. He noted that the purpose of the workshop was to critically examine how parliament, especially, the Select Committee on Defence and Interior oversees the operations and activities of the security sector. He apologised for the absence of two key speakers from the UK and South Africa (Hon. Bruce George and Hon James Ngculu, Former Chair of the UK House of Commons Defence Committee and Member of the Portfolio Defence Committee on the Parliament of South Africa respectively) due to ill-health. He ended his opening remarks with a special welcome to the three members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Liberian Congress. This was followed by introduction of participants which set the ball rolling to commence the business of the day which was chaired by Mr K B Asante, an ASDR Board Member and retired diplomat.

#### Session 1:

*Speaker: Prof. Eboe Hutchful*

*Topic: "Parliamentary Oversight of Security: the Broader Picture"*

Prof Hutchful argued that the challenge confronting parliament with respect to security sector oversight and how to build capacities for same has hitherto had a narrow focus. He recommended a broader approach that would engage all the institutions and actors *outside* the legislature itself, whose input are nevertheless essential to the very efficacy of parliamentary oversight of the security sector. He stressed that successful democratic governance of security institutions was the most challenging dimension of any democratic transition and ultimately, democratic consolidation. He lamented the creeping sense of complacency in Ghana concerning the subordination of the security services to political direction and democratic control and mentioned how agnostic civilians were as to what the security services had been doing and how far they have come. He asserted that there was a profound lack of clarity as to the nature of the relationship between both civilian and security institutions under the current constitutional dispensation, and indeed as to the meaning of the

concept of 'civil supremacy'. He said the military especially had a misconceived sense of independence with the notion of institutional autonomy and lack of accountability. He was of the view that parliamentary oversight faced profound challenges both historically and structurally in terms of the very nature of the security sector and hence the need to take a broader picture. Oversight, he said, was a chain of activities with many actors, hence the need for partnership. Parliamentary oversight therefore did not occur in isolation but in collaboration with other institutions that have also not been performing for a long time.

To overcome the aforementioned challenge, he proposed clarity about these roles (who does what and when, relating to oversight); and secondly capacity building had to occur comprehensively, across a chain of institutions and activities, rather than being focused narrowly on the Parliament and its committees. While parliament is indeed the crucible of accountability, the reality is that (regardless of how capable and energetic parliament itself may be), parliamentary oversight will not occur if institutions whose functions feed into and underpin the work of parliament do not perform. He added that there was also the need for partnership between the civilians and the security institutions. He emphasised that historically, civilians have not been able to oblige or coerce security institutions to be compliant. He argued that civil supremacy and oversight were in the corporate interest of the security institutions themselves, had to be recognized as such, and became possible only when this was recognized and actively fostered. This demanded the development of an appropriate professional ethos.

As to what constitutes the security sector of Ghana, Prof Hutchful argued that current literature acknowledges that formal (state) security institutions are not the only sources of security and in many countries (particularly in Africa). The large mass of the people derived their security from private and informal security organs. Indeed, over the last thirty years, virtually all the significant growth in the security sector in Ghana had been in the private and non-formal security sector, particularly private security companies. Beyond these, he identified the village neighbourhood watchdogs, vigilante groups and chiefs that catered to the rural poor and more marginalised in the society. However, across Africa, these non-informal security institutions, he indicated, were almost completely unregulated. He said Ghana has been able progressively to pick up the issue of regulation, but largely because the private security sector itself has been pushing for regulation. In terms of the broader picture, there was therefore the need to appreciate this vast network and subject it to some form of regulation and oversight.

He observed that from a global or continental standpoint, the landscape of parliamentary action (and inaction) was so diverse that meaningful generalization is difficult. However, one generalization that can be made is that parliament everywhere had considerable potential political power in the area of security, if only they knew how to use it. Parliament was unable to tap this formidable well of power because security sector governance was the last and least developed area of democratic governance in most countries due to a variety of historical factors and specific political legacies. Security Sector Governance (SSG) was also particularly liable to erosion and reversal. Thus globally, there has tended to be a wide gap between theory and practice. There was also a wide variation between national parliaments in terms of capacity and willingness to exercise their powers. The scope of parliamentary power was thus context-specific. There was therefore, no universal model for democratic security sector governance though there were a number of

commonly accepted principles. New democratic parliaments (e. South Africa and Poland), he said, were much more energetic and effective in terms of oversight than older parliaments (eg. UK). He indicated that regardless of the context, three things determined parliamentary oversight. The first is the legal framework. He argued that Ghana's legal mechanisms were extremely limited in terms of what parliament should do. There were outdated and uneven Acts governing the security institutions (Armed Forces Act of 1962, Police Service Act of 1970 and Act 526 of 1996). He indicated that the Intelligence Act 526 was the most progressive and accountable, Armed Forces Act was the least unaccountable while the Police Service report was sent to the Ministry of Interior but never got to parliament, and parliament hardly requests for these reports. However, Legal frameworks, he argued, are not useful in the absence of associated policy frameworks.

The second area is that of capacity. Parliament lacked the tools to enable understanding of security issues: the way our security institutions are configured and functions and the nature of security policy and security budgeting.

The third area he noticed was that of political will. He asserted that a parliament must be fearless about exerting its great powers in the area of security. Parliamentarians in Ghana seem to be completely uninterested in security sector oversight (though to him, Senegal is the worst example

He called on participants to view oversight in a broader picture. Oversight, he said, must be seen as a partnership and a process performed by a multiplicity of external and internal agencies. These agencies had to be able to collaborate. There was the need for a clear division of labour among all the civilian agencies involved in oversight including parliament. He also argued that, historically, realizing or arranging compromises and shared understanding among civilian actors had been the most important single problem of civil-security relations. He said, Samuel Huntington in his seminal book, argued that, *"the reason that militaries are so difficult to control is not because militaries do not want to subject themselves to civilian control, but because civilians cannot decide how to use the military. That very often the various civilian factions had an interest in controlling the military themselves in order to use it against their civilian opponents. There is therefore the objective (constitutional) and subjective (when a political party or regime puts the military in its pocket in order to use it against its opponents) control over the military"* He called for a concordat between all the powerful civilian groups so that the military will be beyond politics. Power over the military should be shared in a particular manner among the executive, legislature, judiciary, and the civil society. He stressed, *"We need bi-partisan parliament or else security institutions will be politicised with the source emanating from outside interest."* Without proper interplay between the executive and legislature, parliamentary oversight would not be possible. There was the need for an executive that is responsive to and supportive of parliamentary oversight.

The bigger question he asked was how parliament was going to strategise to force or encourage these recalcitrant outside actors to behave in a way that are more supportive of parliamentary oversight. First, he called for a policy framework and policy implementation from the executive that will confer the strategic aims and benchmarks against which parliament votes money, carries out its monitoring, reviews and assessment. He bemoaned the fact that there had never been a defence, policing and intelligence policies in Ghana, hence budgeting in these institutions takes place in the dark and approved by parliament in the dark.

Other elements he spoke of were the internal and external independent oversight. There was a whole range of institutions within the security institutions that carried out internal oversight that fell within the area of the executive. There were also external oversight activities (CHRAJ, Public Service Commission, Civil Service Commission, and Auditor-General) that fed into parliamentary oversight.

Another area of concern was the regular reporting to parliament that was already captured in some of the service Acts. He was of the opinion that the culture of secrecy made it almost impossible for parliament to get the most basic information. He said when parliament called ministers to answer questions in parliament, ministers especially those of defence gave unsatisfactory answers to questions posed. He also touched on responsiveness to parliamentary directives. He said there was a long record officialdom never bordering to act when parliament initiates a set of inquiries and come with its findings. This clearly indicated that oversight has no teeth or no enforcement. Other actors he identified included a strong judiciary though it was a passer-by. It was needed to ensure rule of law. He however noted overly dysfunctional justice systems in most countries.

The third institutional actors he identified were the civil society and the media. Across Africa, civil society was emerging as an important player in the security sector and that includes the ASDR and ASSN. He charged Parliamentarians to see the civil society as an important player in terms of research, training, education and analysis. He spoke of the external actors who were not national actors but had put security sector governance on the agenda. However, he argued that much of this was rhetoric rather than substance since external actors talk of building parliamentary capacity but very little extended to defence and security committees.

Prof Hutchful further made two observations. According to him, responsive and accountable security institutions and agencies that were compliant to oversight and see oversight as not only legitimate but also in their corporate interest were essential. Parliament must therefore, be seen as a useful ally by security institutions. This can only happen if the security institutions see parliament as a useful and relevant actor. However, many security personnel spoke dismissively of parliament. He noted that Parliament could be counterweight to executive dominance instead of the executive co-opting and capturing security institutions that was the worst problem faced in Africa.

Secondly, the instrument of oversight varies from security agency to agency. Oversight was institution specific because the functions of the security institutions varied. Oversight could be effective in some areas and defective in other areas. He emphasised that, there was no oversight framework for intelligence in Ghana. He added that disciplined and well-run professional security institutions were more likely to be compliant to oversight than undisciplined, anomic, chaotic and ill-run security sector. He said, "*Parliament therefore was the crucible of transformation of the very quality of security sector governance. Its powers of moral suasion, its convening powers and sanctions were capable of disciplining institutions and also creating a forum for partnership.*"

In his conclusion, he charged participants to think more broadly in terms of security sector governance rather than narrowly in terms of parliamentary oversight. He said many organizations contributed to security sector governance and parliament was only one organization. He argued that parliament was not the only organization that was challenged but the whole management of the

security. There was therefore, the need to build capacity comprehensively rather than restricting it to parliament.

The chair thanked the speaker and called for questions and comment from participants. A participant asked why ASDR did not issue communiqués and press statements on national security issues. He also wanted to know why campaigning was not allowed in the barracks. In an answer, the Executive Director of ASDR said the outfit was interested in capacity building workshops rather than issuing statements and engaging in media rhetoric. In response to the latter, a participant said that women in the barracks were free to engage in party activities outside the barracks but not within to avoid politicising the military. Another participant called for the strengthening and restructuring of the security institutions to make them more efficient and effective since these were core to any democracy. The next question from a participant had to do with the way forward after the workshop since a number of workshops have been held with no solid and visible achievements. In an answer to this, the Executive Director of ASDR indicated that new committees formed always led to the loss of institutional memory. He said there was also the suppression of free speech in parliament depriving parliamentarians of the opportunity to ask sensitive security questions. He added that there was lack of political will on the part of the ‘powers that be’. He therefore, called on parliament to devise strategies to overcome these challenges.

## **Section 2**

***First Speaker - Lt. Col. E. W. Kotia, GAFCS***

***Topic: “Desirable Roles of the Legislature over Defence”***

Lt Col EW Kotia indicated that in most liberal democratic political systems, the Legislature was one of the three arms of government. The other two arms were the Executive and the Judiciary. In political systems in which the principle of separation of powers is enshrined in constitutions, legislatures are normally granted the power to raise and support the armed forces of a country. He cited Article 210 of the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana as an example that stipulates that, only parliament could raise an armed force. The importance of legislatures to defence is therefore, self-evident. He argued that constitutional and political arrangements in a particular country were influential factors that determined how legislations are shaped by the legislature of any democratic state. Another influential factor he identified depended on whether the government of a particular state is practising a presidential or parliamentary system of government.

Specifically, legislatures were responsible for debating and passing defence legislations after the executive had submitted proposals for consideration. Once bills were presented and given a second reading, they were passed to the specialised committee on Defence, which took evidence, considered memoranda from various groups and civil society, before the committee reports back to the full legislature with its recommendations. Some areas of defence legislations he enumerated included; military laws to regulate the Armed Forces, procurement of major defence equipment, approval to participate in foreign/international operations, enactment of a defence policy to protect the national interest and defence strategic reviews. He said Legislatures in most transitional democracies have used their legislative powers to pass important legislations on defence issues. He noticed in some democracies, it is not surprising for major policy decisions on defence to be taken by the executive without the knowledge of the legislature. He argued that Defence Committees

were created in most legislatures to support the work of the legislature with jurisdiction almost matching the Defence Ministry. Defence Committees in most countries did not have a formal role in legislation. Its formal functions were defined as monitoring the expenditure, policy and administration of the Ministry of Defence and associated public bodies and making recommendations although it could not comment on any defence-related issue. The committee effectively undertakes most of the oversight functions of the legislature. He indicated that in a country like Germany, the Defence Committee was the only legislative committee mandated by the constitution (may be because of its history in the world wars), whilst in Ghana it was created under the Standing Orders of Parliament. He noted that Defence Committees examined issues more critically and the smaller size of the committee usually facilitated compromises between different political divides. He mentioned that Legislatures in most modern democracies vote for the defence budget in its entirety. Even though departmental expenditure may be scrutinised by the Defence Committee or the Accounts Committee (depending on the tradition of each state), the committees had no direct power over the expenditure vote, he claimed. He observed that weapon procurement worldwide had ceased to be the preserve of the Armed Forces and the Defence Ministry of any democratic state. The procurement process in most established democracies was effectively divided between the legislature and Defence Ministries. The important lesson here was, he emphasised, that the legislature and the public were much better informed about how procurement process worked and why certain decisions were taken. The legislature was therefore better placed to approve estimates for new equipment. In some states however, he said, because of the resistance by the executive to provide information on vital procurements, the legislature was denied its constitutional duty of oversight in procurement of defence equipment. This he saw evident in most emerging democracies which had transited especially from military regimes. Citing Ghana as an example, he said the government purchased an executive aircraft for the Air Force without the knowledge of parliament in late 1999. Parliament and civil society groups protested vehemently against the process and the aircraft was resold eventually.

He opined that apart from legislation, oversight and budgetary roles, the legislature in some democratic states might have the duty of vetting and approving of appointments and promotions of officers in the armed forces to high command positions. These appointments, he indicated, were normally the prerogative of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In contrast, the Armed Forces Council in Ghana (constitutional body) recommends to the President, officers due for promotion to the rank of Colonel and above, whilst the President solely appoints the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Service Commanders in consultation with the Council of State.

An emerging role of the legislature in modern democracies he identified was the right of declaration of a State of Emergency and the deployment of the military internally at the request of the executive. In view of the history of the misuse of the military to suppress internal opposition in most developing states in the recent past, most liberal democratic constitutions demand for legislative approval before a State of Emergency is declared by the executive to quell domestic insurrections, violence or disturbances. He observed that, in some states, the executive alone had the right to declare a state of emergency, whilst in other states the legislature had to sanction the deployment of the military in case of internal conflicts. Yet in another circumstance, the President can declare a state of emergency and deploy the military immediately, however the legislature would have to sanction such a move within a specified period. He said that despite the positive roles

that legislatures had played over the years, there were several challenges they encountered over their democratic control of defence in most countries. Most of these challenges equally affected developed democracies and transiting or new democracies.

He noted, firstly that, *“the legislature was placed at a disadvantaged position over its oversight role because it lacked the access to expertise and information on defence issues. The executive shrouds information in secrecy and prevents the legislature from accessing. It influences the withholding of information from the legislature using the protection of national security as an excuse.”* Secondly, *“the effectiveness of the legislature’s control over defence will depend very much on the expertise and effectiveness of the select committee on defence”*. Most members of Defence Committees, he argued, were naive with defence and particularly military matters. The third challenge that legislatures faced was the lack of qualified parliamentary staff (researchers, expertise and administrative staff). This setback had had a serious effect on the supervisory role of most legislatures in developing countries. He indicated that the legislature’s role in the area of defence is indisputable. The legislature had jurisdiction over policy, oversight, budget issues, procurement of defence equipment, promotions in the armed forces and the deployment of the military in a state of emergency. These areas were necessary for the legislature to exercise its essential role in shaping national security policy and democratic control over the military. In many countries, however, the constitutional and legal framework marginalizes the role of the legislature relative to the executive in formulating and implementing policy. Some legislatures manage to overcome these obstacles and turn their limited legal powers into real authority. He said, while defence committees will benefit from any measures taken to strengthen the legislature as a whole, specific efforts targeted at defence were required to overcome the special challenges posed by this area.

He made the following recommendations to strengthen the overall role of the legislature over defence:

- An organized and informed civil society established in democratic countries to put related military issues on the political agenda of states. This will encourage the legislature to be responsible in the legislative execution of its responsibilities and to press for more powers from the executive.
- Legislatures empowered by constitutions to prevent the executive from using secrecy in the name of national defence to keep information away from the legislature. The enactment of Freedom of Information legislation in modern democracies was the way forward.
- It was important to develop good cooperative relations between members of the legislature, defence officials and civil society involved in the defence sector to ensure partnership to benefit all. Such partnership should be built on mutual learning, respect for one another and the building of trust.
- Governments of new democratic states should increase the budgetary allocation of legislatures to enable them procure the necessary resources to run parliamentary business efficiently.

The chair thanked the speaker and opened the floor for questions and comments.

A participant from the Liberian Parliament commented that though there were challenges facing parliament, parliament equally had tools they could use to overcome those challenges and this included refusing to approve the budget for the executive. Participants were concerned about the lack of information due to the whole business of ‘secrecy’ and national security interest that prevented vital information from being accessed by parliament. In answer, the speaker said it was a dicey situation that needed to be tackled carefully. Generally, participants were optimistic that the passing of the right to information bill would help alleviate the problem. A member remarked that information especially within the military is given only on a *need to know* basis but this did not go down well with most participants who consequently questioned the criterion used in assessing who needs what and when. A participant argued that extensive oversight could be dysfunctional as in the case of the United States. Another participant therefore, advised that, our culture should influence how we oversee the activities and operations of the military.

***Second speaker: Nana Oye Lithur***  
***Topic: “Police Oversight and Accountability”***

She traced policing in Ghana to pre-independence and traditional governance systems. She however said Governor George Maclean introduced formal policing in Ghana in 1831 for economic purposes. By 1871, the police numbered 90 and was formalised into the police force in 1873. She said the force was basically made up of 700 Hausa people from Northern Nigeria and were associated with brutalities and so ended up with the name “buga buga” that literally means beating. She said there was therefore the need for us to interrogate the orientation of the police even at that ‘buga buga’ period. Later, there was the Gold Coast Coastal Marine set up in 1876 and at independence, Kwame Nkrumah started the Africanization process that affected the Police Force and Madjitey became the first Ghanaian police head in 1958. Subsequently there was the 1969 Constitution that established the Police Service and made it a public service with a police council.

She said Article 200 of the 1992 Constitution clearly spells out the mandate of the police service that states, “The Police Service shall be equipped and maintained to perform its traditional role of maintaining law and order” and stressed on the words ‘shall be equipped and maintained’. She asked participants if the police had been adequately equipped to perform this mandatory function. She indicated that the Constitution sets out the procedure for appointing the IGP and creates the Police Council that was a general oversight institution. It also sets out the mandate of the regional police committees. She inquired if all regional police committees had been set up under the new government and the response was NO. She charged the parliamentary select committee to take the matter up.

She spoke of the Police Service Act as the main legislative framework or legal statute for policing that sets out what police values are and what the conduct of police should be in Ghana but pointed out a major defect of the Act. She indicated that the police had drafted a code of conduct but was not incorporated into its service instruction/manual for a long time until recently. She spoke of the Security and Intelligence Act of 1996 that creates National, Regional and District Security

Councils. She said in a case in 2004, the Northern Regional Security Council ordered all arrested individuals in relation to electoral violence to be handed over to the military. Subsequently, Issah Mobila was arrested and handed over to the military. This order to her was unlawful according to the Security and Intelligence Act since they did not have the mandate to order suspects in police custody to be handed over to the military. She was puzzled why neither parliament nor civil society organizations nor government had looked at what was the cause or trail of the death of Issah Mobila.

She touched on some of the ills of the police. She noticed a routine disobedience to procedural law. There were also countless examples of police brutalities and torture, she claimed. There were also acts of extra-judicial killings. There was corruption and the police was viewed as the most corrupt institution of the state, she argued. There was lack of both equipment and human resources. The UN ratio of police to civilian was 1:500 while that of Ghana, as at 2005 was 1:1160. There was also a problem with capacity and training. She indicated that, DOVVSU set up in 1998, has regional branches in all the 10 regions and has handled over 104,000 cases. In spite of their enormous task, aside Accra and Ashanti, none of the remaining 8 regions had vehicles to aid their activities. She attributed all these problems of the police to lack of effective accountability mechanisms and strong oversight institutions. She observed over seventeen police enquiry reports with recommendations for police reforms but there was a challenge with the implementation of these recommended reforms. Though a lot has happened, she asserted that there was lack of documentation to track what has happen.

She advocated for democratic policing which she thought was consistent with our values and what we hope to be as a country. The concept of democratic policing sees the police as protectors of the rights of citizens and as upholders and respecters of rule of law. Nevertheless, she observed that *“Ghana’s police answer to the regime in power because nobody watches over them”*. She applauded the oversight role the media was playing in this direction. She called for the police to be answerable to the law and democratic government structures and the community. She was against the idea of the Deputy Minister of Information being the spokesperson of the BNI that has been delinked from the police and brought under National Security. She called for the police to be transparent in their activities especially their budgeting. She also indicated the difficulty in assessing information from the police (eg. police 5- year development). She however acknowledged the efforts of some of the police personnel.

She called for executive, legislative, judicial, internal, and an independent external control over the police and some form of social accountability. Though there was Police Intelligence and Professional Standards Bureau, she called for external mechanism where there will be a complaint commission manned by independent people. She indicated that there was the need to seriously think about police accountability since Ghana had a powerful executive that could lead to patronize police service. She called for a clear policy direction from the executive and called on parliament to ensure that is done since they had the powers.

She spoke on the police council and called for more deliberations on their independence and constitution. She was strongly against the membership of the IGP on the council, which to her could not make the council truly independent. She called for a close examination of the appointment and dismissal of the IGP and said too much power was vested in the IGP. She noticed inconsistencies

with the Police Service Act and the 1992 Constitution as to who chairs the Police Council and called for reconciliation of the two.

She also indicated that though CHRAJ is an external accountability mechanism, its effectiveness is limited due to its numerous roles. The Ministry of Interior to her has not been too effective though there have been a number of inquiries; no one knows what happens next after these inquiries.

On *Question Time* in Parliament, she said there was a heavy focus on resources and funding as against operations and effectiveness of the police (all 14 questions asked the Minister of Interior in 2006 focused on funding). The Parliamentary Select Committee on Defence and Interior to her, was the most critical external oversight institution. She indicated however that, the select committee had been disengaged from its police accountability role in 2006 and 2007. It was only in 2006 that the annual report of the police got to parliament. She said, “*Police fails to submit reports and the select committee also fails to demand these reports*”. Though the select committee had investigative powers, the select committee had never conducted investigations into police misconducts, she claimed. She appreciated the challenges that confront the select committee especially ‘secrecy’ of information but asserted there were opportunities to overcome the challenges.

She invited her colleague, Mina Mensah, to take over.

***Third Speaker: Mina Mensah (Project Officer, CHRI)***

***Topic: “CHRI’s Police Accountability Project and Its Impact”***

Mrs Mensah said in 2005, the Africa Office commenced a project on enhancing police accountability in Ghana aimed at initiating reform in the Ghana Police Service (GPS) in accordance with modern principles of democratic governance and international human rights. CHRI started facilitating advocacy to ensure increased awareness and acceptance of human rights norms and the rule of law of the GPS. CHRI hoped that upon completion of the project there would be increased public debate and demand for greater police accountability.

The purpose of the project was to develop a responsive and accountable Police Service in Ghana. Its main activities included identifying the legal framework in the Ghanaian context that best ensure human rights and the rule of law as guiding principles for governing the police and developing and disseminating educational and advocacy materials, campaigning for policy reform, building a network of civil society organizations committed to police accountability. She said CHRI had published a research report titled “The Police, the People the Politics - Police Accountability in Ghana”. The report according to her had revealed three major gaps to the accountability of the GPS: inadequate resourcing, inadequate support for internal accountability structures and weak external accountability mechanisms. She indicated that CHRI was engaged in advocacy on improving police accountability in Ghana, Consultative and Advocacy meetings with stakeholders including Government, Ghana Police Service, Police Council, BNI, and NGOs. Advocacy Documents of CHRI included: Advocacy towards the establishment of a Police Council, Memoranda to Georgina Wood, Dansoman and the Kotobabi Shooting Committees, Memoranda to Minister of National Security on Instant Justice and Memoranda to Appointment Committee during vetting of Interior Minister designate in 2009. It also includes articles in the print media, letter to

the IGP on the decentralisation of PIPS, Fact Finding Missions on Police Brutality in Takoradi Polytechnic, Jayee Institute, The Ga Mashie Violence and Anloga Violence where 98 people were randomly arrested and brutalized. Its educational materials included booklets, posters, brochures, Radio and TV Commercials on PIPS.

The impact of the project had been enormous she claimed. There has been increased knowledge of current specific obstacles to police accountability, increased knowledge and acceptance among stakeholders of new arrangements to improve accountability, increased demand for Police Reform and the Georgina Wood Committee in paragraph 9.4 of its final report included CHRI's recommendations. A new Police Council was appointed, a more 'open' Police Service, Specific Reform Initiatives and Increased media discourse on issues relating to Policing in a democratic dispensation are all part of the success story of the project. In addition, there is increased capacity of CBO's to educate communities on their rights and responsibilities relating to the work of the police, increased knowledge on Rights of arrested persons, Increase Knowledge of availability of reporting agencies and a more aware civil society. She concluded by saying that over the past years civil society consciousness on issues of policing and the need for change has increased. More is demanded of the police in terms of accountability and the way they perform their mandate. Moreover, the GPS itself is more open and responsive than it used to be. This in part was due to some of the activities that the Africa office had undertaken which places issues of policing on the national agenda through newspaper reviews, radio and TV programmes and panel discussions.

The chair called for comments and questions on the two presentations.

A participant wanted to know why the IGP should not be a member of the Police Council. In answer, Nana Oye argued that she wondered how the council could be independent with the IGP as a member. She preferred the IGP having an observer status during council meetings. A parliamentarian corrected the impression created by the presentation that parliament was silent on the absence or delay in constituting the police council in 2006. He said he took the matter up after a similar workshop and just about that time, the council was constituted. Calling for a policing policy, a participant noted that the real problem of the police was not really resources but rather extreme internal mismanagement. Another participant expressed concern about why the presenter, Nana Oye, only cited examples of police brutalities in the erstwhile regime and not the current administration. There was a question as to how to draw the line between traditions and culture. A participant therefore suggested that, there was the need to closely examine the link between customs and traditions and human rights since our thinking did not always go with the legal provisions. He also indicated that most administrative corruption in the police service could be addressed by administrative rules. A participant from the Ministry of Interior indicated that the ministry consolidates the various reports from Fire, Prisons, Police and NADMO into the ministry's annual performance report and sent them to the head of the civil service who ensured they are made available to parliament. He assured participants that he would also make available a copy of the police strategic plan. He informed participants that the IGP was coming out with institutional reforms to salvage the image of the police.

***Fourth Speaker: Ecoma Alaga, WIPSEN***

***Topic: “The Role of Parliament in Gender Sensitive Security Oversight “***

Ms. Alaga indicated that modern pattern of warfare has seen a major shift from inter-state to intra state conflicts and this brings to mind the changing focus from state centred security to human centred security. It was important therefore, to look at the narratives from which security policy making were drawn. To her, parliament does have a significant role to play in this process, particularly in generating people-centred security narratives that inform security policy making. In her bid to clear some myth about gender, she opined that gender was not a woman’s issue but a basic tool of analysis that says what the particular priorities of the particular groups in the society are. She said, gender was used to identify gaps and noticed that security, particularly because of our cultural background, has been the preserve of men. She also said security issues are not the same for all the identified groups in the society.

Society and culture has apportioned responsibilities to the different groups especially man and woman category. There was the need to understand the sex and gender roles of man and woman as she noted that sex roles are limiting, as they are biologically determined. Gender roles to her however, were culture specific. Gender as a tool therefore acknowledges and responds to the different security needs of the various gender groups. This to her will enhance accountability to all the groups. To her, incorporation of gender ensures the full and equal participation within the security sector of both men and women. Participation was not just about who was involved but also whose protection security policy served (state, regime or citizens). It further ensures operational effectiveness in the security sector. She emphasized the need to build partnership and consultative processes that is crucial in driving local ownership and leadership to ensure sustainability.

She argued that if parliament could play their oversight role on the security sector, (approving budget, reviewing legislations, etc), then it needs to critically understand and incorporate gender issues into its processes.

She spoke on gender based violence that occurs in the security institutions but indicated that there was denial by the security agencies. She was particularly concerned about the poor representation of women on Ghana’s parliamentary select committee on defence and interior and indicated that all the respective gender groups must be consulted in order to make security policies need based and inclusive. She suggested a participatory approach by encouraging civil society groups especially women groups to be involved by setting mechanism for public hearings and debates. She also advocated for parliamentarians to make themselves available to their constituents especially women. She called for the use of gender inclusive language such as chairperson and ombudsperson rather than chairman and ombudsman respectively. She argued that analysing security budget through the gender lens (Gender budgeting) was important for recognizing the different needs of male and females.

In building representative and effective security sector institutions, she advocated for comprehensive gender training for security sector personnel. She called for initiatives to increase the recruitment, retention and advancement of women in the security sector. She called on parliament to monitor the level of implementation of international, regional and national commitment concerning full and equal participation of women in the security environment.

She also called on parliament to identify and address issues relating to gender based violence and pass a legislation encompassing all issues of gender base violence and include gender based violence in the mandate of truth and reconciliation commissions and special courts. She argued for a clarification of the definition of rape. (Liberia had a rape policy that was clear on the definition of rape)

She indicated that security sector personnel and institutions could be held accountable for preventing and responding to gender based violence through Policy formulation; reviewing code of conduct; monitoring, complaint and punishing violators of human rights; establishing inquiries and ombudsperson. She also called for a sexual harassment policy, human resource/recruiting policy, etc. She finally cited Ghana's DOVVSU as good example of institutional structures that caters for gender and called for clear communication channels.

The chair called for deliberations on the presentation.

A participant indicated that rape had become a massive weapon for war in conflict areas and called for measures to address it. Another participant also indicated that religion played a significant role in undermining women in society and called for a change of mindset. He expressed worry about the fact that participants knew what to do to address the gender issue in the security sector but were not doing them. A participant said the UN was taking measures to address gender issues especially rape that are associated with Peace Support Operations. He informed participants that there was special training on sexual harassment during peace operations. The presenter in response to comments argued strongly that, religion should not in any way be used to justify discrimination against women in the security field. She also called for a comprehensive review of security training manuals to meet the various dynamics in cultures. She however, cautioned that competence should not be sacrificed on the altar of participation and inclusion.

## **DAY 2**

### **Section 1**

***Speaker: Mr. Ernest Ansah Lartey – KAIPTC***

***Topic: Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector – A Lesson from Ghana***

He apologised for his absence on the 1<sup>st</sup> day and remarked that his presentation would focus on a paper he co-authored with Dr. E. Aning in 2008. The paper focused on Ghana but touched on ECOWAS and AU as well. He said Security Sector Reform (SSR) started in the colonial days especially with the occurrence of the 1948 riots. The riots caused the colonial administration to put an internal intelligence unit that continued until the 1992 Constitution. He indicated the police, military and governance institutions as the actors in the security sector.

He used the 3A's approach (Authority, Ability and Attitude) to deal with his topic. In terms of authority, he looked at the legal framework within which parliament carried out its oversight roles over the security sector. He made mention of Article 200 (2) of the 1992 Constitution that empowers parliament to be the sole institution to raise an army or police force in the country. He was however concerned about the recent phenomenon of macho men and land guards especially

those associated with political parties. He indicated that parliament had some rights and privileges of the high courts to compel persons to give evidence on any matter under investigations. Though he made mention of the Intelligence Act (Act 526), he observed that the Constitution was silent on the intelligence units and wondered how parliament could perform oversight over these units. The act compelled the Minister of Interior to submit report to parliament but this is rarely done.

On Parliament's ability he considered issues of human, financial and technical resources. He questioned the composition of the parliament Select committee on Defence and Interior as to how many of them were women and how many of them had the technical know-how to for oversight of the security sector. He also expressed worry at the frequent changes in the membership of the select committee especially after elections and lamented how it affects their efficiency and effectiveness. Turnover rate in 1996 was 64% and 2000 was 44% and that gravely impeded building institutional memory. He was also concerned about the dual functioning of parliamentarians as ministers. He was of the view that the executive was most of the time well resourced than parliament though parliament approved monies for the executive. Parliamentarians therefore, could not undertake research to aid their activities of oversight. He wondered if knowledge was available for parliamentarians to enhance their capacity.

On the third A – Attitude; he touched on the political will of parliament for checking accountability and transparency. Political polarization, morality, ethics were necessary issues to consider if parliament could perform its parliamentary oversight role.

In conclusion, he touched on a number of challenges to parliamentary oversight of the security sector but highlighted party loyalty and secrecy of information as the major challenges. He called for a balance of interplay of parliamentary authority, ability and attitude.

The chairperson called for comments and questions on the presentation.

A participant asked what an armed force was. In response, a participant argued that there was no clarity on what an arm was. He however, called for regulation of the informal insecurity sector. He also indicated that security intelligence reports are not submitted annually, as it ought to be due to party influence. The first report submitted was in 1998. The participant was also worried about the nexus between the national security coordinator and advisor and noted that the advisor was not accountable to parliament. The presenter was against the national security coordinator sitting on a party's committee since he ought to be neutral. To this end, all participants called for attitudinal change on the part of all stakeholders. A parliamentarian participant also called for clarity on what constituted national security. Another MP raised concern about vigilante groups surging and causing harm in his constituency, and called on authorities to act. A participant also claimed that there was the gradual erosion of the trust people had in the formal security agencies and this needed to be addressed urgently. There was a call on the security institutions to liaise with the select committee on defence and interior to enhance efficiency in the security sector. There was also the concern about members of parliament being ministers and sitting on more than a committee in parliament. This invariably reduced their efficiency and performance.

## **THE LIBERIAN EXPERIENCE**

An MP from Liberia said oversight was unthinkable in Liberia until 1980 when there was a transition and parliament begun to assert itself drawing its strength from Act 34 of their Constitution. This was largely because Liberia until 1980 was a one party state led by the minority settlers. The legislature then was a conveyor belt or rubber stamp of the executive. He indicated that the Liberian Legislature currently was a bicameral one with 30 Senators two from each county forming the Upper House and 64 Representatives forming the Lower House. The ruling party did not dominate parliament he indicated. The Liberian legislature had the power of contempt and had exercised that power to discipline executive members following due process (some were jailed for up to 48 hours for contempt). He indicated that they had the power to subpoena members of the executive when the need be. He made mention of how well the members of the legislature were resourced as compared to the Ghanaian case to perform their duties (good salaries, fuel and not less than 14 staff). He also mentioned that the president could not declare a state of emergency without the consent of the speaker and must be brought before parliament within 7 days for approval or otherwise. The budget of the executive was an open document that included those of the state security agencies. He however said they were challenged by the power of veto vested in the presidency though a two-third majority of parliamentary vote can override it. He also mentioned capacity as a big challenge as members of parliament usually employ not based on qualification but party affiliation and support during campaign. He also said most of the MPs were first timers and therefore lacked experience. He also touched on executive manoeuvring that could be worse when ruling party had the majority in parliament and cautioned Ghanaian parliamentarians against it. At this point, the chairperson called for contribution and questions.

In his contribution, a participant noted that development comes about when there is commitment and called for commitment on the part of the participants wherever they find themselves. Another participant was however worried about the gender sensitivity in the Liberian parliament. There was the assurance that a lot was being done to address gender issue across board in the country.

The chairperson brought discussions to a close and the participants went into their respective working groups.

### **Section 2: Thematic Working Groups:**

#### ***GROUP 1: Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Lessons from Ghana***

The group's presentation was in two parts: the first part touched on the issues hampering parliamentary oversight and the second part focused on their recommendations.

On the issues hampering parliamentary oversight, the group indicated the following:

1. Lack of national security policy that inhibits parliament capacity to do checks and balances as it ought to do

2. Difficulty in co-ordinating the various service councils as they operated independently. They indicated that the National Security Council now functioned as an operational agency rather than a co-ordinating agency. This, they said, was aided by executive manoeuvring due to the fusion of powers we operate in the country. They mentioned some of the security agencies (police and military) were supporting peace operation outside the shore of Ghana without parliamentary control.
3. Overlap of agency functions: they said CEPS was operating under the Ministry of Finance, the Police operated under the Ministry of the Interior while BNI operated under the National Security council.
4. Difficulty in auditing security institutions especially military stock
5. The delay in the delivery of the Auditor-General's report to parliament

They recommended the following:

1. Co-ordination and information sharing among committees of parliament
2. A thorough scrutiny of the defence budget and others by parliament
3. Submission of performance report to parliament on quarterly basis
4. Adequate regulation of the informal security sector by the police and the Ministry of Interior
5. A clear cut distinction between what security was meant for and the issue of rule of law and justice
6. Bringing the intelligence services under the control of parliament
7. A policy guideline for parliament to aid them in their oversight role
8. A sense of focus by parliament so as to concentrate on specific essentials

***GROUP TWO: Executive- Legislature relationships needed to make Parliamentary oversight more effective***

The group defined oversight as powers conferred on a select committee of parliament to oversee. It included investigation, making inquiries, monitoring and auditing the performance of a sector related to the ministry to perform their duties according to the appropriate legal framework.

In discussing what kind of relationship that needed to exist between the executive and the legislature to make parliamentary oversight more effective, they made the following suggestions:

1. The group called for a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislature.
2. They appealed to ASDR to make proposals to the constitutional review committee on this subject.
3. They advocated for regular consultation and interaction with the executive and related institutions especially women's groups.

4. They charged parliament to demand for the submission of regular and timely reports from the various security agencies.
5. They also called for a strategic defence, police and national security policies that should be periodic and renewed every 4 years.
6. They also called for regular flow of information between the executive and the legislature.
7. They charged parliament to have oversight responsibility on procurement within the security agencies (such as specialised vehicles and fire tenders) and even suggested that parliament should have representatives accompanying the purchase of equipment.
8. They also called on parliament to oversee peace support operations and if possible send representatives to mission centres.
9. They also called for parliament to be resourced with researcher and equipment

On how parliament could build their capacity, they recommended the following:

1. Capacity building workshops for committee members and their staff
2. Adequate financial resources and provision of necessary facilities such as infrastructure  
Exposure of the workings of the select committee to the workings of other parliaments
3. Attachment of technical staff and experts to the select committee

***GROUP THREE: Policy development: What are the policy gaps? What role can/should Parliament play?***

The group defined a policy as a set of ideas documented to meet current and future trends in order to mitigate events that confront us such as issues of human rights, good health, right to education, etc. They also defined security as freedoms and liberties guaranteed by the constitution. It also meant the absence of threats to an individual's aspirations, freedoms and liberties. In defining national security, their focus was on the national interest. They defined national interest as a plan of action for all and according to Ghana's constitution were about protection of life, right to work, healthy economy, etc. They argued that there was the need to develop a national security policy and the central government had to lead this policy by looking at instruments available to us and the instruments needed for tomorrow.

On the issue of gaps that exist, the group noticed that

1. The procedures and processes of practice in parliament itself constituted a gap. A question put to a minister could take several (8 - 9 months) months before an answer is given.
2. They also mentioned the differences in the various security policies as each security agency had its own policies they pursue. There was therefore no holistic national security policy.

3. There is no clear definition of the boundaries of national security; the role of the security agencies (police, fire service and immigration) hence duplicating of efforts. They argued that the National Security Council should be a think-tank for all the security agencies but they are seen as operatives, which is a big gap.
4. They also made mention of lack of information flow and conditions of tenure of both parliament and parliamentary staff as well as the security service.

On the question of way forward, the group recommended the following

1. Reviewing all subsidiary legislation on the various security sectors
2. Proper co-ordination and the real role of the national security secretariat is to serve as a think tank and not an operative
3. They called on Parliamentarians to lead the way of advocacy on behalf of their representatives

The chairperson called for contributions and questions on all the three presentations.

A participant called for collaborative effort among all the committees in parliament to enhance oversight by parliament. He also appealed to ASDR to organize such workshops for all the committees in parliament engaged in oversight roles. There was a general agreement that oversight was not time bound. It ought to be carried out always and as and when the need be. A participant also reiterated that security was diverse and involved diverse groups and institutions. He wondered if Ghana was prepared to deal with security issues that arise because of natural diseases. He called on the various security institutions (police and military) and the non-security institutions such as NADMO and CEPS to work together to ensure the security needs of Ghanaians are catered for. Some members were concerned about the operations of the national security whether it was a coordinating unit or an operative itself. They called for clarification. A participant also indicated that Conflict and Crisis Management course was being run by the GAFSCS and entreated parliament to take interest in it. He also indicated that there was a serious confusion between the CEPS and Immigration as to who controls the borders. He called for immediate remedy to safeguard the borders of Ghana. A participant requested ASDR to organize a workshop to discuss what constituted national security. He called for clearly defined roles of the state security institutions and private security organizations. A participant bemoaned the fact that the drug trade had been ignored in discussing security matters. He called on parliament to have an oversight role on NACOB. He informed participants that a woman had been arrested with 80 kg (\$4.8 million) of heroin concealed in jeer box. He indicated that NACOB was so poorly resourced and remunerated that it is tempting for some staff to connive with drug traffickers. A participant sympathized with NACOB and said it was a general problem in Ghana. On a lighter note, he called on NACOB to work diligently as their reward was in 'heaven'.

In conclusion, the chairperson thanked all the participants and charged them to take up the recommendations seriously after the workshop to the appropriate quarters.