Welcome to the July 2014 Issue

Dear Reader,

As the newest member of the ASSN Executive Committee, it gives me exceptional pleasure to pen this editorial to the Network’s members, friends, associates and other readers with an interest in Africa security sector issues. Although my own network of origin, the Southern African Security Management Network (SADSEM), is one of the ASSN’s oldest institutional members, I was formally welcomed into the ASSN Executive Committee in November of 2013 at the ASSN’s 2013 Executive Committee Meeting in Addis Ababa, a few months after I took over as Regional Coordinator of SADSEM. My experience with the ASSN has so far been characterised by a number of exciting developments both for the ASSN as an institution and for its individual members.

One recent development we are particularly proud of is the honour done by Sierra Leonean President Ernest Bai Koroma in awarding the Grand Commander of the Order of the Rokel (GCOR) to Retired Brigadier Kellie Conteh, one of the ASSN’s most highly regarded members. Brigadier Conteh received the award in recognition of his outstanding contribution towards the reform of the security sector in Sierra Leone and the establishment of the Office of National Security. I wish to take this opportunity, on behalf of the entire ASSN membership, Executive Committee and SADSEM to relay our hearty congratulations to Brigadier Conteh. We also wish to thank President Koroma for recognising the efforts of this gallant Sierra Leonean soldier and statesman, who by his work and dedication not only made an indelible contribution to his country’s post-conflict history, but also made his mark on the continental stage through his participation in the effort by Africa’s youngest nation, South Sudan, to build its post-independence security sector.

On the institutional front this quarter, the ASSN has continued with its efforts to support security sector reform and governance across the African continent. In the month of May, the ASSN Chair, Professor Boubacar N’Diaye, was among a group of eminent security experts participating in a one-week African Union assessment mission of the security sector in the Central African Republic. In June, the ASSN and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) jointly organised and facilitated a three-day parliamentary capacity building workshop to enhance the capacity of members of Burkina Faso’s Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defence to better provide security sector oversight. In the same month the ASSN also inaugurated a new research project on Hybrid Security Governance in Africa. Implemented with the support of the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC), the project will involve research in six African countries – Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia and South Africa. The project started off with a successful methodological workshop in Accra on 16 - 18 June and will be implemented over the next three years.

Down south, members of my own home network, SADSEM, contributed papers to a special issue of the Journal of Public Policy in Africa (Joppa), entirely focusing on the relationship between national security and the right to information, with case studies from the experiences of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe. These are some of the news updates you will find in this edition of the ASSN Quarterly newsletter.

In the features section, Chinedu Nwagu from the Cleen Foundation makes an assessment of the security situation in Nigeria ahead of the next general elections in 2015 Elections; Nicole Ball assesses the governance-orientation of the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development (SSD) programme; and Colonel Emmanuel Kotia reviews a book authored by Colonel Festus Aboagye that studies indigenous African warfare with a focus on parts of pre-colonial Ghana.

We hope that you will enjoy these news and feature articles and enjoy your time reading through this edition of the ASSN Newsletter. I personally would like to thank the ASSN secretariat, individual members and institutional affiliates, who have all continued to tirelessly make their contribution to the African security sector governance, thus contributing to our shared dream of accountable and democratically governed security for the peoples of Africa.

On that note, I wish you a delightful and informative read through this newsletter.

With the warmest of greetings,

Brigadier (Rtd) Misheck Chirwa,
ASSN Regional Coordinator, Southern Africa.
**OKEY UZOECHINA** has been appointed Programme Officer for Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Regional Security Division of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission.

An alumnus of the African Leadership Centre (ALC), Okey took up his new position in the beginning of July.

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**PASCHAL BADONG** has been deployed to Yangon, Myanmar, as the UN Deputy Security Advisor for the country.

A former ASSN Programme Manager, Paschal has spent the past three years working for the joint United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). He begins his new assignment in August 2014.

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**TITILOPE AJAYI-MAMATTAH** contributed a chapter to the *Handbook of Civil Society in Africa*, edited by Ebenezer Obadare and published by Springer in January 2014.

More details about the book are available [on this link](#).

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**BRIGADIER (RTD) KELLIE CONTEH** has been awarded Sierra Leone's Grand Commander of the Order of the Rokel (GCOR).

Brigadier Conteh received the award on 28 April 2014 from President Ernest Bai Koroma at State House in Freetown in recognition of his 'outstanding contribution towards the reform of the security sector and the establishment of the Office of National Security.'

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**EBOE HUTCHFUL** (second from right, partly hidden) attended two meetings of the UN Secretary General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters, the first in New York on March 5-7 and the second in Geneva on July 2-4, 2014.

Professor Hutchful, who is the ASSN's Executive Secretary, has been a member of the Board since January 2013. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon is on the front row (seated second from left).
ASSN Participates in African Union SSR Assessment of the Central African Republic

Jean Marie Michel Mokoko. It comprised Security Sector Reform (SSR) experts from the AU, United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the ASSN.

During the one-week period, the mission held consultations with a number of ministers of the country's Transitional Government and leaders from National Assembly Commissions; practitioners in the justice, defence, security and correctional sectors; civil society representatives; private security companies; the media and other stakeholders.

The assessment mission also included consultations with representatives of the international community in the country's security sector, including the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic (MISCA); the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and other UN agencies; the European Union mission in Bangui; representatives of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), ECCAS officials, the French Embassy and representatives of Opération Sangaris. The mission also visited a Gendarmerie Brigade, the Central Prison of Bangui, and a police station being rehabilitated.

The assessment mission ended on 24 May 2014 with a workshop in Bangui, where the various stakeholders held consultations and made recommendations on the way forward towards the revival of the country's stalled SSR programme. The workshop was opened by Lea Koyassoum-Doumta, Vice President of the CAR’s National Transitional Council.

ASSN, DCAF Parliamentary Workshop in Burkina Faso

On 10-12 June 2014, the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) jointly organised and facilitated a three-day parliamentary capacity building workshop in Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso.

Themed ‘Parliamentary Oversight of the security and armed forces: Control mechanisms, issues and challenges’, the overall objective of the workshop was to allow members of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs and Defence (CAED) to better and more efficiently provide security sector oversight.

The workshop followed a June 2013 ‘needs assessment’ in the country's capital, Ouagadougou, and its activities constituted part of the process of implementing a protocol signed by DCAF and ASSN with the Burkinabe parliament.
ASSN Selects Consultants for Second Round of AU SSR Policy Guidance Notes

The following are the successful candidates for the ASSN consultancies:

1. Anicia Lalà and Dylan Hendrickson for the Handbook on SSR Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Africa;
2. Valerie Yankey-Wayne and Claire McEvoy for the OGN on SSR Monitoring and Evaluation;
3. Alex Mayer-Rieckh and Gavin Cawthra for the OGN on SSR Training;

This engagement forms part of a broader multi-year programme to help operationalise the AUPFSSR, as well as to build the AU's SSR capacity by bolstering African ownership in the policy and practice of SSR, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. The programme is being implemented in a partnership between the AU Commission (AUC), the European Union (EU), the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), the SSR Unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO SSR Unit), UNOPS and the ASSN.

The first set of three OGNs were presented for validation (in preparation for their eventual ratification) at a November 2013 consultation workshop organised in Addis Ababa by the AU Commission and the ASSN. These were the OGNs on Gender and SSR; Conducting SSR Needs Assessments; and the Development of Codes of Conduct for African Security Institutions, respectively.

SADSEM Academics Document Regional National Security Policy and Practice in Special Issue of Journal

Various members of the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) Network contributed articles to a special issue of the *Journal of Public Policy in Africa* (Joppa), published in June 2014 around the topic 'National Security Policy and Practice: Case Studies from Southern Africa'.

In his introduction to the special issue, SADSEM's Anthoni Van Nieuwkerk explains that the idea emanated from a conference in which the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA) invited a number of Southern African academics to reflect on the relationship between national security and the right to information.

A range of papers reflecting the experiences of Angola, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe were commissioned from members of the Southern African Defence and Security Management (SADSEM) network.

These papers were presented at a regional workshop, in which it became apparent that the commissioned papers broke new ground in reflecting on national security thinking and practices amongst member states of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

It was this realisation that led to the articles being assembled into a special edition of the *Journal of Public Policy in Africa* (Joppa).

Professor Van Nieuwkerk explains that the country studies – which arose from the earlier OSISA/SADSEM workshop - are written from national perspectives and are similarly structured to allow the reader to explore common (and divergent) trends.

JOPPA is a biannual journal published by Africa University's Institute of Peace, Leadership and Governance (IPLG) in partnership with OSISA. SADSEM is the African Security Sector Network's regional hub for Southern Africa.
ASSN Inaugurates New Project on Hybrid Security Governance

The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) organised a Methodological Workshop on 16 - 18 June 2004 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAJPTC) in Accra, Ghana, to kick-start its new project on Hybrid Security Governance in Africa.

Undertaken with the generous support of the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC), the new project will involve conducting research will be conducted in six African countries: Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, (Manu River Union), Somaliland (Horn of Africa), South Africa (Southern Africa), and Nigeria (West Africa).

The purpose of the workshop was to bring together all the designated researchers for the respective case-study countries to share conceptual reflections, critically review methodologies for the field research, and consider risk mitigation strategies in the volatile environments in which much of this research is expected to take place.

A total of 20 participants attended the workshop, among them Professor Eboe Hutchful, the Project Leader; Professor Boubacar N'Diaye, the ASSN Chair; and two members of the ASSN Executive Committee, Professor Robin Luckham and Dr. Niagalé Bagayoko. Also present were IDRC representatives, Ms Ramata Thioune and Ms Njeri Karuru; all the designated researchers for the six respective project countries; and members of the Advisory Group that will be directing the research.

The workshop commenced with a brief introduction to the project covering the project outline, conceptual framework, research questions and the IDRC's expectations from the research project.

The researchers then gave presentations on their respective case studies, with each presentation followed by response from a discussant and a wider critical discussion of theory and methodology.

The successful delivery of the methodological workshop has set the pace for the commencement of the three-year research project.

LEFT: Participants pose for a picture after being treated to lunch by Professor and Mrs Hutchful at their home at McCarthy Hill in Accra.
Introduction

The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) recently signed a Memorandum of Grant Conditions with the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) for the execution of a research project extending over a three year period. The project is titled **Hybrid Security Governance in Africa** and will cover six African countries: Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somaliland and South Africa. The total grant award for the project is seven hundred thousand Canadian dollars (CAD$700,000) over a three year period.

**Background**

The grant application submitted by the ASSN to IDRC in support of the project was premised on the realization that Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes are more often than not focused on structural and formal institutional arrangements of the state. SSR focuses largely upon tangible policy goals such as better budgetary management of security spending, training and professionalization, police and courts reforms, mechanisms of parliamentary accountability, or the provision of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. They have scarcely begun to touch upon the deep politics of reform or to draw in any systematic way upon the critical literatures on the state, hybrid political orders [HPOs] and security. References to the ‘informal’ security and justice sector have become a standard fixture in the global SSR and ‘state-building’ toolkit, but this has remained largely at the level of rhetoric, with little real understanding of how this sector actually functions, of the complex character of the intersections between formal and informal institutions, or the implications (importantly) for reform efforts that aim to build Weberian ideal-type institutions. Yet, in reality, the Security Sector in Africa is an intricate fusion of both formal and customary/traditional actors and institutions.

The term ‘hybridity’ is employed in this context to denote the complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions typically at play in the African security sector, though in this project the main thrust of the concept is to illuminate the character and functioning of security systems in countries emerging from conflict, where customary, clan and non-formal institutions tend to be widely implicated in delivery of security services.

The project, and thereby their ability to engage issues of security sector reform and governance of the security sector.

Specifically, the project is set to achieve five distinct and yet interrelated objectives.

The first is to identify and analyse the networks and processes that span the divide between ‘formality’ and ‘informality’, and, as a result, provide a better and more realistic understanding of decision-making processes and power distribution in the African security sector.

The second is to clarify the role of non-state / non-formal / customary security institutions (community security organs, militias, vigilante groups, etc), and the interactions and interface between these and the formal security institutions of the state. Hybrid security orders are characterized by the existence of multiple non-state providers of security, as the state shares ‘authority, legitimacy, and capacity’ with other actors, networks and institutions that transcend the formal/informal divide. Such a phenomenon requires analysts to gain empirically grounded knowledge.

It also has undoubted policy implications: if the typical African security sector is in reality hybrid (and hence far removed from the ideal-typic conceptual understandings underlying current SSR and SSG initiatives), this would have significant implications for the way we understand and approach reform and governance of the security sector.

A third purpose is to better understand the ‘real economy’ of security provisioning in hybrid systems, and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion associated with such systems (in particular the role of gender and sexual orientation, where the notion of ‘double jeopardy’ may well apply). At a broader level, investigators will use the lens of social inclusion to begin to distinguish those HPOs that provide for workable public authority from HPOs that merely reinforce ‘elites bargains’, ‘coalitions’ or ‘pacts’, or only seek the capacity to contain violence and to secure the property, economic interests, and opportunities of pact members (recognizing at the same time that many HPOs may be inclusive in certain respects but also remain ‘limited access orders’ in many other respects).

Fourthly, the project seeks to investigate whether the concept of ‘hybridity’ cannot be more than an analytical tool (to explain functions and dysfunctions in African security systems) and become a guide to action. We will try to establish if ‘hybridity’ in its broadest sense can furnish a strategy for building effective security systems, and the extent to which these ‘crossover’ networks (or the values motivating them) can be mobilized (or not) as checks and balances to inform and reinforce African security governance.

Finally, the project will strive to contribute to strengthening the (notoriously weak) research and evidence base of SSR, and addressing the many ‘research gaps’ in the discipline, at the same time building the research capacity of civil society groups and research institutions involved in the project, and thereby their ability to engage issues of security sector reform and governance in their respective countries.

**Case Studies/Project Countries**

Field research will be conducted in the following six African countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somaliland and South Africa. However, while some of these are case studies that seek to explore the dialectics of hybridity in national security sectors, others are thematic in nature, and seek to analyse particular facets (and impacts) of hybridity in those contexts (informal policing in Nigeria, gender and policing in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and sexual rights and citizenship in South Africa). The first (methodological) workshop of the project, held last June in Accra, Ghana, created a platform for the designated researchers to develop approaches to research appropriate to the diverse contexts of the six project countries.
The alteration between the parties about which of them is behind the Boko Haram insurgency also raises tensions and could impact on the elections if not checked. Two main factors - ethnicity and religion - are likely to continue defining party politics in the run up to elections in the coming months. The potency of these two factors may however become neutralised in some areas by money politics which appears to have an overwhelming effect on the choice of candidates by both the electorate and political elite.

The security situation has been dominated by the cases of cattle rustling, banditry, assassinations, ritual killings, political skirmishes and rape. Two different cases of violence in March 2014 killed over 200 people in Katsina and Kaduna state alone. The violent confrontations between farmers and herdsmen, as well as overnight attacks against defenceless communities in some North central states by suspected Fulani marauders, pose serious threats to national security. This situation is seen by many communities as a reflection of the failure of the Nigerian state to protect its citizen, in the face of its displacement by non-state actors in terms of the control of the instruments of coercion. The inability of the security agencies to arrest or prosecute persons and groups responsible for the spate of violence and insecurity has accounted for an entrenched culture of impunity.

Preparations for the Elections

Political parties and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) are at different levels of preparedness for the 2015 elections. Historically, Presidential and Gubernatorial elections attract more popular attention, but in the last few months indications are that Senatorial election will also become a major issue, particularly because most Governors whose tenure are ending are likely to run for senatorial seat. The political environment is therefore being defined by contentions over presidential election, gubernatorial candidates and senatorial candidates across the major political parties.

A series of political activities such as membership registration, ward congresses and rallies are being carried out by political parties in some states to galvanise action and strengthen membership base. Although there were no major incidences, some minor skirmishes were experienced at different locations. With gubernatorial elections coming up in Ekiti and Osun States in June and August 2014 respectively, INEC has taken steps to update the voters register by conducting Continuous Voters Registration (CVR) and distributing Permanent Voters Cards (PVC) in those states. It has also opened a Voters Verification Platform for those who have registered to vote in the two states' and promises to replicate these steps across the country in coming months.

Gender Dimension

A combination of cultural practices, religion and long history of political exclusion has continued to keep women out of active political participation. Although women candidates have increased in the last 10 years, the number of those who get nominated and eventually elected are still low across the country. There are however indications that more women will be contesting in the next elections; through the level of impact they can make is subject to the support they can get from the two major parties. Only a few women are currently holding leadership positions even in the political parties. As the run towards the 2015 election continues, more of female candidates are expected to emerge at all levels.

Presence and Activities of Non-State Actors

The emergence and activities of non-state actors as it relates to challenging state control over the control of the instrument of coercion is evident in the spate of violence witnessed in the North Central zone for example. This is obvious with the Ombatse phenomenon in Nasarawa State, as well as cattle theft, banditry and other forms of criminality, which include armed robbery and overnight attacks.

There are several other non-state actors involved in security activities across the country. For instance, with the increasing cases of cattle rustling, especially in Zamfara, Kaduna and Sokoto states, several community vigilante groups have been established. Sokoto, a hitherto quiet state has in the last eight years been experiencing rising spectre of political violence due to the growing notoriety of Area Boys (a militant youth group in Sokoto).

More generally, the youth bulge in all the states continues to remain ready-made reservoir of vibrant energy for recruitment by non-state actors and politicians in turn. Another threat to security in the North East zone may likely come from the Civilian JTF (CJTF) in Borno currently hailed for their gallant counter terrorism efforts in the state. The CJTF are currently heavily armed with machetes, knives, daggers etc. to fight insurgency but it is reasonable to assume also that some of the heavy weapons acquired from encounters with Boko Haram may remain in their circulation which could be readily used for intimidation during the forthcoming elections.

Migration and Internal Displacement

Due to Nigeria's porous borders, some persons from neighbouring countries such as Benin Republic, Togo, Ghana, Chad, Niger and Cameroon have been known to enter Nigerian territory illegally. These immigrants are sometimes involved in trans-border crimes such as smuggling of food items, vehicles and even small arms. These smuggled arms and ammunition are sometimes bought by politicians to arm their thugs.

The North East continues to suffer massive population movement at a scale never witnessed before principally arising from Boko Haram insurgency. The three states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe that are presently under emergency rule have recorded millions of internally displaced persons. This excludes those that have qualified as refugees across Nigeria's international borders. Scores of settlements have even been attacked several times such that their populations have now been decimated leading to grave humanitarian crisis for the people living in these communities. The fear expressed by INEC about the possibility of holding elections in the three states under emergency rule should therefore not be taken lightly. Whatever political interpretations INEC's fear might take, many people in the states are already traumatised to the extent that their willingness to participate even if elections would hold remains to be seen. This is more so given the perception in many communities about neglect by government in their times of need when these communities were ravaged by the insurgents.

Violent Hot Spots

We categorised the states according to the perceived level of threat using traffic light signals (green, amber and red); green indicating stability/lowest threat states and red indicating the highest threat level/most volatile states. The measures used for the categorisation include history of violence, degree of control by incumbent and relationship with the federal government, stability of internal state party politics, existence of terrorist/militant activity, state of emergency or communal/religious conflict, bid for second term by incumbent governor, zoning arrangement, jostle for federal and state legislative positions etc. Most states fit into various categories based on comparison within their region and not on the scale of risks nationally.
Regional Analysis

North Central: Persisting communal /religious clashes and more recent violent confrontations between farmers and herdsmen, as well as overnight attacks against defenceless communities in Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau make them high risk states. The Ombatse phenomenon in Nasarawa State makes it very volatile. Communal and religious also make Kogi and Niger risk states but not to the degree in Benue and Plateau. The political crisis in Kwara is mostly contained within the Sarakises, though deep it does not portend any immediate security challenge.

North East: Persisting insurgency activities and state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe put them in the red. The number of internally displaced persons, presence arms and political contestation within these states are also worrisome. Political contestation around the governorship in Taraba puts it in this category also. Political alignments and realignments within the PDP and APC make Gombe and Bauchi states to keenly observe.

North West: The defections across the two major parties have produced huge internal contradictions, it will take a little trigger for the bubble to burst. In Kano, there an increasing tension between Shekarau group and the old PDP in the state. In Sokoto, the tension between the group loyal to the Governor Wamako and those of PDP, particularly Senator Ahmed Maccido and former Governor Bafarawa can easily escalate. Zamfara and Katsina have also been experiencing increasing cases of cattle rustling resulting in wanton destruction of lives and property. These internal contradictions coupled with historical grievances between the opposing forces now in the same party could degenerate into violence. The threat level now are therefore highest in Zamfara and Kaduna, high in Kano, Kastina and Sokoto and lowest in Jigawa and Kebbi.

South East: Enugu and Ebonyi are both PDP states but contestation over zoning to senatorial district and fights as to who succeeds the exiting governors makes them very high risk states within their context. Defecting of the Imo governor to APC and efforts by candidates from other senatorial districts and parties to unseat him puts Imo in the red also. Growing contestation over zoning arrangements for the governorship position in Abia State makes it a state to watch. Though there is no gubernatorial election in Anambra in 2015, contestation by serving senators and new-comers will make the election one to also watch.

South South: The ongoing crisis in Rivers State keeps it in the red. Inter and intra party tension and succession contestation amongst zoning arrangements make Delta and Akwa Ibom states. Edo is not up for gubernatorial election and the senatorial elections may not throw up significant security threats. There are intra party tensions in Bayelsa and Cross Rivers but these are not likely to spill over.

South West: Osun and Ekiti States are oscillate between amber and red because of their forthcoming gubernatorial elections. Lagos, Ondo, Ogun, and Oyo are green now due to low level political activities but this will likely change to amber a couple of months from now when APC congress and conventions may have been held and INEC distributes PVC and conducts CVR. The closer we are to the candidate nomination process and campaigns the more unpredictable the political scenario becomes and likelihood of election related violence

Features

Synthesis of Key Risk Factors

1. The proliferation of arms and increasing activities of armed groups is a major risk factor. In less than three weeks over 300 people have been killed and thousands of people displaced. There are two dimensions of risks in this regard – first some of killings can easily be manipulatively attributed to some historical conflicts and therefore justify reprisals. Second some of these armed groups are potential army for electoral violence.

2. Inter and intra party conflicts: the defection and counter defection between the two major parties have generated a huge political tension. As political activities picks up within the year, we may begin to experience some violent engagements within and between the political parties.

3. Contention over candidates including zoning of presidential or gubernatorial candidates. Like what happened in 2011, if the ruling elite don’t manage the situation properly, it could escalate into a huge national crisis. Similar situation are also emerging at the state level – senatorial districts for governorship and senatorial positions.

4. Cattle rustling and conflicts between farmers and herdsmen: In the last few months over 300 people have been killed in different incidences spread across these state. It has become more like an organised crime, involving sophisticated weapon.

5. Perceptions that there is no level playing ground for people due to the hijack of the electoral process by ‘god fathers’.

6. The presence of militia groups provokes apprehension as they could be used by powerful politicians.

7. Massive displacement of people on a scale never witnessed before has led to a humanitarian crisis in the North East region and most of these people might be disenfranchised in 2015.

Mitigating Factors and Recommendations

1. Election related stakeholders – including security agencies, INEC, political parties and civil society groups must commence preparation for the 2015 election and mainstream conflict management in their plans. A quarterly security situation review can be very helpful for INEC, law enforcement agencies and CSOs.

2. Reversing the entrenched culture of impunity through the prosecution of perpetrators of violence by the police and the judiciary.

3. Public safety mechanisms across the country should be strengthened so as to assuage fears over the likelihood of violence before, during and after the elections.

4. More options for dialogue and disarmament of insurgents failing which dislodgement of their camps in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States should continue to be vigorously pursued.

5. Rapid response to the humanitarian crisis in the northeast is urgently required.

6. Efforts should be made to reduce the level of small arms in the country. The report of Presidential Committee on Small arms and the Presidential committee on Post Elections violence made useful recommendations on how to deal with these issues.

7. Urgent attempt should be made to understand the political economy and dynamics of cattle rustling in the zone. The situation is not simply about military action, it is also about having a better understanding of the situation so that a better response mechanism can be developed.

Chinedu Nwagu is a Programme Manager of the CLEEN Foundation, an institutional member of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).
PUTTING GOVERNANCE AT THE HEART OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM  
Lessons from the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development Programme

By Nicole Ball

My recent report titled *Putting Governance at the Heart of Security Sector Reform* assesses the progress recorded by the Burundi-Netherlands Security Sector Development (SSD) programme during its first four years and explains some of the factors that have enabled the SSD to begin to change the security governance landscape in Burundi.

There are important differences between the SSD programme and most other SSR programmes. The SSD was established in April 2009 with the signing of an eight-year Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two governments. The MoU laid out a number of strategic objectives for the programme, the attainment of which would strengthen the governance of Burundi’s security sector but did not tie the SSD to specific outputs or outcomes. With its governance orientation, the SSD adheres more closely to the original security sector reform (SSR) concept, which emphasised transparency and accountability, than many other SSR programmes do. The donor is much more engaged at a political level than is typically the case and structures have been created to manage and foster this engagement. National actors are significantly more involved in the design, implementation and monitoring/evaluation of SSR programmes, which is typically contracted out to external agents. Structures have also changed over time as needs have evolved or initial structures found not to work optimally.

**Approach**

The SSD programme is guided by a shared vision between the two partners and a set of loosely defined strategic objectives. The programme adopted a highly flexible problem-solving approach, taking conditions on the ground as its starting point and building on them to progressively effect change. Beginning with concrete activities aimed at improving the capacity of the military and the police during its first two years, the SSD sought to build the trust and relationships that would be necessary to seriously tackle the thorny governance issues involved in reforming the security sector. It has progressively prioritised activities intended to change the attitudes and behaviours of key Burundian actors consistent with democratic control of the security sector.

**Four key results**

In its first four years, the SSD has achieved four key results:

- Important barriers to secrecy in the security sector have been eroded, and security issues are now acknowledged by many to be the legitimate concern of the full range of Burundian stakeholders, including civil society.
- Dialogue on SSR and specifically governance-related aspects of SSR are occurring more frequently among key stakeholders in multiple fora inside and outside of government.
- The programme is increasingly inclusive as key oversight actors (the Constitutional Court, the Ombudsman’s Office and the Auditor General) and key security actors (intelligence service and the national Security Council) have joined in. A diverse group of civil society actors is also engaging more frequently. The programme has made progress in achieving the governance objectives of the SSD MoU, particularly in terms of strengthening security-sector accountability to civil authorities and adherence to national and international law and introducing the concept of financial accountability to the security services.

**Promoting a process of change**

Four features of the SSD programme have enabled it to achieve these results:

- The programme proactively addresses the politics of change at both the policy and operational levels on a daily basis. Political dialogue occurs between the two MoU governments, between the Burundian government and other international partners, and among Burundian stakeholders. It is clear from the SSD that there can be no effective SSR unless the political challenges to processes of change are squarely addressed. It is also clear that the donor government needs to be actively involved in that process.
- The SSD establishes results progressively. Multiple programming phases over eight years provide ample opportunities to respond to openings that arise as the political environment evolves and as trust and relationships develop. The SSD is not tied to objectives that made sense in the first year of the programme but are no longer feasible or salient in year five. And it is clear that seemingly small steps can lead to other and potentially more significant outcomes.
- The programme prioritises the gradual development of ownership. Responsibility and authority for identifying the strategic direction, developing activities and managing the programme have been progressively transferred to Burundian stakeholders. Burundians are increasingly the public face of the programme.
- Lastly, the SSD matches timeframe with ambition and environment. The eight-year timeframe has enabled Burundian stakeholders to understand what SSR implies and begin to adjust attitudes and behaviours so that sustainable change can take root. Because of the centrality of changing attitudes, and thus behaviours, and because governance raises inherently sensitive subjects, it is unrealistic to assume that results will be achieved quickly.

The SSD programme reminds us once again that what may seem to be a very minor change to “Northern” eyes can in fact be a substantial milestone in countries just setting out along the road to democratic governance.

**Sustainable change?**

Although the governance environment in the security sector has improved since the beginning of the SSD programme, strengthening security-sector governance remains a work in progress. The degree to which the programme will ultimately change security governance in Burundi remains to be seen. Political will among the highest ranks of Burundian political decision-makers remains weak, and although demand for change is growing it may not be adequate to offset the concerns of those who ultimately make decisions on the country’s political direction by the time the programme ends in 2017.

When this report was written in late 2013, the programme was contemplating steps to increase the chances of sustainability by expanding upwards (to senior political figures) and outwards (beyond Bujumbura). Had the SSD had the 3-5-year duration typical of donor-funded SSR programmes, there is good reason to believe its results would not have been sustainable. At the same time, many programme stakeholders have expressed concern that even eight years is not sufficient to guarantee sustainability.

This is not only because Burundi remains a resource-constrained country and continued financing will be desirable even after the MoU comes to an end in 2017. Even more important is the political pressure that programmes such as the SSD provide to stay on the path of reform.

Nicole Ball is Senior Visiting Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Centre for International Policy in Washington, DC, as well as a long-time member of the ASSN. Since 1978, Nicole has conducted research on a broad range of issues relating to security and development.

The full report can be accessed in PDF form [on this link](#).
Indigenous African Warfare: Its Concept and Art in the Gold Coast, Asante and Northern Territories up to the early 1900s by Festus Aboagye

According to the author, "The vision and inspiration for this work were nurtured between Teshie and Dehra Dun, where, as a young cadet just embracing on my military career in 1973-1975, I was struck by one remarkable difference between the study of military history at the Ghana Military Academy and at the Indian Military Academy. In Ghana, the study of military history started immediately with World Wars I and II. In India, the officer cadet started with ancient wars fought with basic weapons and formations, including animal formations. It was only after grounding these young cadets in India's national military history that the course embarked on the study of other military histories. My conviction remains that, even though we should study modern history, we should equally study our own ancient history."

It is to address such imbalance in the curriculum of the Ghana Armed Forces that the author wrote this book. The book is made up of fourteen chapters. The first chapter is titled: Towards a Theory of Indigenous Warfare. The chapter presents a structured approach to the study of the concept and art of African indigenous warfare including the encounters with colonial entities. The chapter covers a number of topics which are thoroughly discussed namely: the overview of ancient (4000 BC to 5000 BC) and medieval (500 AD to 1500 AD) warfare, synopsis of early modern military history and comparative Arab military doctrines.

The debate on whether indigenous warfare is an art or science is most fascinating and educative in this chapter. The writer asserts that indigenous warfare was more of an art, partly because its contemporary theorist and thinkers lacked the means to properly document the planning, conduct and outcomes for more systematic and analytical study. In spite of this, however, the writer agrees that, a more scientific approach to indigenous warfare is possible to some degree. For instance, indigenous generalship appreciated the doctrinal principle that offensive action was superior to defensive or that to win a war, an army must not only have superior strength, but must have it operationally organised and echeloned to achieve depth. This chapter therefore, lays the foundation for the conceptual framework of the book with comparative analysis and a number of examples. Reference to Clausewitz's theory of war to illustrate the discussions of the theory of indigenous warfare makes interesting reading in this chapter.

Specific areas of indigenous warfare are covered under Chapters Two and Three. Broadly, the chapters discuss the principles of indigenous warfare; spatial trajectory of indigenous warfare, indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms, and tools, types and levels of indigenous warfare. Of significant interest in Chapter Three are the conflict resolution mechanisms that the book as a whole highlights. The writer elaborates on the use of indigenous state councils for arbitration and mediation by first and second estates of chieftaincy and eldership.

Another important mechanism highlighted is the use of punitive expulsions ("persona non grata") to discipline trouble makers and to prevent the escalation of disputes and conflicts. This mechanism, according to the writer, was normally invoked to ensure the security and preservation of ethnic groups or the state. One effective measure the writer highlights involved the mass exile of stools and ethnic groups which was an effective tool for conflict resolution during the pre-colonial era.

Other conflict resolution mechanisms and tools discussed in the book include imposition of Vassalage, Balkanisation of conquered ethnic groups (this involves Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of armies), indigenous diplomacy, influence of indigenous civil society personalities like the fetish priest or kraomo. As part of chapter three, the writer clearly examines the types and levels of indigenous warfare which will interest most modern military strategists, tacticians and historians. These include the level of mobilisation and causalties, fortification and siege warfare, marine and riverine warfare, civil wars, coups and insurrections, guerrilla and terrorist warfare and day and night warfare.

Chapters Four and Five discuss indigenous society and the army, and the functional arms and roles of indigenous armies. The writer touches on the origins, organisation, structure and tactical doctrines of the various indigenous Asafo militias in Ghana. Interestingly, the writer identifies indigenous Military Reforms and Transformation which is equivalent to modern day Defence Sector Reforms (DSR) or Security Sector Reforms (SSR). He outlines the forms of indigenous Security Sector Reforms for comparative study by actors and researchers in wider peace support operations and in peace and security studies.

The structures of the indigenous military at operational and tactical levels (both Southern and Northern armies of Ghana) are covered under Chapters Six and Seven of the book. Prominent military strategies and doctrine covered include those of the Akyem operational doctrine, the Akan tactical doctrine of defence and offence, Asante operational doctrines, the operational organisation of the Mamprugu Army (now in Northern Region) and reforms of war and the structure of the Zabarama-Grunsi Army, among others. An important lesson here is that, the indigenous society in pre-colonial Ghana had long ago developed doctrines at the operational and tactical levels. This, therefore, serves as a great challenge to the present generation of the Armed Forces of Ghana and Africa as whole.

An important segment of the book is the evolution and employment of weapons in indigenous armies covered in Chapter Eight. The writer gives an overview of the evolution of weapons and their employment in wars. In the words of the writer 'Indigenous armies were predominantly composed of foot soldiers or infantry, the fundamental weapons were hand-held stone, bone and wooden implements...' The writer subsequently gives justification for the decline of indigenous weaponry, and the ascendency and proliferation of European weapons technology. The chapter concludes with the impact of European fire arms on tactical and operational deployments and movements and indigenous training for war.

In Chapters Nine and Ten the writer addresses issues on Command and Control in indigenous armies and warfare. Leadership and Generalship in indigenous warfare is covered extensively in Chapter Ten. The chapter gives detailed synopses of local and expatriate generalism and leadership of the various indigenous armies. Chapter Eleven discusses indigenous defence, economics and war logistics. The gender dimensions of military organisation and warfare are covered in Chapter Twelve. This segment discusses issues of women and sex in indigenous armies and warfare. The writer summarises the crucial role of women during war as the maintenance of morals, domestic economic development, rear homeland defence, direct and indirect participation in combat and combat service support.
Chapter 13 of the book deals with Military traditions, customs, conventions and norms. These, according to the author are a very important part of regimental and military history. The conventions and norms during the indigenous era covered issues like the declaration of war; request for allied assistance; reporting of war victories; recruitment; promotions; appointments and retirements; court martial and field trials; and the general treatment of prisoners of war and casualties. Military traditions and customs traced to the indigenous era included paying of compliments, gun salutes, banners and flags and indigenous military ranks and insignia. A discourse on the end of indigenous warfare and the beginning of European military legacy, form the concluding chapter of the book.

This book on Indigenous African Warfare presents over 120 different varieties of indigenous concepts and doctrines under its 14 chapters. The book is a theoretical study of military art and science; it presents a structured approach to the study of African indigenous warfare and presents a structured study, understanding and critical thinking about our past military history. This book also helps to correct the fundamental misconception that such warfare evolved only after contact with Europeans. In his comments for the launch of this book, Lieutenant General Daniel Opande, former Force Commander of the UN Mission in Liberia said: “The Indigenous African Warfare is a book that should be read by all potential peacekeeping mission leaders – civilian, military, police and humanitarian actors for useful insights and lessons towards the management and resolution of conflicts.”

Professor Eboe Hutchful, the Executive Secretary African Security Sector Network (ASSN), also stated that: “The book seeks to collate and reinterpret the scattered existing work works on indigenous military history. The book goes well beyond that by adding new areas of research such as the gender dimensions of military organisation and warfare, and military budgeting, while establishing important parallels in logistics.”

Finally, the book can help to introduce or revise the study of Military Art and Science in our higher learning institutions, to compete with similar courses offered at higher institutions in developed countries like the United Kingdom and the USA. This will help to raise the profile in the study of modern warfare.

This publication contributes significantly to the enhancement and enrichment of contemporary military professional and academic studies, and provides outstanding material for academic researchers, teachers and students of history. Students of military history in particular, will be adequately grounded on the concepts and art of warfare in the Gold Coast, Asante and the Northern Territories up to the early 1900s before they embark on the study of contemporary military history. The quality of writing and printing of the book are excellent. It is expected that in future revised editions the writer will include comparative analysis of the doctrines and tactics of the old Ghana Empire and possibly indigenous warfare in Dahomey.

Colonel Aboagye has produced a book that scholars and researchers in military history will find accessible and easy to use, and which can be adopted by any tertiary institution to formulate a course for a first degree or a post graduate course. I can imagine it being adopted for a course on “Military Art and Science” in the Master of Arts Degree in Defence and Conflict Studies proposed for the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College and possibly a future War College in Ghana. Or as a Military History textbook for Cadets training at the Ghana Military Academy, or even as material for Army Promotion Examinations in Military History.

MEMBER SPOTLIGHT: Akinola Olojo

Akinola Olojo is a doctoral candidate at the Université Paris Descartes as well as a Teaching Assistant at Sciences Po in Paris, France.

He was formerly a visiting research fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) – The Hague, and a research consultant with the Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) in Kenya and Nigeria. While at the ICCT, he worked on a project that investigated the underlying drivers of violent radicalisation in northern Nigeria, with specific focus on Boko Haram.

Akinola’s understanding of sectarian and political violence in Nigeria is further inspired by his first-hand experience of the Ife-Modakeke conflict in south-western Nigeria. While living in this conflict zone, he witnessed the sordid sights of human and material casualties, and the near total breakdown of order.

Akinola has a Masters in Conflict, Security and Development from King’s College London and another Masters in Political Science from the University of Lagos. From 2010-2012, he was a Peace, Security and Development Fellow at the African Leadership Centre (ALC) in both London and Nairobi.

In 2011, he was an African Junior Professional Fellow at the International Peace Institute (IPI), New York.

His fellowship engagements underscore his research interests in security sector reform, governance and development in Africa, human security and most significantly, sectarian violence and counter-terrorism. He has also conducted external reviews for the knowledge production department of the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) in South Africa.


Akinola is also an external reviewer for the Journal of Terrorism Research at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland, as well as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) also in Scotland.
The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) was founded in 2003 to help harmonise the various African organisations carrying out activities in the broad areas of Security Sector Reform (SSR), Security Sector Transformation (SST) and Security Sector Governance (SSG).

Our fundamental objective is to facilitate progress towards the achievement of Effective and Democratically-Governed Security Sectors across the African continent. We pursue this mission by spearheading and implementing programmes aimed at strengthening the capacities of African governments, National Security institutions, Parliaments, Intergovernmental Organisations and Civil Society groups to undertake and own SSR programmes. The ASSN also strives to expand the concept of African SSR through sustained research, publication and training.

The driving vision of the ASSN is that of an African Security Sector that is Democratically Governed, People-Centred, Well Managed, Accountable and Effective in supporting and sustaining Human Security.

OUR PRIMARY TOOLS ARE:

- Advocacy and facilitation of emerging SSR and SSG networks;
- Promotion of inclusive dialogue and informed debate around issues of Security and Justice, designed to influence decision-makers and policy processes;
- Enhancement of Security literacy among the continent’s policy- and decision-makers and the general public, through training, education, and dissemination of resource materials;
- Support for policy and institutional development, via applied research and provision of advisory and consultancy services;
- Building of capacity within the Security Sector, as well as relevant policy and oversight organs;
- Promotion of an African-centred focus through dissemination of African 'best practices' in the areas of SSR/SSG; and
- Functioning as a continental information repository on SSR/SSG.

ASSN STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

In the short to medium term, the bulk of the ASSN’s efforts will be channelled towards the following strategic priorities:

1. Assisting the African Union (AU) and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to develop and deliver on their SSR/SSG agenda, in accordance with the ASSN’s MOU with the AU, and a related tripartite agreement between the AU Commission, the UN and the ASSN;

2. Assisting African countries (particularly those undertaking SSR as intrinsic part of their transition from situations of conflict to peace) to plan and implement SSR programmes, and to better comply with AU/REC SSR frameworks and standards;

2b. Addressing current gaps in SSR and integrating excluded programmatic elements, particularly those that strengthen Governance and improve Security and Justice for the poor and vulnerable such as the following:

(i) Strengthening the Gender dimensions of SSR/SSG;
(ii) Forging closer links between SSR, Justice and the Rule of Law;
(iii) Integrating private, informal and customary Security and Justice institutions into SSR, in recognition of the often crucial roles they play in providing Security for the poor and ensuring social peace and stability;
(iv) Engaging Intelligence organs and facilitating Intelligence reforms.

3. Building the capacity of National Legislatures and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) to engage with SSR/SSG and to better conduct their Security Oversight responsibilities;

4. Running a ‘Next Generation of Security Analysts’ Programme, which entails building the capacities of young professionals in policy, research and advocacy around SSR/G.

If you are interested in supporting our work in any of these areas, or generally in collaborating with the ASSN on related projects, please contact our Donor Liaison Officer on info@africansecuritynetwork.org.
Our Regional Hubs

In West Africa

African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR)
Accra, Ghana
Website: www.africansecurity.org
Regional Coordinator: Dr. Uju Agomoh

In East Africa and the Great Lakes Region

Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC)
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Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD)
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