REPORT OF THE HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA MIDTERM REVIEW WORKSHOP

6-8 June 2016
Ambassador Hotel, Hargeisa, Somaliland
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Overview

The midterm review workshop of the Hybrid Security Governance in Africa research project (HSG) was held in Hargeisa, Somaliland, from 6-8 June 2016. It was organized by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the Academy for Peace and Development (APD), a Hargeisa-based think tank and HSG project member responsible for Somaliland, with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC).

Welcome remarks by Professor Eboe Hutchful, project leader and His Excellency, Adam Jibril, Ambassador of the Somaliland Republic to Ethiopia and project member, preceded an open discussion in which researchers shared their field experiences and received feedback from mentors and reviewers. One strong thread in all the narratives was the duality of political contexts and certain factors (examples: Ebola, perceptions of target populations toward research, security and hybridity in particular) and experiences (example: being (perceived as) an outsider) as simultaneous challenges and opportunities. At the core of the workshop were researchers’ presentations of their midterm papers and substantive discussions, guided by the project’s leaders, of research approaches, research findings and analysis, areas of convergence and divergence among the project countries, and the policy implications of individual papers as well as the collective body of work emerging from the project. Throughout the workshop, formal presentations and discussions were accompanied by less formal individual and mini-group exchanges between and among senior and junior researchers, research supervisors, independent expert participants and the project’s leaders.

The location of the midterm review workshop in Somaliland, a young, fiercely patriotic nation not yet formally recognized as a state was symbolic of the relative novelty of the subject and exploratory study of hybrid security in Africa. It was also an opportunity to engage and observe the context and realities of hybridity and statebuilding in what is admittedly a keystone case study for this project. While some members of the team were unavoidably absent, including Okey Ibeanu (research supervisor, Nigeria and member, HSG advisory group), Awino Okech (gender expert, and member, HSG advisory group) and Boubacar Ndiaye (Chair, ASSN), the workshop benefitted from the new presences of Cannyce Oyieyi (co-researcher with HE Jibril and Mohammed Farah Hersi on Somaliland), Jimam Lar (expert on nonstate actors, Nigeria) and Oluwole Ojewale (replaces Nengak Daniel, CLEEN). IDRC programme officer, Ramata Thioune, was also unable to attend. The
participants list, agenda, project research questions, original and revised project timelines and some general observations and recommendations are appended to this report.
As Eboe explained, the tardy addition to the agenda of this session was informed by three key factors: (1) Observations that there has not been enough sharing on the diverse but comparable research experiences from the different project sites; (2) The need to conceive, based on preliminary research findings signaling its variegated nature, a more universal (and flexible) concept of hybridity that acknowledges its history, context and construction in different environments, and (3) The need to air and address disparities in the quality of the research papers with a view to ensuring more uniform intellectual output(s).

This discussion was guided by the following questions with more feedback on some than others, including an unstated question about what challenges researchers faced in the field:

1. Did the concept of Hybrid Security Orders (HSO)/HSG (as well as the research design) remain relevant once you got out in the field?
2. To what extent do you feel that your field research is actually answering the project questions?
3. What have been the drivers of HSO/G in your particular study, and do these appear to be universal or strictly contextual (important to ponder this as some have viewed ‘hybridity’ as a ‘promiscuous’ concept)?
4. Where do you envision the politics of HSG moving in the future in your case study?
5. To what extent has the project built your (or your Centre’s) research capacity, and how?
6. Advisory Group members and supervising/senior researchers are asked to weigh in on their experiences of mentoring the researchers (responses on this featured throughout the discussions, not just in this session, and are collated here for ease of reading).

Feedback from researchers, reported below by country, was mixed but revealed enough similarities to validate the usefulness of the sessions. In hindsight, many of the original guiding questions were unanswered. To forestall this, it might have been more useful to take them one at a time or display them by flipchart or projector as a prompt.

In Sierra Leone, the Ebola crisis, not unlike the challenges experienced by other researchers, was both a challenge and an opportunity for the research and for the reality of hybridity and other aspects of life in Sierra Leone. Ebola distorted research schedules and restricted access to research participants due to constraints on physical contact. Fredline (researcher, secret societies) had to leave Sierra Leone and was not allowed back by her institution, limiting her access for a time to the field. Ebola also obstructed relationships between formal and informal governance.
and security actors. Yet it exposed the need for more comprehensive, multilevel reactions, thereby enabling the integration of women and traditional leaders (chiefs) into response strategies which were initially dominated by the state and thus had limited effect. The Ebola crisis also helped to halt female genital cutting and allowed researchers to observe security hybridity deconstruct, alter, and reconstruct in response to the threat.

Perceptions of Fredline as an outsider restricted her access to the secret societies that she is researching but positioned her as a neutral confidante of their resentment at being marginalized by other actors—a factor of their apparent reluctance to help even where opportunities exist. Her work revealed how state policies controlling the actions of nonstate actors make clear the no-go areas but have also created lots of grey areas where nonstate actors are unsure what they can and cannot do.

Osman found it difficult to translate the concept of hybridity into practice with regard to the three groups that he researched: community defence forces (CDFs), chiefs and chiefdom security committees (CHISECs).

Freida also experienced access challenges in Liberia due to Ebola but also to internal conflicts around her identity as a non-Liberian and staff of an international organization and the logistical difficulty of travelling to parts of the country rendered minimally accessible by heavy rain. She found that certain NGOs were pointedly unresponsive, possibly out of research fatigue with the topic of SGBV, or because they found the concept of hybridity confusing or daunting, or both. A paucity of data on land from women’s perspectives made it difficult for Freida to define hybridity in Liberia and she faced the extra challenge of dividing her time between the HSG project, a full time job and her doctoral studies.

Negative perceptions affected research in Somaliland too. On one hand, state research participants were reluctant to give security related information because they thought that researchers sought to assess security provisioning in the country. On the other, researchers noted some research fatigue, expectations of quick outcomes from the research—including the official recognition of Somaliland—and queries about the benefits to Somalilanders of foreign research monies (some people asked openly for money). The concept of research was new to some participants and the team tried to build their confidence using detailed explanations.

Informal actors (women, sheikhs) were more receptive. The team could only access one of several targeted regions in the country due to insufficient funds, and it had no access at all to the military and intelligence services on grounds that any information they might give was too sensitive. Time limitations and professional conflicts informed the hiring of a lead consultant and assistant researchers, none of whom attended the Accra inception workshop. Researchers drew two main
conclusions: that “hybridity is real and really working in Somaliland with widespread acceptance, mutual respect and understanding of the intersections and limits among various actors”, and that historical and conceptual issues and constructions of hybridity vary in different parts of Somaliland.

The Boko Haram insurgency eclipsed access to the key site of Borno state in Nigeria. Aishatu reported a bomb attack two kilometres away from her hotel on the night of her first field visit. Many political leaders were unavailable as they had left the town because of the insecurity. Religious leaders were reluctant to talk for fear of attacks and victimization as they had no way to tell people apart. Aishatu found it difficult to obtain certain publications, deemed classified, from the National Defence College using official means. Fear of election problems at some point. Access to hisba was initially only possible through the police, whose presence rendered initial meetings so unproductive that the team was forced to arrange repeat bilateral interviews with them. One respondent died in a military operation, making it impossible to contact him for any verification.

In South Africa, heated student protests and an aggressive state response obscured the focus of Xavier’s research and his access to relevant research subjects during one of his visits. He observed some amount of research fatigue, ostensibly informed, at least in part, by a wariness to speak amid unprecedented criticism of the national government, even when he explained that he would hide real identities. People in communities were hesitant to share their experiences about security with researchers, regardless of whether they were scholars or activists.

The research environment in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire was shrouded in distrust, political tensions and divisions. The subject of security hybridity was politically delicate and polarizing and Michèle had to keep refocusing discussions away from political issues to encourage research participants to talk. However, even though the entire country was at a literal standstill, she was able to observe and participate in the intense reflection, strategizing and rebuilding almost from scratch that was occurring on the way forward. It was difficult to get information from the new army hierarchy who did not understand the relevance of the HSG project. Some rebel groups members were in exile, while others were wary of talking for fear of reprisals from the army’s new leadership. Those who accepted to speak did not want to be identified. The Ivorian conflict was in itself as much a challenge as it was an opportunity.

The dozo involvement in security remains a controversial issue in the country. The subject was debated extensively during the 2015 presidential elections, with the opposition accusing the ruling party of using the group as a militia to intimidate and frighten dissenting populations. This made it impossible for Rodrigue to interview state security leaders in order to assess their collaboration with the dozos as
proclaimed by the latter and the media. While he could not get appointments with the Ministry of the Interior and Security and some military leaders, Rodrigue was able to hold informal discussions with some soldiers and one military official as well as the leaders of the dozo brotherhood. Rodrigue and Michèle both had conflicts of commitment.

**COMMON THEMES FROM RESEARCHERS’ FEEDBACK ON RESEARCH EXPERIENCES**

- One strong thread in all the narratives was the **duality of political contexts** and certain factors (examples: Ebola, perceptions of target populations toward research, security and hybridity in particular) and experiences (being an outsider) as simultaneous challenges and opportunities.

- **Time management and availability** for those working full time--many researchers in the project--especially in geographically disparate spaces (example: Xavier lives in the US but is researching South Africa).

- **Access to people**—mostly to state actors but, surprisingly in some cases, to nonstate actors; access to places (logistical challenges), and access to published knowledge (sensitivity of security information, identifying relevant literature).

- **Research fatigue and skepticism** about the value and benefits of participating in the HSG project.

- The **impact of identity** on access to information: For Fredline, a Sierra Leonean woman researching Sierra Leone, it was being perceived as an outsider by women’s secret societies because she is not a member. For Xavier in South Africa, it was the touchiness of the subject that he was researching in the particular context of South Africa, even though he did not necessarily identify visibly with it on the outside. In order to respond to grievances expressed by some research participants, Fredline and Cannyce had to sidestep their roles as researchers and respectively smooth tensions and help to enhance the knowledge and capacities of participants on research and hybridity.

- Reconciling researchers’ **conceptualizations of hybridity** with its actual workings on the ground: This challenge first expressed itself as a difficulty explaining hybridity during initial research in ways that all respondents could understand and engage.

- Because of inconclusive process of legal instrumentalization, a number of nonstate actors are unsure what the **boundaries** are to what they can legitimately do.

In response to the preceding researchers’ reflections, senior researchers and mentors, David Leonard and Eboe Hutchful, asked them to consider the following
comments, a mix of guidelines for further work and factors which they deemed to have been omitted from or understated in most of the papers:

- Formal actors: How have they evolved and what impact do they have on the workings of hybridity today?
- Assessing hybridity: What criterion or evaluation are/should we be using to assess how hybridity works in different contexts: the absence of visible conflict? Or compliance with the latest international standards? Strive for keener descriptions and analyses of observations of how communities behave and why. Do not assume that state actors are following their stated rules.
- Scope of research: Go further afield to get new perspectives and realities. Keep in mind the endgoal of access to justice and security of users, especially vulnerable groups.
- Definitions of hybridity: Hybridity transcends security. It is dynamic and reflects the constant reformulation of political and social relations in any given context. To depoliticize the subject for respondents, it is vital to locate its security aspects within a broader conceptual framework. What happened to the agreement at the initial (Accra) workshop to map all relevant actors and approach research in this more open way?
- Positionality: Avoid the use of terms that convey coloured connotations of groups under research. Be more sensitive to the nuances of historical trajectories and political realities of relationships among all identified actors.
- Capacity: No researcher commented on this but several mentors identified it repeatedly as a challenge for them. They expressed concern that some junior researchers were continually not paying sufficient attention to feedback, either due to a lack of grasp or disinterest, resulting in contentions over the quality of some papers. It would be useful to obtain researchers’ perspectives of access to assigned mentors and how beneficial it was, albeit in a less public setting.
- Thematic questions: Some are more relevant for some countries and research themes than others. The original concept paper is just a guide; researchers need not be bound by it but ensure that their work reflects ground realities in their respective study contexts.
- A further question to consider (not already addressed in the concept): Reverse the embeddedness of informality in formal institutions and look at institutionalization processes within informal bodies.
- One way to navigate the often blurred lines between the formal and informal is to look more at function than form. Example: Look at, say, the phenomenon of policing, and who is providing policing services, rather than who is or is not considered a formal or substantive policing actor.
Session II: Recap of the Conceptual Framework and Research Questions (see appendices)

PRESENTATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

In the interests of space and brevity, the paper presentations delivered by researchers are not detailed here. What follows are synopses of individual research objectives and comments and recommendations by reviewers and research mentors. All of the midterm research papers which formed the bases of each presentation are accessible online via Dropbox here: https://goo.gl/CalfA6

Session III: Liberia and Sierra Leone (Bondo)

Working title: Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Limited Access to Justice for SGBV Survivors in Liberia

Researcher/Author: Freida M’Cormack

Research overview: This paper examines the challenges and opportunities presented by a hybrid justice system in relation to addressing sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and more specifically, violence against women and girls (VAWG) in Liberia. It considers women’s access to justice in two areas: sexual violence and land rights.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER, TITILOPE AJAYI-MAMATTAH (expert on gender and security and civil society and member, HSG advisory group)

• It would be good to buttress your point about the non-homogeneity of state systems and actors using a mapping of all security and justice actors and relationships.
• To set the stage for the rest of the paper, the introduction needs some referenced outline (including figures, where possible) of the extent of violence against women and girls in Liberia, especially sexual and gender-based violence, which was rampant during the wars but arguably as high today. It may be useful to add something about how the reparations process has or has not helped to address SGBV.
• It would be useful to explain what the terms state/formal and nonstate/informal mean to you in the context of Liberia and your research topic, especially as you note from your research that the lines are not always clear. Be consistent in your use of these terms to avoid confusing your readers.
• Your statement on page 1 ‘traditional justice mechanisms are often considered to be controlled by elders, and mostly males’ needs to be more definite. Also, please complete your description of the problem so that we understand clearly why the control of male elders is a problem. The answer is in the paper; it just needs to be stated briefly in the introduction.
• Your statement on page 3 about gendered concerns should more correctly read women’s concerns since you are not looking at the entirety of gender aspects of justice in Liberia.
• Consider adding a separate section on methodology to give you more space to explain your methods.
• On civil society and NGOs:
  o Did you speak only with NGOs or more diverse civil society groups? To enrich your context, it would be useful to specify the core work areas of the NGOs that you met with.
  o On a broader note, NGOs are only a small part of the very heterogeneous concept of civil society. It would be informative to trace, maybe through a mapping of actors, some of the different ways in which different civil society organisms engage your topics of interest.
  o You make an implicit suggestion that civil society work in this area has been led by international actors. This may be a factor of how you seem to conceptualize civil society as NGOs but it is critical that you review this and to highlight more organic efforts and their impact and also look at their interactions with international actors and efforts and consider any successes or frictions there.
• It is important to emphasize, as you do in part on page 10, that some of these security and justice actors and institutions are directly responsible for committing VAWG and SGBV against women and girls, sometimes while they are trying to access justice for previous assaults.
• Also on page 10, your assertion that one theory suggests that ‘the formal system presents the best chance for achieving justice’ needs to be referenced.
• You refer on page 12 to a third theory that recommends ‘overcoming the specific injustices of both state and non-state systems’ instead of upholding either one; will this automatically make them complementary or mutually reinforcing? Should this not be accompanied by some effort to reconcile both systems and what might this entail?
• Many of the statistics on SGBV and VAWG in the paper are from sources external to Liberia. Are any reliable figures obtainable from the Liberian police or any Liberian justice entities?
• Regarding the figures that you quote on the rates of SGBV, it is worth noting in the paper the relativity of such data, given that a lot of SGBV is unreported for reasons that you can elaborate.
• On page 13, you use the terms victims and survivors; is there any difference between them?
• You point about the early sexual exposure of young girls needs explaining as a legacy of the sexual economy of war, the limited options that women have because of poor education, and the cultural practice of having children for different men as economic collateral in order to survive.
• There is some duplication between sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. At first reading, it looks like that the second part of section 4.1 where you talk about obstacles to access to justice should come after you lay out what the mechanisms are in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
• I have some hesitation about your suggestion on page 27 to harmonize traditional authorities with formal systems along the lines of upholding the
formal, which in our context is fundamentally alien, as a standard without examining it critically to see if its very nature is conducive to resolving the problems it was created for. Consider the more innovative approach of remodelling the formal in ways that incorporate the best parts of Liberian traditional structures and reflect our values without compromising women’s rights and safety.

Working title: Women’s Access to Justice in Sierra Leone: Secret Societies and Bridging the Formal and Informal Divide

Researcher/Author: Fredline AO M’Cormack-Hale

Research overview: This paper seeks to address the comparative dearth in empirical studies on nonformal sectors within the framework of accessing justice for women and how hybridity might work in this space. It also answers the following questions: Can organizations that are primarily women based provide better alternatives for women to access justice? Are they perceived as more legitimate than security arrangements encapsulated by the State? Do they serve to strengthen national structures or undermine them? To what extent can these serve as a potential positive source for those that argue in favour of hybridity, and ultimately protect the welfare of citizens, especially women?

Comments by reviewer, Titilope Ajayi-Mamattah

- The paper was very well written and communicated complex ideas clearly.
- Suggested title change: ‘Secret Societies and Women’s Access to Justice in Sierra Leone: Bridging the Formal and Informal Divide’. This reads better and refocuses attention on the paper’s two key issues.
- Use references to buttress the point about how loopholes in security sector reform in the formal sector as applies to women means that they continue to remain under-served in accessing justice.
- The paper alternates between different terms for state actors. You may need to define briefly what you mean by formal/official and use one word for consistency.
- It would be useful to indicate in brackets the geographic locations of the research sites that you mention in the paper for those readers unfamiliar with Sierra Leone.
- Sexual abuse by male police and health workers has been an issue in Ghana and Nigeria where security personnel routinely abuse women, including survivors seeking justice. Have there been any such cases in Sierra Leone?
- It is puzzling that, as you note, donors seem hesitant to invest in better resourcing initiatives to improve women’s access to justice. Were you able to interrogate the reasons for this?
• Corruption in the judiciary was a serious issue around 2012. Is this still the case?
• It would be good to document abuses by chiefs, if you recorded any, and to mention how closed the chieftaincy institution is to women, especially in northern Sierra Leone.

GENERAL COMMENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

• There is a delicate balance between what’s driven by traditional institutions and the ways in which they respond to social culture and change? It is important to not blame traditional institutions for the cultures in which they are embedded.

• How do the secret societies relate with other traditional mechanisms? To answer this, it would be useful to: (i) use a mapping of all security actors to provide profiles and show interactions and influences, and (ii) trace changes in each one from a historical perspective. Osman Gbla (researcher, Sierra Leone), the only project member to have done a mapping through field interviews, was advised to do further research to crosscheck his findings in order to ensure comprehensiveness.

• It would be interesting to show how shifts in culture, particularly those pertaining to women’s changing priorities, that are reducing reverence for secret societies, are also feeding societies’ reorientation regarding what matters they are willing to engage and their methods in order to retain and grow their relevance.
Working title: Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: The Case of Hargeisa City, Somaliland

Researcher/Author: Fintan Cannyce Oyieyi/Academy for Peace and Development

Research overview: The purpose of this study was to assess hybrid security governance in Somaliland. It looked specifically at the networks and processes that differentiate formality and informality security governance, the roles of informal security institutions and how they interact with the formal security institutions, sources of financing and how hybrid security governance strategy applied in Somaliland can be used to strengthen effective secondary systems to improve African security governance.

COMMENTS BY REVIEWER, DAVID LEONARD

In many ways this paper has improved since the Accra meeting, particularly as regards the literature review. My complements on the work you have done. You have demonstrated a high degree of hybridity in the Somaliland security system and implicitly attested to the great legitimacy it enjoys with its citizens. Nonetheless, there still are improvements that should be made, some of which are essential.

Essential changes:

- Many of the references in the bibliography are incomplete. Some of the references cited in the paper are not listed in the bibliography.
- The figures as presented here are incomprehensive, as I said in Accra. They must be explained in detail, as I outline in the comments in the paper itself.
- The number of interviews done is unacceptably few, even if the study were to be confined to Hargeisa. More field work is essential to making this paper credible.

Highly desirable changes:

- In effect you are telling us that the hybrid system of local dispute governance described in the study done by IM Lewis 60 years ago (1961) has shown a great deal of continuity and is responsible for much of the success of Somaliland— as has already been said by Bradbury, Hoehne, Menkhaus and others. But how much continuity? Has there been change? [Have ALL the authors read the original IM Lewis study, for it isn’t properly cited in the references? They must.] There are three systems of courts—formal, traditional (including negotiations between elders using Xeer/Heer) and sharia. Can you give us
some data on the proportion of total case loads being handled by each today? Lewis reports that he saw the traditional courts as dominant. You may be seeing an increase in the formal and sharia, for you report some people being concerned about the legitimacy of compensation, which is central to the traditional system. You would be making a GREAT contribution to the literature if you went back to the original Lewis and point by point document what has changed. To the best of my knowledge none of the many scholars who have worked on the Somalis in the last 20 years have done this.

- Are the Islamic courts really as uniform system today, as you imply? There are several schools of sharia law. Which are in use in Somaliland today? If there are several, can disputants choose between them? Or does the state dictate which school will be used? Has the Wahhabi school been growing among sheikhs as it has among imama? What does this mean about the potential for intra-Islamic conflict in the future in Somaliland? This is a core issue in the centre and south of Somalia and can even be seen in Tanzania.
- In terms of tracking changes in hybridity since Lewis, it would make a BIG difference if you were able extend your study in Hargeisa AND to replicate it in at least one rural district. You then could report the contrast between security governance in a large urban and a more traditional setting.
- In extending the field work, it would be useful as well to track where the finances for it are coming from and what potential there is for taxes or for informal fees.

**Comments by reviewer, Tadesse Medhane**

- The literature review is comprehensive but omits notable rich primary and secondary sources in Somaliland, primarily the outputs of the 30+ peace conferences and other experiences that make the country stand out. The study should include a chapter on the political process that led to the emergence of Somaliland in 1997.
- There is a disconnect between the literature review and the structure and focus of the study, and an almost complete lack of analysis from the literature review, on which the study presents no defined position, through the rest of the paper.
- Some statements, like ‘Hybridity is real and working well in Somaliland’, are not backed by the study’s findings.
- The team should review its choice of diagrammes to present certain types of data, for example, the use of pie charts to measure composition(s) of networks of hybrid security actors.
- The paper cites the research timeline as May-June 2015. What has happened since?
• Data from Hargeisa alone does not give a full picture. Researchers should add at least one rural district to show the impact of the concentration of Somaliland’s population in its major urban district, i.e. Hargeisa.

• The researchers ought to expand on the Guurti’s shift from its previous roles to its current support to the Ministry of Defence.

• The presentation, which was comparatively more informative, did not match the paper, suggesting that the research team needs to infuse more of the information that its members know from everyday life—some of which HE Jibril shared briefly on the rising influence of Wahhabism sequel to the reviewers’ comments.¹

• Both reviewers queried what appear to have been unapproved changes in personnel, methodology—which was supposed to include quantitative as well as semi-structured interviews--and the need for translation in a research that was meant to be conducted by Somalis. They reported that their feedback on previous drafts was repeatedly not acknowledged or incorporated into the study.

Working title: Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), Customary Justice and the Chiefdom Security Committees (CHISECs) in Sierra Leone

Researcher/Author: Osman Gbla

Research overview: This paper examines the diverse networks and processes involved in formal and informal security, policing and justice provisioning in Sierra Leone using the CDFs, the Chiefs customary justice system and CHISECs as a case study. Its objectives are five-fold. First, to identify and analyze the diverse networks and processes of the formal and informal security, policing and justice institutions in order to generate an understanding of their interwoven nature. Second, to analyze the nature of local level security and justice institutions and how they function in practice, either alone or in partnership with the formal to reinforce or alleviate gender, class and ethnic disparities in access to justice and security at local and national levels. Third, to examine the various roles of the informal CDFs, Chiefs Customary justice system and how they interface with the formal system. Fourth, to discuss the impact of the hybridized role of the informal and the formal system on vulnerable citizens and communities. Fifthly, ¹ According to him, there have been major changes in Islamic philosophy and orientation in Somaliland, chiefly a discernible rise in the influence of Wahhabism occasioned in part by the yearly sponsorship of 1000 young Somalis from across the region to a Wahhabi Islamic school. The number of mosques, almost all Wahhabi, has grown from eight in 1991 to over 1000 today. This influence is most pronounced in education and business. It is Jibril’s perception that Wahhabi Muslims are working underground to come to power through democratic elections with the aim of establishing a universal Islamic state. Wahhabi Somali objection to a secular state and traditionalistic structures points to the future of hybridity in Somaliland.
to assess the various national efforts in Sierra Leone to build viable, transparent and accountable hybrid security governance.

**Comments by Reviewers, Eboe Hutchful and David Leonard**

- Avoid reifying traditional institutions and recognize that they are subject to change (Jimam Lar later cited the example of Nigeria where the changing dynamics of chieftaincy include more educated chiefs who are better resourced and therefore have more social, economic and political influence).
- Be more explicit about changes to traditional institutions and ‘Janus-faced’ CDFs not being one thing to all people—unlike states, they cater more to specific groups than others, like many nonstate security actors.
- Hybrid governance is not a fixed phenomenon.
- The challenge with researching countries like Sierra Leone that are so meticulously documented is the question of the added value of yet more research. It was suggested that Osman try to deduce theoretical additions from his findings that might give new meaning to existing knowledge.
- This paper, like all the others, needs to problematize three aspects of hybridity: its historicity, its constructedness and its contextuality. Researcher should seek to answer the question: Who and what drive hybridity and what contestations surround it?

**General Comments**

- It would be good to compare notes with Rodrigue and maybe also Nigeria with regard to civilian joint task forces, who will be considering regional aspects of dozos in the next phase of his research. Some suggested key points for comparison: how did CDFs and dozos emerged in their specific contexts? How did they evolve and become politicized beyond what they were created for, especially when the original contexts changed? What links do both groups have with state actors in new governance systems? How have they been instrumentalized socially, legally and politically? Are there disparities between what is constitutional and what is not? How is power distributed and what power plays are at work within both groups?
- Are there any links between chiefs and secret societies and their members?
Session V: Côte d’Ivoire

Working title: Security Structures and Traditional Ties and Solidarities in Côte d’Ivoire

Researcher/Author: Michèle Pépé/Fondation Sérenti

Research overview: The paper queries the extent of influence on the sociology of the new Ivorian national army of the uncodified norms and practices of the ex-rebel groups that have formed the core of the Forces Républicaines de la Côte d’Ivoire since March 2011. Specific research questions include: (i) How do informal norms, solidarities and networks impact formal institutions of security, law and order and justice? How do social and political elites instrumentalize these hybrid networks? (ii) What role do nonstate actors and institutions play in security, law and order, and justice, and how do they interact with formal state security institutions—are they a complement, a competitor or a substitute for the security services provided by the state?

Comments by reviewer, Niagalé Bagayoko
The general thrust of Niagalé’s comments was that the paper fell far below her expectations and did not incorporate her significant inputs throughout the research leading up to the midterm review workshop. David Leonard offered to share the title of a new book by Professor Scott Strauss, an independent expert, that proposes new theories on why the war in Côte d’Ivoire was less brutal than elsewhere in Africa. He suggested that Michèle disaggregate the Ivorian army in transition to show how it has changed since the war ended.

Working title: The Dozo Confraternity of Traditional Hunters in Côte d’Ivoire: Sociocultural Factors and Security Dynamics

Researcher/Author: Rodrigue Koné

Research overview: Against the background of debates about the involvement of dozos in Côte d’Ivoire’s national security matrix, this study asks: Who/what is this community of traditional hunters involved in security (provisioning) in Côte d’Ivoire? What sociocultural norms guide their operations? In what ways do dozos influence and interact with Côte d’Ivoire’s formal security system and actors? What factors drive these interactions?

Comments by reviewer, Niagalé Bagayoko
- Include some discussion of the relationship between the three dozo groups and politicians, local perceptions of dozos and abuses committed by them.
- The ultimate source of dozos legitimacy is that they defended local communities during the war. They made a sacrifice of service that has led to
their recognition and acceptance today but this cannot be analyzed in a vacuum. What other factors account for their popularity? How powerful is the aspect of moral populism? How do they compare with other nonstate actors in the security marketplace in terms of efficiency, cost and affordability?

- In what ways have dozos been instrumentalized politically and how has this impacted on perceptions of their legitimacy?
- Private and privatization of security. Implications of involvement of group with political and specific ethnic agenda?

### Session VI: Nigeria

**Working title: Safety and Security of Urban Poor Communities in Nigeria**

**Researcher/Author:** Aishat Sambo, Oluwole S Ojewale/CLEEN Foundation

**Research overview:** Within the context of Nigeria’s complex political and security history and infrastructure, this paper studied hybridity with regard to security provisioning for urban poor communities in the country. It posed three specific questions: (i) Can patterns of embedding be identified between the state and hybrid security organizations? (ii) What are the likely impacts of the processes of hybridity on the current security order in Nigeria? (3) Are there gender considerations regarding the processes of hybridity on the current security order in Nigeria?

### Comments by Reviewer, Jimam Lar

Though Jimam was not part of the process from its inception, he had access to recent drafts of the Nigeria report which formed the basis of his remarks.

- The paper does not answer the research questions sufficiently.
- Previous feedback from other reviewers was not incorporated in the two drafts immediately preceding the midterm review workshop.
- The balance between respondents’ perceptions and tangible experiences is skewed toward the former. Barring Borno for obvious though somewhat arguable safety reasons, the study repeatedly does not follow through on the suggestion of engagement with actors.
- The paper needs to:
  - Take note of the historical context of hybridization and plurality of the case study groups that are the focus of the study.
  - Clarify what it defines as state against what is non-state in Nigeria’s precolonial context? Avoid mentioning without discussing.
  - Reconcile the paper with the presentation with regard to gender (mainstreaming) and hisbah.
Strengthen justification of its choice of case studies by going beyond its stated reasons for selecting the geographic areas where it worked and explaining its choices in reference to those areas that were not chosen.

Improve the literature review and the authors’ engagement of it. The paper should reflect pertinent knowledge of related topics, like the debate between David Pratten and Kate Meagher, but also show what arguments derive from this review of knowledge.

Identify logics (mobilization, livelihood etc.) that allow for better comparison between its subjects of study. Conceptualizations that permit deeper and more complex analysis.

Address a number of contradictions and inaccuracies in its text. Examples: the federal monopoly of security vs. a long existence of hybridity and the claim that hybridity is not strong in Bauchi whereas a nonstate group known as yan banga has a long history and strong presence across that region.

There was one general comment about expanding the gender lens beyond women and capturing the diversity of women’s experiences with the topics under study.

**Presentation on The Police, Vigilantism and Historical Trajectories of Plurality: Lessons from the Past and Present**

**Jimam Lar**

This was an overview of Jimam’s PhD research on plural policing in Nigeria with a specific focus on the workings of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) and its interactions with policing and the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). His information was gathered over ten months of fieldwork in northern Nigeria and the UK involving archival research and observation but mainly interviews with serving and retired police officers, community leaders, vigilante group members, and former British political and police officers, among others. Against a background of police and policing reform in Nigeria, he traced the history of vigilantism and its relations with state policing structures—what he termed plural policing—from 1945 in three main eras: 1945 to 1969, 1970 to 1990 and 1999 to the Present, looking at the institutionalization and socialization of vigilantism in response to varied cultural and political events like military rule, the dismantling and absorption of the Native Authority Police, and the influence(s) of the NPF. Jimam described in some detail how the VGN, formed in 1999, has adopted standard police practices of recordkeeping and evidence-gathering with regard to preliminary investigations, though low literacy levels compel some creativity. He outlined their main areas of activity as precursory policing and arrest and preliminary interrogation, explaining that the VGN, in the states that he visited, is embedded in police stations and
supports police patrols. There is, however, varied understanding of the VGN’s role in policing.

Jimam ended on the note that the reality of security sectors is different from what is written on paper and that in order to reconceptualise it accurately, analysts should ask these and other questions:

- Who is on ground? What are they doing? How are they doing it?
- What are the views and experiences of the community (being served by security services)?
- Are there institutions and structures for providing monitoring and oversight functions?

**Session VII: South Africa**

**Working title: Sexuality, Security and the Post-Apartheid State**

**Researcher/Author:** Xavier Livermon

**Research overview:** The paper examines what safety and security might mean for black Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transsexual (LGBT) populations in South Africa who exist at the intersection of multiple forms of power, making them in many ways some of the most vulnerable members of the South African polity, and argues for the need for serious consideration of LGBT populations in discussions of security in Africa. Following the work of various feminist critiques of security sector work in Africa, the paper calls for an intersectional black feminist/black queer theory of security with the aim of illuminating what taking seriously sexuality as an issue of security might add to scholarly understanding of security sector development in Africa.

**Comments by reviewers, Titilope Ajayi-Mamattah and Eboe Hutchful**

This paper received unreserved commendations from both reviewers with the following specific comments:

- It expands global understanding and conceptualization of hybridity and security in ways that challenge the entire project. It defeats the perception of South Africa as a standard for LGBT rights, given the surprising savagery around the subject on the ground.
- A major highlight is the way that it stretches the research terms of reference beyond security to look at different facets of hybridity and how they interact in post-apartheid South Africa—in a sense it explores hybridity among different hybridities, notably race, gender and sexuality, differing concepts.
of security, governance, security provisioning, the ownership and use of private, public and political spaces, and LGBT bodies. The danger with such an inclusive approach is deciding where to draw the line without compromising the richness of the study.

- Key additions to previous drafts of this paper include more of the author’s personal engagement with the topics, some information on LGBT men and a new discussion of security provisioning and how LGBT populations engage.
- Some suggestions for the final research phase:
  - Develop the LGBT men angle a bit more. The author indicates the need for more research on this topic but his paper is an opportunity to provide some of the groundwork toward this, particularly as he states that he has had easier access to LGBT men than women in the field.
  - How do LGBT women relate with LGBT men? It would be interesting to know whether the same patriarchal behaviour exists in the broader LGBT movement that is typical of other social movements.
  - Regarding security hybridity, it is unclear beyond private security and police which other actors LGBT persons are likely to encounter and who the researcher might need to talk to, thus suggesting the need do a mapping as discussed earlier to paint the landscape and give a clearer picture of who is who, what they (are supposed to) do, how they do or do not interact, specifically where one’s mandate ends and the others begin, and the implications of all this for hybrid security and the needs of LGBT communities.
  - With regard to nonstate actors, where do religious and traditional leaders come in, especially concerning the reinforcement of gender and sexual binaries which are mentioned in the presentation? Are there, for example, community vigilante groups that provide security? Do LGBT groups have any self-protective mechanisms? How do these interact with police and private security?
  - The author stated in his presentation that his work focused on urban areas but it would be useful to know the balance of dynamics between urban and rural settings.
  - Personal observation and interviews are clearly key methods in this study but the researcher needs to describe his overall research approach with details of who he spoke to, where and why, how many interviews he conducted, inter alia.

**General comments**

- One comment on the place of social class in the LGBT movement triggered reflection by the author on how LGBT vulnerabilities might alter depending on their social class, where they live and whether their demeanour is more
feminine or masculine. Xavier also remarked that LGBT groups are mounting pressure on cultural groups to provide security as opposed to the state, ostensibly because they feel that the state apparatus has failed them.

- Consider whether the police in South Africa is a source of insecurity or failing to provide security. To what extent does private security enforce the standards of commercial clients?

**Session VIII: General Comments on the Research Findings and Session IX: Workplan Review**

The ensuing key points were distilled from brief discussions, led by David, Niagalé and Titilope, on the research findings, some of which spilled over into Day 3 (both outcomes have been merged for ease of reading):

One participant observed a disconnect and, in some cases, a confrontational relationship between researchers and reviewers. At this point, Hutchful asked reviewers to share some of the responsibility for the affected researchers’ unresponsiveness to comments and suggested that the problem might be more a factor of lapses in some of the institutions involved in the project than individual researchers.

On the structure/ing of papers:

- Each researcher must complete comprehensive mappings of hybrid security and governance systems in their respective study countries by December 2016. The outlines shared by Niagalé in her briefing on the Social Intelligence in Africa think tank (see page 26) are a useful guide for this.
- All researchers need to be thinking about converting their papers from the current report format into journal articles. Following discussion of which formats are most suitable based on cost, salability and visibility, it was agreed that each paper should yield three main outputs: namely one midterm draft, one final paper by December 2016 and a short book draft (agreed after some discussion of the merits and demerits of journal articles, special issue journals and book volumes).
- The project leaders and probable editors will need to think about their editorial approach and introductory chapter, and use this to guide researchers on how to orient the content and structure of their papers to focus on identified key themes that are common to most of the papers, many of which are considered rich enough to produce at least two (journal) articles.
- Discussions about which publisher(s) to use are ongoing. Researchers will be expected to conform to stipulated formats for citations, inter alia.
On timelines (see original schedule and newly agreed deadlines in the appendices, pages 39-41):

- The project’s leaders are considering requesting for a six-month no-cost extension from the IDRC, especially to accommodate the need for considerable further discussion and work on the Nigeria and Côte d’Ivoire (Michèle) papers, which may have to be shelved. To make up for a slight delay in the original publication schedule, it was agreed that some blog pieces, policy reports and op eds be produced and published on the ASSN and ISSAT websites between June and September as proof of productivity to the IDRC.
- Freida, Fredline, Rodrigue, CLEEN and Osman committed to ending fieldwork by October and submitting final drafts to the project’s leaders by December 2016. Papers will be reviewed and returned to researchers by end January 2017 with final publishable articles expected by end March 2017. Xavier’s deadline will be agreed with his supervisor, Eboe Hutchful, and communicated soon to the rest of the team.
- Researchers will submit their next periodic research updates by end July 2016.

Other matters:

- There was agreement on the need to diversify outputs in order to broaden access to research findings. Suggestions, in addition to policy paper and opinion pieces, include blog articles on the ASSN website.
- Pending a review of finances, the international conference may no longer be feasible, given the losses incurred by depreciations to the Canadian Dollar from 2013-15. Strategies considered to save cost and maximize the conference’s impact include locating it near major airline hubs where there’s a high concentration of people doing security work. Preferences include Nairobi (home to the IDRC Africa office), Addis Ababa and Accra. The team was urged to give careful thought to the timing of the conference and how it can further the project’s goals. It is projected to hold within the six months from March to August 2017.
- The project’s leaders should start thinking early about marketing outputs, including by selling print-ready articles, to build wider interest in the final product.
- There is no budget line for translation in the project budget but this can be pulled from the dissemination budget if necessary.
Niaglé Bagayoko

In addition to varied publications, the ASSN has given some thought to complimentary outputs from the findings from the HSG project. In this light, Niaglé floated, with a brief presentation, the idea of a think tank to be coordinated by the ASSN, provisionally named Social/Societal Intelligence in Africa (SIA). Its rationale would be to fill gaps in ‘understanding of the socio-cultural context(s) within which security and development policies are implemented’ in Africa with the aim of making these policies more efficient and context-appropriate and helping to connect decision-makers to a new community of African experts.

SIA will focus on seven areas: country overviews; traditional authorities, community memberships and social solidarities; religions and religious networks; gender; informal security and justice systems; social changes and emerging stakeholders, and African and international networks. Its three-pronged methodology will be based on (i) the analysis of actors (legally established and without legal existence) and networks (structured and non structured) that interact, in a competitive or additional manner, within the framework of formal or informal institutions; (ii) making more accessible and operational (policy-oriented) knowledge accumulated by anthropology (through literature and field investigations), and (iii) an “institutional mapping” technique presented through text and visual aids (computer graphics) that helps to highlight, in a simple and visual manner, the interactions of nonstate and state stakeholders, networks and standards within the framework of formal but also non formal institutions.

SIA plans to share its knowledge in the forms of weekly briefs in French and English by email and social networks; tailored expertise (case studies) on the societal and cultural dynamics of Today’s Africa; and physical and distance learning training using the latest digital resources. Much of this work is expected to be done by African anthropologists and sociologists who are continually in the field for the primary benefit of public decision-makers involved in conceiving, implementing, and monitoring African security and development policies implemented on the African continent; business leaders and the media.

Finally, SIA hopes to enhance existing knowledge through at least three innovative approaches: (i) highlighted topics that underline the importance of often disregarded parameters as they pertain to the informal domain; the formats of disseminated documents, developed based on an “institutional mapping” technique; uncompromised reliance on African anthropologists or sociologists.
Niagalé shared that she has already secured funding commitments on behalf of the ASSN from donors in France and Belgium and is awaiting feedback based on initial expressions of interest from the European Union.

**Comments/Discussion**

The SIA presentation was well received with a general concern about how exclusive it would be compared with well-established entities like the International Crisis Group and the Institute for Security Studies. Though it emerged that a market survey had considered this and revealed a potential opportunity to focus explicitly on Africa’s social realities, there was a consensus to give more thought to SIA’s niche in order to distinguish it and the knowledge that it aims to produce from the plethora of other African and Africanist think tanks and their analyses.

There was no immediate feedback on the proposed name as participants requested for time to reflect. They suggested that the Think Tank Index might offer some guidance on how to structure and position SIA for maximal visibility and influence. Responding to questions about obtaining support from African private philanthropy, Niagalé and Eboe Hutchful shared that the African Development Bank and Mo Ibrahim Foundation had responded to their initial advances with mixed responses and that they would be pursuing other options.

**Closing Session**

The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Somaliland Republic, Dr. Saad Ali Shire, addressed the HSG team on the final day of the workshop. Eboe Hutchful first sketched out the project, expressing its deep intellectual and sociopolitical interest in Somaliland as the only African country to successfully pursue hybridity as a new form of peacebuilding. Introducing himself as an academic and political neophyte, Dr. Shire remarked that hybridity is important to Somaliland where although various aspects of tradition and modernity coexist, there is no dichotomy but a continuum between both systems. According to him, Somalilanders understand the importance of modern governance but hold in high value indigenous knowledge and traditions which they have tried to merge in their nation’s governance and security institutions, guided by the principles of community and rationalism as against individualism and conservatism. Members of both parliament houses are elected and selected from communities in a nod toward the potential inequity of the system of democracy. This fusion works well within the judiciary too where traditional and formal courts collaborate, although many people prefer the former. “Our elders did things for a reason,” he said; “It is our job to apply their wisdom.”

Responding to participants’ questions, Dr. Shire concluded thus:
On the biggest challenge that the Somaliland government has faced: Balancing its lack of international recognition with deciding which system best fits individual cases. Competition between systems can lead to conflict and the lines are not always clear.

On the role of religion in Somaliland’s hybrid system: It can be difficult to distinguish between religion and tradition. Ultimately, people have the power to choose among religion (God), tradition (experience), and the state (law).

Does the Somaliland government plan to pay volunteers in the traditional security system to ease their financial pressures? It would make sense to pay them but it is recognized that their work ethic is driven by a sense of personal responsibility and the knowledge that benefits to their communities constitute personal benefits to them too. The monetization of responsibilities is not always a good thing. The responsibility for safety and security is a shared one that exceeds the state’s capacity. It is important to teach young people that they do not need to be paid to do something for their community.

On the role of women in security provisioning and the justice system: Women in Somaliland are more active economically (more than one in three households is headed by a woman) than in politics and governance. The government has instituted policies to address this, notably free primary education to avoid gender skewed rationing a Bill stipulating that 30 per cent of parliamentary seats be reserved for women.
## I. Agenda

**Hybrid Security Governance in Africa**  
*Midterm Review Workshop*  
6-8 June 2016  
Ambassador Hotel, Hargeisa - Somaliland

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| 9.30-11.00 | Session I:  
Welcome and Introduction to the workshop  
Research Roundtable: Sharing Experiences from the Field | Mohamed Fara Hersi & Eboe Hutchful  
Eboe Hutchful & David Leonard |
| 11.00-11.30| **Coffee Break**                     |                                                 |
| 11.30-12.30| Session I (Conclusion): Research Roundtable: Sharing Experiences from the Field | Eboe Hutchful & David Leonard |
| 12.30-13.30| **Lunch Break**                      |                                                 |
| 13.30-14.00| Session II: Recap of the Conceptual Framework and Research Questions | Niagalé Bagayoko |
| 14.00-16.00| Session III: Presentation of Research Findings: Gender and Justice Sector Reform in Liberia | Freida M’Cormack  
*Discussant(s):* | Titilope Ajayi-Mamattah |
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<td>Presentation of Research Findings: Civil Defence Forces and Chiefdom</td>
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<td>Urban Poor Communities in Nigeria</td>
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<td>Overall project management and expected outputs from final phase of the project</td>
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<td>Policy and operational implications/Enhancing project visibility</td>
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<td>Any Other Business (AOB): this session will cover any unfinished business from the last session of Day 2.</td>
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II. List of participants
III. Conceptual Framework and Research Questions

Hybrid Security Orders: Some Questions for Research

Security sector reform (SSR) processes have more often than not concentrated on the formal arrangements of the state and its security and justice institutions, focusing on tangible policy goals such as stronger mechanisms of civilian control, better budgetary management of security spending, training and professionalization, police and courts reforms, mechanisms of
parliamentary accountability, or the provision of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. Analysis and policy has scarcely begun to touch upon the deep politics of reform or to draw in any systematic way upon the critical literatures on the state, hybrid political orders and security. Yet increasingly references to the informal security and justice sector have crept into the SSR and ‘state-building’ toolkits, although so far based upon insufficient empirical understanding of how this sector actually functions, or of the complex interplay between formal and informal institutions, which determine how policies play out on the ground and impact (or not) on the lives of citizens and communities.

We will focus our research on this complex amalgam of formal and informal, statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions, which together constitute what we call “hybrid security orders”. We use the term “hybrid” in preference to alternatives such as “informal” or “non-state”. For we not only differ from those who confine analysis and policy to formal state security and justice institutions and the regulatory frameworks supposed to ensure they are accountable. We also distinguish our approach from those analyses of African political systems, which focus primarily on the ‘politics of the belly’, reducing states and their security institutions solely to the informal politics of tradition, patronage, plunder and ethnic solidarity. In contrast to both of these approaches we shall investigate both the ‘informal’ within the ‘formal’ and the ‘formal’ within the ‘informal’.

We also see “security” as a deeply problematic and contested concept. On the one hand security can be seen as a process of political and social ordering, stabilizing state and local power structures (hence our focus on ‘security orders’). On the other hand, security also concerns the safety, rights and welfare of citizens and human beings, including preservation of their livelihoods and of the communities in which they live. Our focus is upon the interface between these two dimensions of security: between state or official security on the one hand and citizen or human security on the other. How are the safety, rights and welfare of citizens and communities dependent upon the protections provided by both official and non-state security and justice institutions? In what ways do the authority and legitimacy of these institutions depend in their turn upon their capacity to guarantee the safety, rights and welfare of citizens?

Hybrid security orders in sum are characterized by the co-existence and interaction of multiple state and non-state providers of security, as the state shares authority, legitimacy, and capacity with other actors, networks and institutions across the formal/informal divide. Below we spell out a number of guide questions for research on them. Since the relationships between formal and informal security provision vary considerably from one national and local situation to the next, each case study will have its own particular take on the issues. Hence we do not expect the research teams to follow our template in all respects. Nevertheless, we ask them address our questions so far as is practicable within the limits of each case.

How Informality is Embedded in Formal Security and Justice Provision and Instrumentalized by Elites

1. How do informal norms, solidarities and networks become embedded in the official security, policing and justice institutions of African states? In what ways are they instrumentalized by elites? And in what ways does this influence their capacity to provide security and protect the rights of citizens? Actors in these institutions do not necessarily follow bureaucratic [rational-legal] rules or deliver according to their official mandates. Their decisions tend to be influenced instead by prevailing power relations, by various forms of patronage, by
the social networks in which they are immersed and by alternative norms and codes of behavior framed in the language of ‘custom’, ‘tradition’ or ‘religion’.

1.1 Mapping the processes of informalization. Which social bonds, identities or networks are most salient and what ways have they penetrated the official security and justice structures of African states? Analysis of hybrid security orders requires an understanding of the socially embedded forms of reciprocity, which inform leadership, recruitment, promotion and social networks both in and beyond the security sector, including for instance:

- Extended family, kinship, clan and caste relationships and networks
- ‘Joking relationships’ and other forms of reciprocity
- Social bonds created through secret societies and initiation rituals
- Links to elders, chiefs and other local notables
- Gender relationships, patriarchal forms of authority
- Religious faith communities, sects and brotherhoods
- Ethnic, ‘home town’ or regional solidarities
- Inter and intra-generational ties and networks, including informal peer groups within security institutions themselves
- Patron-client relationships: ‘big men and small boys’
- Criminal networks and warlord alliances
- Transnational including diaspora networks

Such an analysis also demands some serious attention to the micropolitics of security and justice institutions themselves. In what ways are they penetrated and influenced by these informal norms, social ties and networks? Do particular groups predominate in recruitment, promotion and influence within them? In what ways do patronage and other networked forms of influence coopt or corrupt them, degrade their capacity to deliver security and justice, and damage public perceptions of their fairness and impartiality? How essential on the other hand are such informal arrangements to their legitimacy and their capacity to function within the hybrid political and social spaces in which they operate?

1.2. How do political power-brokers and security elites themselves instrumentalize social identities and informal networks in order to redefine security, cement their grip on power and navigate the contradictory terrain between formal and informal orders? Since colonial times state security elites have manipulated ethnic, religious and other identities to consolidate their grip on power, to divide their opponents, to map the boundaries of groups and regions considered as threats and to marginalize dissenting voices. We shall be asking how these processes play out within security institutions themselves, for instance when political and security elites use identity politics to cement their control of security bureaucracies; and or deploy patronage networks to buy their political loyalty. We shall also scrutinize the variety of ways security elites forge alliances with, and subcontract security provision, especially in peripheral areas, to a whole range of networks and institutions outside the confines of the state, including paramilitaries, ethnic militias, religious militants and other non-state armed groups.

Non-State, Informal or Customary Security Actors

2 What roles do ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors and institutions play in security, policing and justice; and how do they interface with the formal security institutions of the state?
There has been a recent flowering of interest in security and justice provision beyond the confines of the state. This stems in part from the perception that state security and justice institutions are failing in their core functions and lack legitimacy and public support. Yet we still have an incomplete understanding of how these non-state institutions function and whether in reality they deliver security and justice to poor and vulnerable people any better than the state.

2.1 Assembling a more complete picture of ‘non-state’ security and justice bodies. How and by whom they are controlled and resourced; whom do they include and exclude; what are their sources of legitimacy and public support; how far do they rely on consent, and how far on coercion as well as consent; what is nature of their claims to deliver security and justice; and what are their capacities to deliver on these claims? Our starting point will be (a) a mapping of the relevant actors and bodies in each national or local context (b) case studies of particular non-state security and justice bodies. There is a very broad range of such bodies, not all of them obviously linked to the delivery of security and justice, including for instance:

- Chiefs and other traditional authorities
- Customary courts and dispute resolution bodies, recognized and unrecognized
- Community and local policing bodies
- Secret societies, hunter’s associations, women’s associations, young men’s associations etc.
- Neo-traditional ethnic, community or home town bodies, offering various forms of protection (such as OPC in Nigeria)
- Community protection, militant or vigilante bodies
- Paramilitaries, militias and other non-state armed groups
- Criminal mafias and gangs offering protection in bad neighbourhoods and unsecured borderlands

2.2. Do these ‘non-state’ actors and state security and justice institutions cooperate with, complement or alternatively compete with official security and justice institutions? From colonial times state elites have pursued strategies of indirect rule: forming alliances with local elites; codifying ‘traditional’ law and sources of legitimacy; formalizing traditional chiefs and justice bodies; and subcontracting security provision to local policing bodies and militias etc. To what extent does this still remain the case in contemporary African states? How far are non-state actors subject to state monitoring or coopted through the patronage networks of elites? In what ways are they instrumentalized by these elites, for instance to fight elections, or to intimidate opponents?

Do non-state actors and institutions instead enjoy some real autonomy from state institutions and patronage networks? In what circumstances does this autonomy enable them to offer genuine alternatives to state security provision? When do they compete with or undermine the latter, for instance by weakening the state’s own grip on security and justice provision and breaking its monopoly of violence in peripheral regions and contested political spaces? Do informal institutions on the whole reinforce the influence of state and other elites, or rather open up political spaces for citizens to influence and challenge them?

2.3 How far do these informal actors rely on negotiation and consensus to establish their authority and deliver security; and how far upon various forms of intimidation, patriarchal authority and violence? What are the implications of their use of violence for their popular
legitimacy, for the rights of citizens and for the notion of legitimate public authority? The balance between consensus and violence tends to be especially problematic where there is violent conflict or entrenched criminality, although it is an issue even in some less obviously violent situations. We should not only consider the claim that vigilante groups, militias, faith-based militants and criminal mafias etc. in some cases offer credible protection and are seen as legitimate by local communities; but also their wider impacts in eroding the state’s monopoly of legitimate violence, on the rule of law and on human rights.

The Impacts of Hybridity on the Security and Entitlements of Citizens, Particularly in Situations of Vulnerability, Exclusion and Inequity

3. What is the impact of hybrid security orders on the security and entitlements of citizens in African states and in particular on vulnerable and excluded people and communities? In what ways if any do they foster more effective, equitable and accountable security provision? Or do they instead reinforce existing inequalities and local-level disempowerment? Empirical studies on the whole confirm that local people and communities themselves regard informal security and justice institutions as more legitimate, accessible and effective than their formal counterparts. Yet this is not always the case and popular perceptions are not always the best guide to how hybrid security institutions work and whom they benefit. Moreover, they fit within much wider patterns of inclusion and exclusion and of violence, often linked to the functions and dysfunctions of African states. Hence fine-grained field research on hybrid security arrangements themselves should also be combined with scrutiny of how they link to wider patterns of patronage, corruption, inequality and violence.

3.1 How and for whom do hybrid security arrangements in reality work? Who benefits, who loses? Is there any accountability and to whom? We aim to identify empirically which hybrid processes on the one hand foster inclusion and accountability; and which on the other hand reinforce exclusion and violence. When does the informalization of state security structures open them to elite capture, patronage networks, corruption and abuse of power? And when does it instead make them more responsive to the interests and concerns of local communities? When do non-state security and justice institutions merely consolidate the position of traditional and local elites and reinforce social and gender inequalities? When on the other hand do they draw upon the wider trust networks, which bind local communities and familiarize citizens with public authority? When (as with certain vigilante groups) do they encourage or even depend upon intimidation and violence? When instead do they provide mechanisms through which disputes can be resolved by more peaceful means?

3.2 What gender biases arise in official and popular framings of security? How do these impact upon the rights and security of women and of sexually marginalized (LGBT) groups? Official security, policing and justice hierarchies are usually highly gendered, more so even than other state institutions. At the same time masculinized ‘informal’, ‘neo-traditional’ non-state security and justice bodies also tend to reinforce gender biases in popular perceptions. We shall investigate how these biases are created and reinforced within state and non-state security institutions alike. And we shall empirically scrutinize their impacts upon the rights and day-to-day security of women and sexually marginalized groups.

3.3 How do hybrid security arrangements draw upon and shape citizens’ own vernacular understanding and practical experience of security at grass roots? So far as possible the research should investigate how citizens, especially those who are poor and vulnerable, perceive
and experience security in their everyday lives. To what extent are their experiences predominantly negative, to the extent that hybrid institutions may simply reproduce existing patterns of patronage, corruption and exclusion? Are they on the other hand positive in that these institutions are easier for them to relate to, provide simple and speedy justice and ensure popularly endorsed dispute resolution? We shall be interested in how citizens navigate these contradictory relationships between the formal and the informal. What are their coping strategies and ways of pursuing their rights as citizens and members of communities? What agency if any do they have, for instance to exit from abusive institutions, to seek redress or to mobilize for reforms?

**Building Viable and Accountable Security and Justice Institutions in Contexts of Informality and Hybridity**

4. How can effective, inclusive and accountable security, policing and justice be negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality, and foster new forms of public authority better suited to African realities? We believe that the concept of hybridity can encourage rethinking of the entire basis of security, justice and legitimate public authority in an African context. Hence a fundamental question for our research is what follows for public policy, for security governance and for social action to ensure that security institutions more responsive to the needs of poor and vulnerable people.

4.1. What can be learned from the vicissitudes of previous experiences of security reform? To what extent have their limitations and failures arisen from their weak evidence base; inability to adjust to situations of contested authority; failure to take account of informal as well as informal hierarchies of influence; and lack of attention to the concerns and interests of those at grass roots? We shall also explore the argument that international actors have sometimes only made matters worse by working with and empowering national and local level security elites, who in their turn have used international resources to consolidate their own extractive networks and positions of power.

4.2. How can security governance mechanisms ‘work with the grain’ of informal institutions and relationships, and be reinforced by them - without diminishing the rights and day-to-day security of citizens? To answer this question, we need better empirical understanding of how and for whom oversight mechanisms work in situations where parallel channels of influence and informal networks determine the allocation of resources and security provision. What are the different checks and balances present in traditional etc. forms of authority, which can reinforce democratic oversight and accountability?

Informalization and the presence of parallel lines of influence also raises particular problems for those promoting security reform, trying to curb the abuses of security institutions or seeking their accountability, be they donors, government decision-makers, NGOs or civil society organizations. With whom should they work; should they work through or around informal elite networks; and will they further reinforce the latter by cooperating with them? Research can prove a more accurate picture of these dilemmas, even if it cannot resolve them.

4.3 What can be learned from existing efforts to renegotiate security and justice institutions ‘from below’ around customary institutions or on the basis of vernacular understandings and popular framings of security? Somaliland’s experience of peace-building is of especial interest because (a) it was locally-based with minimal involvement of international actors; (b) it drew
upon a variety of traditional and other groups (clan elders, fighters, women’s groups, diaspora groups) (c) it did so both to negotiate a peace and to reconstitute the state, including its security framework; and (d) it seems to have enjoyed a broad basis of popular support. How far this characterization reflects realities on the ground, and whether it conceals a more contradictory picture, is open to debate. But it remains an important example of alternative ways of negotiating security, which can also be explored with other more limited examples.

IV. Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Original Project Timelines

The project was intended to span a 36-month period as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Completed by (month)</th>
<th>Comments/Progress analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Framing of Concept Paper</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First meeting of Working Group</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field research</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Draft (research findings)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Meeting of Working Group and other Experts (Review Team)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Final Draft of Research Reports</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Briefs and Op Eds</td>
<td>18-36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Drafts for Book Publication</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissemination (Workshops, Conferences)</td>
<td>30-36</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regular quarterly reports due</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>31 July 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Policy briefs/Blog/Op Eds</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30 September 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All field research concluded</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines for publishable papers/chapters</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31 October 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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V. General Observations and Recommendations

- Researchers were palpably keen to share their field experiences so the session was clearly inspired. There were indications that the inception methodology workshop in Accra could have helped to address some of these issues. Research capacities among researchers are widely variant. Project leaders may have overestimated some researchers’ capacities for this level of research. Going forward, there is clearly a need for a methodology intervention for those who need it, to prevent further challenges. Focal areas should include literature review, choice of methodology, data interpretation and analysis, and how to present research findings.

- Related to the previous point are disparities between some researchers’ presentations and their papers in the Accra and Hargeisa meetings, a possible indication of a difficulty deciding what information to include and how to present it and link various aspects. It would be useful to help build capacity in this area also. Several researchers struggled to provide comprehensive overviews of their work during the Hargeisa workshop within the allotted timeframe.

- Varying amounts of discordance between what transpired at the inaugural meeting and certain outputs, e.g. the mapping of actors and systems, signal a need for more effective communication and closer partnership between mentors and researchers.

- There were observable tensions between some mentors and researchers, largely due to mentors’ complaints about researchers’ nonresponse to and rejection of feedback. Project leaders should give thought to building capacity for research as well as to receive and manage constructive critiques. Several researchers were patently defensive of mentors’ suggestions during the Hargeisa workshop.

**: No-cost extension period of 6 months
• Conceptualizations of security actors were sufficiently diffuse in research reports as to suggest the need for some framework to guide the mapping of hybrid security systems.

• Mappings were absent from most papers, creating some fuzziness around the structures and workings of governance and security and justice frameworks in each country context.

• In addition to institutional failures with some think tanks affiliated to the project, it appeared that there was not enough accountability on the part of some researchers.

• All of the papers will need terminal some editorial work.