REPORT

METHODOLOGICAL WORKSHOP ON
HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

16 - 18 June 2014
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Accra

Compiled by:
Jane Abubakar and
Elom Khaunbiow
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>ASSN</td>
<td>African Security Sector Network</td>
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<td>CBOs</td>
<td>Community Based Organisations</td>
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<td>CDF</td>
<td>Civil Defence Forces</td>
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<td>CHISECs</td>
<td>Chiefdom Security Committees</td>
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<td>CODESRIA</td>
<td>Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa</td>
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<td>CONTRALESA</td>
<td>Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa</td>
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<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DISECs</td>
<td>District Security Committees</td>
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<td>FRCI</td>
<td>Republican Forces of Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>IDRC</td>
<td>International Development and Research Centre</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
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<td>KAIPTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>LGBTs</td>
<td>Lesbians, Gays, Bi-sexuals and Transgenders</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>OPC</td>
<td>O'odua Peoples Congress</td>
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<td>PROSECs</td>
<td>Provisional Security Committees</td>
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<td>SNM</td>
<td>Somali National Movement</td>
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<td>Security Sector Governance</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire</td>
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<td>WACSW</td>
<td>West African Civil Society Institute</td>
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The African Security Sector Network (ASSN) would like to render its heartfelt appreciation to all participants of the Methodological Workshop on Hybrid Security Governance in Africa for their engaging participation and valuable contributions.

The ASSN is particularly grateful to the International Development and Research Centre for its financial support to the project.

Special thanks also go to the ASSN Executive Committee Members, particularly Prof Eboe Hutchful, project leader, Prof Robin Luckham and Dr Niagale Bagayoko as well as staff of the secretariat who anchored the proposal that won the grant.

We also acknowledge the ASSN staff whose efforts saw the event through to a successful end.

Our appreciation also turns to Mrs Titilope Ajayi-Mamattah of the West Africa Civil Society Institute (WACSI) for her tremendous support in reviewing this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In April, 2014, the ASSN received a generous grant from the International Development and Research Centre (IDRC) to conduct research on Hybrid Security Governance in Africa. This is a three-year research project targeting six African countries: Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Somaliland, South Africa, Liberia and Nigeria.

To inaugurate the project and roll out the research, a Methodological Workshop was held in Accra from 16-18 June 2014 at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC). The event brought together twenty people, including all the designated researchers for the respective case-study countries, research supervisors, project coordinators and independent experts, to share conceptual reflections, critically review methodologies for the field research, and consider risk mitigation strategies in the volatile environments in which much of this research is expected to take place.

The workshop was guided by the original proposal, a synthesis document of research questions and presentations and discussions on each project country. Details of the rich discussions are in the report but some key comments are summarized below:

- There was a long debate about definitions of the concepts formal/informal, state/non-state and their usefulness as descriptors of the boundaries between the varied groups involved in security governance in Africa.

- The project should:
  - Streamline gender throughout the project and not only in selected case studies. Researchers should also be mindful that gender does not just mean women (we have different needs anyway) but also increasingly LGBT persons.
  - Creatively engage policy makers in the research process to create a sense of ownership and interest in the final products (particularly policy papers).
  - Consider how the research can contribute to knowledge as well as influence behaviour change that can help address Africa’s most pressing security concerns.

At the end of the workshop, the ASSN committed to sign agreements with all individual researchers and research centres to commence the research work and to prepare and disseminate to all researchers a concept paper based on the original proposal and incorporating all suggestions from the workshop.
DAY ONE

OPENING REMARKS

Eboe Hutchful, the project leader and Executive Secretary of the ASSN introduced the workshop as a platform to share conceptual reflections, critically review methodologies for the field research and consider risk mitigation strategies in the volatile environments in which much of the research is expected to take place. He added that the points of divergence created by the diverse political landscapes in the different project countries call for critical thinking into the research questions in order to build consensus around which questions best fit which case studies.

Ramata Thioune, the IDRC Programme Officer indicated that despite the different forms of hybrid security systems across the continent and their concomitant challenges, IDRC expects that through this research, a coherent story on hybrid security governance in Africa can be told to create a better understanding of the subject and address related issues. Ultimately, the project should be able to foster state-building in Africa. Related to IDRC’s thematic focus on research for development, she noted that the project should contribute to knowledge generation, positive changes in policies, practices and behaviour as well as building both individual and institutional research capacities which Africa is in dire need of.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Niagale Bagayoko & Robin Luckham

In this interactive session, Niagale Bagayoko gave an overview of the four main research questions:

1. How does informality become embedded in formal security and justice provision; and how and by whom is it instrumentalized?

2. What are the roles of ‘non-State’, ‘informal’ and ‘customary’ security actors?

3. What are the impacts of hybrid security provision on the security and entitlements of citizens, especially in situations of conflict, exclusion and inequity?

4. How can viable and accountable security and justice institutions be built in contexts of informality and hybridity?

She further led the analysis of the sub-questions under each of the four main research questions. (please see annex 1 for the full presentation). The presentation received the following comments:

- Researchers should ascertain whether the hybrid nature of security governance is an African or global phenomenon and if it is global, then what makes it ubiquitous?

- Explore further who determines which security actors/institutions are formal and informal as well as how informal actors/institutions are formalized and vice-versa.
- A paragraph should be added to explain the terminologies - informal, formal, codified, customary, statutory, traditional, etc.

- Capture the role of private security actors in hybrid security governance

- Highlight the importance of micropolitics especially, those issues that are ill-understood but greatly impact security.

- In the case of Federal Republics, explore how to classify security actors who are formalized at the state level but not at the federal level, like the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria.

- Formality and informality must capture both functional and dysfunctional entities.

- Broaden the scope of the informal and formal security actors to include Civil Society actors.

- Hybrid security governance should be examined vis-à-vis new security threats

- Given the strong linkage of security to justice, it will be appropriate to bring in the justice dimension as well. In a way, inaccessibility to justice or injustice is a security challenge.

- Examine who has the legitimacy to be included in the group considered as security actors

LIBERIA

Gender, Transitional Justice and Justice Sector Reform in Liberia

Freida Ibiduni M’cormack

The presentation gave a background into the proposed title as well as the rationale for the choice of focus. It also touched on the proposed research questions, conceptual considerations, proposed research strategy, challenges and risks/mitigations measures, research impacts and timelines for carrying out the research. Highlights of the presentation are as follows:

Liberia is confronted with a disproportionate police to civilian ratio (1 police personnel:150 people) coupled with limited access to formal justice systems by the majority of the population. This situation has caused majority of Liberians to continue to rely on traditional mechanisms as alternatives to law enforcement and dispute resolution. This is very much entrenched in the Liberian society and does not only concentrate on justice but restorative justice. The alternative traditional systems include cults, secret societies and the ‘palava’ hut system. While such arbitration is generally considered necessary for filling the void of an inadequate formal justice system, the Government has taken active steps to curtail, through prohibition, some of the more problematic traditional practices. This includes the ‘Sassywood’ or trial by ordeal, whereby guilt is determined or confession elicited primarily by ingesting poison but also oath-taking, burning and so on. Typically, much of these traditional practices have absolutely no gender considerations and have brought untold hardships on women and children in particular as certain acts that would be criminalized at the formal level are treated as social problems that can be ‘talked through’ under the traditional system.
This consequently, calls for an urgent two-fold intervention to strengthen formal police and justice sector processes on the one hand and support for informal initiatives for conflict resolutions on the other. So far, a national, inclusive ‘Palava Hut’ project has been launched within the national reconciliation framework. It has attracted international funding, and is being trialled as a community level transitional justice mechanism.

The research dwells on these two major questions:

- In a context where the legal justice system is under-resourced and under-capacitated, what are the prospects for, and implications of, complementary rather than competitive dispute resolution systems particularly for women who continue to be under-served by both customary and statutory systems?

- How are ongoing processes, such as decentralization of security provision and promotion of alternative dispute resolution, influencing women’s access to justice?

In terms of conceptual considerations, the presentation noted that in Liberia, the hybrid nature of security governance is recognised and, to some extent, promoted by the government of Liberia through the Ministry of Internal affairs. It is also worthy of note that this is not a post-conflict development but one that has been with Liberia since history. It will also in parallel, consider potentially contradictory (statutory and non-statutory) processes, including those being supported by international partners as well as potentially focusing on family and land conflicts.

The proposed research strategy for data collection will use formal and informal interviews with a wide range of actors including government officials, Civil society/women groups, international agencies, UN organisations, justice and security agents and traditional authorities. The researcher will also observe proceedings of Justice and Security Hubs, Palava Huts and Criminal Court ‘E’ (which handles cases of sexual violence in Liberia).

The presentation identified access to key informants/gatekeepers and data sensitivity as the major risks to the research but proposed tapping into existing networks and limiting the scope of the research as mitigating measures.

At the end of this presentation, the discussant, Titilope Ajayi-Mamattah proposed that the discussion session be done after the presentation on the Sierra Leonean case because of the similarities in the issues.

**SIERRA LEONE**

**Bondo Society, Gender and Police Reform in Sierra Leone**

_Fredline M’cormack-Hale_

The presentation captured the background and rationale of the research and highlighted that the issue of informality, formalization and hybridity is very salient in Sierra Leone, where it is recognised that security, policing and justice go beyond the state.

Generally, the state is unable to address the security needs of the citizens, so traditional informal mechanisms have become the only recourse. The main question guiding the research was given
as “what roles do Secret societies play in security, policing and justice and how do they interface with the formal state institutions”? Additionally, given the interest in gender in countries transitioning from conflict and the disproportionate impact on women; the research further looks at how and whether these societies can better serve the needs and advance the rights of women.

Sierra Leone runs a kind of dual governance system where constitutional rule co-exists with customary law (though the constitution supposedly takes precedence where there is conflict). The key challenge for Sierra Leone since the end of the civil war has been to not only develop governance structures that answer to modern principles of democracy, social inclusion and service provision but also respect the political and cultural preferences of the Sierra Leonean people. For instance, people see Chiefs as the primary source of legitimacy when it comes to conflict resolutions in the community.

Despite the acknowledgement of the need to work on informal systems, what is missing are the secret societies. The Secret societies in general and Women’s Secret Societies in particular have not been included in the review of customary justice institutions though these societies are widely revered, if not feared, and many loathe interfering with them, even the Police.

**BONDO/SANDE**

Women secret societies play instrumental roles in all aspects of community life. They are known as Bondo in the North and in Freetown and Sande in the South. It regulates members’ activities as well as serves as a source of mutual insurance for members. It is assumed that these women are bound together through a common experience, through initiation ordeal. They can even unite against offending males.

Given the importance of these women’s secret societies to the lives of the majority of women, it is clear that understanding Bondo and the role it plays in terms of security and justice in the lives of women, fit well within the research questions that guide this study.

The following is a summary of contributions from participants on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean presentation:

- For a more comprehensive literature review, the book titled *Women and Security Governance in Africa* edited by Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech is recommended.
- In managing the risks to the research, the security of the researchers and interviewees should be ensured. The issue of accessibility to information has to be taken more seriously because of the context and the sensitivity of the topic, particularly in the case of Sierra Leone.
- Gender issues must be seen more broadly (not just on women).
- Explore the wider range of relationships between the state and the non-state and how women have been served or under served by the various groups.
- In the Sierra Leonean case study, the synopsis should be aligned with the presentation.
• For both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the researchers should insert background and history in the research document.

• Examine the image of Ellen Sirleaf at the international level and the way she is perceived by the women movement in Liberia.

• Analyze the impacts of the tension between “indigenes” and “foreigners” (the Americo-liberian) on the study.

For an in-depth analysis of issues, the following questions were proposed to be added to the research questions

• The researcher should study the role played by traditional healers, religious groups, private security, etc., in the context of the national reconciliation

• What kind of effects do the laws, provisions, policies trying to regulate these secret societies have?

• What are the processes that led to the development of these policies?

• What explains the fear of the state actors’ to confront these secret societies?

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Civil Defence Forces and Chiefdom Security Committees in Sierra Leone

Osman Gbla

The second presentation on Sierra Leone was structured in five parts: background of the study, objectives, major research questions, methodology and the result and dissemination. Highlights of the presentation are as follows:

Sierra Leone is an interesting case study for a research on hybrid security governance dynamics in Africa. The country defies the logic of the traditional security where the state monopolizes the legitimate use of force to protect its territory and citizens. This is evident in the ignominious role played by the armed forces and civilians efforts at organizing themselves to assure their own security. A case in point being the Civil Defence Forces (CDFs), which are a combination of groups of local hunter militia, established by citizens. The most pronounced of these groups include the Kamajohs, in the Southeast; the Gbethis, Tamaboros and Kapras in the North and the Donsos in Kono. The emergence of these forces had great implications for post-conflict security governance in the country that was not adequately considered in the national post-reconstruction agenda. As with most other post-conflict restructuring exercises, SSR in Sierra Leone has focused essentially on statutory forces.

Sierra Leone also represents an innovation especially when it comes to deliberate and pragmatic efforts to integrate customary institutions into the post-war national security and justice
architecture, in part through the philosophy of decentralization. As a good example of the formalization of hybridity, Sierra Leone harks back to the British colonial indirect rule practice of co-opting and subordinating indigenous institutions to the services of the colonial state. The newer form of this decentralization is the setting up of chiefdom security committees, (CHISECS) which are in turn closely aligned to the Provincial Security Committees (PROSECS) and District Security Committees (DISECS), an intervention that integrates traditional chiefs into the national security and intelligence structure where they are designed to act as the eyes and ears of the national security dispensation, particularly in the border areas.

Although there are formal security and justice bodies, recognized by the country's constitution, there are non–statutory security and justice outfits including the traditional authorities that exercise control over their areas based on cultural norms and practices. For instance, over 70% of Sierra Leoneans, rely on family members, local chiefs, elders or leaders and Paramount Chiefs for dispute resolution. Other alternative justice providers include village and tribal headmen, Mammy Queens, youth chairmen, traditional society elders (poro and bondo); religious leaders (pastors and imams) and community leaders. Local courts are semi-formal institutions with jurisdiction over issues such as marriages, divorce, debt, and succession and land tenure. Determinations are made on the basis of customary law, which, under the constitution is part of the common law of Sierra Leone.

The presentation concluded that SSR in Sierra Leone initially focused on statutory forces thus undermining serious efforts to look at non-statutory forces especially regarding their oversight and interface with formal security forces. The proposed study will consequently seek to address this gap.

The five major research questions proposed by the study are:

- How have the informal security structures of the kamajohs and Chiefdom Security Committees been handled in Sierra Leone’s post war reconstruction?
- What are the relationships between these two informal security structures spawned by the conflict and the constitutionally mandated security structures?
- How have these hybrid security structures supported or undermined (a) elite political projects or (b) the safety and well-being of ordinary communities in the aftermath of the war?
- What are the constitutional implications of creating security structures that do not have a legal basis and yet are considered (at least by some groups and communities) to be vital for their security (if not necessarily an unmixed blessing) and by others as vectors of insecurity?
- What were the gender implications of these informal security structures, especially in the North of Sierra Leone where women are culturally and socially marginalized?

A summary of the comments received are as follows:
Gaps at the level of SSR:

- The case study is more SSR than SSG as the Sierra Leone’s Parliament remained destitute with very little investment in oversight;
- The idea of conjoining Security and Development should be delved into further as one cannot assume that where you have security, development follows;
- Two levels of tension and competition:
  - Police/Military do not want to be commanded by the Office of National Security, through National Security Council
  - Reconciliation and Accountability (approach to SSR.)
- Work with James Vincent who has a lot of data on the subject.
- Link the study to the Mano River Union countries: CDF is a key element to help do a comparative study with Côte d’Ivoire for instance;
- Further explore how the formalization of local governance systems impact security in Sierra Leone?
- Examine when, where and how the state decided to deploy hybrid governance?

CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Security Structures and Traditional Ties and Solidarities in Côte d’Ivoire

Michele Pépé

This presentation commenced with an introduction to the politico-military crises Côte d’Ivoire underwent and its consequences on the present security apparatus. Since 2012, the Ivorian government has initiated a Security Sector Reform programme in addition to a DDR process. This SSR-DDR process is highly influenced by political and personal interests and does not foster the reposing of confidence by the population in the process partners.

Historically, the security and defence forces have always been subservient to the political power on ethnic and regional basis. The social and political protest against the one-party system (which governed Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 to 1990) has also impacted on the security and defence forces which are further divided by political and regional cleavages. On the 24 December 1999, the Armed Forces, manipulated by political actors staged a coup against the President Henri Konan Bédié (1993-1999), who succeeded Houphouët-Boigny (1960-1993). This was followed by a chaotic military transition and a multitude of other failed coups. The subsequent coup d’Etat of 11 September 2002 further divided the country into two.
In the south was a regular army which was coexisting with different “heterogeneous” armed group with an unclear command.

In the north, armed rebel groups, were supervised by defectors from the regular armed forces, and were organized in a structure called Forces armées des Forces nouvelles. They were organized in small armed groups, operating under the direction of “heads of zones” (Comzones), who were in fact real warlords. Although these former warlords and some of their elements have been integrated into the new army renamed, Republican Forces of Côte Ivoire (FRCI), their informal structure and their subordination to non-state actors has not been completely broken.

The challenge of the SSR process in Côte d’Ivoire is the ambition to recompose the defence and security system in order to integrate these two armies that have different cultures and backgrounds. Hence, the principal research questions, “What is the human resources policy of the defence and security forces as well as their traditional ties and solidarities?” and “What is the decision-making system and power distribution in the various military-political groups?”

The proposed research strategy for this study will comprise identifying and understanding how the system of defence and security is organized, how the security forces really work and ascertain whether the links of subordination and alliances forged with parallel forces and/or religious or political, regional, persist. The research will also delve into the impact of the new army in construction and the quality of services provided to the population.

In the first instance, the research will focus on the literature review (laws and regulations, previous studies, press releases); and the identification of potential sources of information; networking for formal or informal discussions with individuals or groups from both the armed forces and other security services as well as SSR actors.

In terms of research risks, the presentation noted that difficulties may arise from the extreme political sensitivity of the subject, the fragility of the political and security situation, mistrust of the political authorities and the military hierarchy often on the defensive on the issue and the electoral calendar.

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Dozos in Côte d’Ivoire
Fahiraman Rodrigue Kone

Giving some background on the topic, Dozo was presented as a brotherhood of traditional hunters now very active in the security system of Côte d’Ivoire. They are estimated to number about 18,000 by ONUCI and 40,000 by Camara Siaka Dozoba (the president of the Dozo in Côte d’Ivoire). Their presence in the Ivoirian security apparatus is a real controversy since they are considered by some as a militia (they are accused of many serious human rights violations) at the service of Allasane Ouattara’s regime and by others as a group that helps to reduce crime. The objective of the research is consequently, not to support any of these assertions but rather assess their implications on a hybrid security system, whilst SSR is ongoing in the country.
Two reasons account for the emergence of the Dozos. The first is the failure of the state to ensure citizen security from the 90s and the second is the Dozo’s entry into politics around the same period to feel the security gaps.

The major research questions include:

- How Dozos influence the security system and policy in Cote d’Ivoire?
- What are the different roles that these non-state actors play in the Ivorian security system? What are the structures at the socio-economic, socio-ideological and the political level, which promotes the involvement of the brotherhood in the security system? In other words, what are the political, economic and social structures logic (ideologies, beliefs, parent, ethnicity, etc.) underlying this involvement in the security system in Cote d’Ivoire?
- What are the sub-regional dynamics that impact the security role of Dozo at national level?
- What is the level of integration of the brotherhood in the Official security apparatus?
- What were the attitudes and reactions of governments to face this Dozo involvement in this system in the post-crisis context? How can we analyze these reactions? What are the implications for our research program?

Two trends emerged in response to the evolution of the Dozos.

First trend (official): was meant to fight against the presence of Dozo in the security system. Basically there are two types of Dozos. The first category, the real Dozos are hunters and must return to their traditional activity. The second category are the fake Dozos who commit abuses and must be disarmed and reintegrated into civilian life.

The second trend is the Laissez-faire of the political and administrative authorities with the consequence of the "Dozoïsation" of the Ivorian security apparatus. Contrary to the official discourse, the Dozos appear to be closely involved in the state security action. Since 2012, the Republican Forces of Cote d’Ivoire have regularly suffered deadly attacks on the Liberian border. These attacks, attributed to diehard supporters of the former president, are always followed by military operations in which the Dozos fight "the enemy" alongside regular forces. The authorities also condone their very showy and spectacular presence in pro-Gbagbo areas in order to discourage any attempt to the constitution of protest movements. If the current president, Alassane Ouattara is possibly facing a military challenge, his supporters are almost certain to rely on the loyalty of Dozos since they can mobilize quickly.

In some areas, where the state cannot provide effective security, the presence of Dozos is well tolerated by state representatives who negotiate with them the security stability in their area.

The presentation concluded that there is a seeming compromise between the Dozos and the State. On the one hand, the state supports the Dozos to ensure its legitimacy and local security. On the other hand, members of the Brotherhood negotiate their employability in the new company
positioning itself within the army, or by acting as security guards. This creates a kind of evolution from an official to alternative security, a compromise between the modern state and its traditional societies. Consequently, moving beyond political instrumentalisation of the Dozos to re-think their place in the security apparatus is critical to the research.

Below is a summary of the comments on the presentation:

**The researchers were encouraged to:**

- Set a clear research methodology (the sociological aspect must be emphasized)
- Work more closely and possibly, produce a common case study
- Enrich the questions and synchronize them with the 4 main research questions proposed.
- Explain the choice of sources. The identification of sources is very important.
- The security of the research and the quality of the research itself should be considered as risks

**The Dozo case study:**

- Lay emphasis on the regional dimension
- Elaborate a mapping of the Dozos in West Africa and Côte d’Ivoire: Trajectories and interactions
- Establish a link with the research on Kamajors in Sierra Leone. Is there any transnational solidarity between these groups? What are the ethnic ties between Dozos in Cote d'Ivoire and traditional hunters in Burkina Faso’s for instance?
- What makes the Dozos more legitimate? How could their ethical norms, code of conduct, etc., be used in the modern state?
- The black magic aspect has to expanded. It is also better to use the term “Mystic” than “Irrational”.
- What are the formal and informal relationships with the State?
- What are the links with land and immigration issues?
- There exists a transnational dimension to the Dozo case that needs to be well analyzed. The periodic meetings among Dozos from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali is a case in point.

**The Security Structures and Traditional Ties and Solidarities in Côte d’Ivoire**

- This research has to go beyond an analysis of the legislation and the formal relation between the security actors.
- Map out the different ethnic groups in the Army
- The role of each actor (state and traditional actors) has to be analyzed
- What are the “invisible” links between the security actors?
- What is the nature of the relation between the Security and Defence Forces on one hand and the *Forces Nouvelles* on the other. In other words, between the formal and informal actors?
- Analyze the role of the *FECI* (which became a militarized militia by supporting Gbagbo).
- Analyze the influence of the religious communities in the security sector
- Analyse the impact of diplomatic relations on the security sector. For instance, the relations between Dos Santos and Gbagbo as a response to the relation that existed between Savimbi and Houphouët
- Consider the international dimensions as well. For instance, what was France formal and informal role? How does France confront the Dozo “phenomenon”?
- There is a transnational dimension in the Dozo’s case that exists and needs to be well analyzed. There is periodic meeting among Dozos from Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali for instance.
This presentation generally covered the political history of Somaliland and the structures and systems that facilitated the consolidation of peace and security in Somaliland after decades of violent conflict.

The presentation highlighted that Somaliland typically had two systems of governance: the Traditional and the British rule. The traditional system was however, not only revered by the indigenes but by the British governments as well. So entrenched are the country’s traditional values that they were strictly adhered to by the British and technocrats were unable to eliminate the traditional system. For instance, where the British governor needed to talk to a local chief, the governor would pay the chief homage at his palace rather than summon the chief. These deeply-rooted traditional values contributed immensely to the success attained in the struggle for peace and democracy in Somaliland and earned the country attributes like ‘an oasis of peace’ in a volatile region.

The presentation acknowledged the famous view that the peace and state building mission in Somaliland has been attainable without external support as against the other parts of the Somali territories (the Italian Somalia) where all attempts by regional and international communities for enhancing the peace and state building project have been tragically unsuccessful despite immense financial support and military engagements. The success was largely attributed to the historical and cultural diversities as well as the dissimilarities between the two – Somaliland and the Italian Somalia.

The almost one century of British dominance left Somaliland with no significant socio-economic and political change and with very little features of modernization. The African traditional system however, remained vibrant essentially because of the indirect rule of the British which was based on clan authorities, known as “Somaliland Local Authority”. Further, unlike Southern Somalia, where the Italian educated class had been highly politicised and ideologically committed to party politics, the British education system in Somaliland produced generations of non-politicized class of technocrats. Again, the system of security sector and its governance in Somaliland, both during the colonial and post-colonial era had been a fusion of traditional and modern systems unlike the South which inherited the Italian system of security sector governance.

The presentation also recounted the numerous intra-state civil wars that plagued the Horn of Africa in the late 70s and 80s much of which was against the authoritarian military regimes and the rise of the Somali National Movement (SNM) in response to the quest for democratic governance. The SNM was a blend of diverse political forces who worked in harmony by restraining their innermost differences and worked together for a common cause. The central and executive committees, as well as the military command of the organization represented the urban elite and their political orientations whilst the Council of elders (Guurti) represented the traditional
value of governance (pastoralists and agro-pastoralist population and their role as actors in both peace and war times. The Guurti stands for the highest reference and the main players in the reconciliation endeavours through traditional means. The alliance of these forces came as a result of a historical necessity dictated by times of difficulties. In spite of its heterogeneous character of the SNM, it has sustained its democratic as well as customary oriented nature and successfully conducted six general party congresses during the decade of conflict. This is a feat the two organisations that dominated South Somalia at the time were unable to achieve.

To a large extent, Somaliland owes its political stability to the combination of the traditional and modern values of governance which contributed immensely to SNM’s victory in the war against the military regime in 1991 both militarily and morally. This culminated in the establishment of a new model of security and political governance, the first of its kind in a post-conflict situation in Africa. Thereafter, the hostilities ignited by the military regimes amongst Somaliland Clans were amicably resolved by conducting reconciliation conferences (known as “shirr” took place under trees) to end hostilities between warring clans. This act is in consonance with the nomadic culture and tradition in the Somali Society. The traditional authorities rather than the political elites have been the drivers of such conferences with the latter only playing a complementary role. At the same time, the clans facilitated a very successful voluntary DDR process as all the armed groups were willing to give up their arms.

The foregoing further accentuates the fact that the course of action for peace and state building as well as the democratization processes in Somaliland has been through local efforts and internally raised funds without external assistance. This achievement did not come easy as the country went through decades of violent conflicts coupled with the imposition of an embargo by the Arab World that isolated the country and denied it of external support by the rest of the world.

Comments gathered on this presentation are as follows:

- The narration is crucial in understanding the unique political systems and hybrid nature of governance and security in Somaliland

- It equally emphasizes the impact of the traditional values on the liberation war. The people believed in fighting for their common good and mobilized internal human and financial resources to halt the lingering violence. There was consequently, no incentive to prolong peace processes unlike in other parts of Somalia and the rest of Africa, where external assistance became a lucrative business for protracting peace processes.

- The Voluntary Disarmament process initiated by the clans is very remarkable considering that it was successful.

- At the end of the war, a profit-sharing rather than a winner-takes-all approach was adopted and that is a significant achievement in consolidating peace.

- The timing of international intervention is very crucial as well, as it came in at a time when the peace process had been finalized. It probably could have had negative consequences if it had arrived earlier like what has been recorded in other African countries.
Somaliland presents a case of a country in the Global South building its own authentic ‘African Democracy’.

- Further underscore the influence and role of the traditional authorities at the local, national and regional levels in the new democratic dispensation particularly in the resolution of conflicts.
- Even though international aid was not visible or public, it may have indirectly supported the process through the participation of foreign-funded CSOs. To that end, it was suggested to highlight the role of CSOs in the process.

- The case study should highlight the importance of the bottom-up approach in Security Sector Governance

- Shed more light on the research methodology

- Whilst the presentation clearly depicted a hybrid system of governance, the nexus between hybridity and the security sector was missing.

- The case of Somaliland serves as a good ground to rethink how to approach conflict resolution in the rest of Africa.

- Even though Puntland is nowhere near Somaliland in terms of democratisation, it has been only slightly less successful in state reconstruction AND there are useful lessons to learn from its experiences. It therefore is inappropriate to structure the study in terms of ONLY a British Somaliland vs. Italian Somalia comparison. Consideration of the Puntland experiences will reinforce the BOTTOM-UP hypotheses that are being advanced from Somaliland. It is fine to focus the primary research on Somaliland but to frame the study as narrowly as currently proposed will only duplicate Bradbury’s book. For Puntland rely on the excellent materials by the War-torn Societies Programme in WSP Somali Programme, REBUILDING SOMALIA: ISSUES AND POSSIBILITIES FOR PUNTLAND (London: HAAN Associates, 2001) @ PO Box 607, London SW16 1EB.

- Considering that the security and justice sectors are male-dominated, bringing out the gender dimensions of the case study would be worthwhile.

- The role of women and its impact on the political system is also worth capturing.

- Given the advocacy for the next generation of peacebuilders, it would be worth capturing the role of the youth in the peace and state-building process, particularly, the extent to which they have been included or excluded.

- The involvement of the diaspora in the reconstruction process would also add value to the research analysis and should be incorporated in the research.
Lastly, it would be worth noting, the identifiable role of foreign actors/assistance when it finally came in and what impact they made as well as whether the security systems that emerged after the end of hostilities and the DDR can be described as hybrid.

NGERIA
Safety and Security of Urban Poor Communities in Nigeria
Nengak Daniel Gondyi & Aishatu Sambo

Focusing on four informal security institutions (The Hisbah, Civilian Joint Task Force, O’odua People’s Congress and the Bakassi Boys), the presentation brought to light the perceived and real threats of the urban poor communities and the relationship between the informal and formal security institutions as well as how these security providers are perceived by the urban poor communities. In the Nigerian context, non-state actors are not necessarily illegal as they exist alongside the formal security actors and enjoy the state’s support. Again, the general citizenry has grown to understand security in tiers from the micro level (domestic) to the macro level (state level). Highlights of the presentation are captured below:

The central government of Nigeria owns and operates all armed services in the country and limits security discourse to a large extent. Whilst the onus of providing security for the general citizenry rests on the state, developments over the past decades illuminated the state’s inability to effectively respond to the diverse security challenges that confronted the country. This led to a proliferation of non-state actors in the security arena at the local level in the late 1990s. These actors gained much popularity over time, largely because they benefited from the proximity with local communities, their understanding of local norms and practices as well as mutual trust between them and local community leaders to provide tailor-made security measures in local capacity. Nevertheless, the challenge of ensuring smooth relations and effective coordination of security between formal and informal institutions in Nigeria still lingers.

THE HISBAH

The Hisbah is an informal (separate from the police) security actor that operates in Kano, North West Nigeria created to enforce Sharia, the Islamic penal law in the early 2000s. It is however, considered a formal institution in some sense because, it was created by law and ensures compliance with the Sharia law.

Hisbah works collaboratively with the police but at a point, the central government sued the Hisbah for usurping its exclusive policing powers as there was no legislative support for their existence. Recently, when the Kano Governor and Emir had their police protection withdrawn, Hisbah took over their protection.

THE CIVILIAN JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF)

The Civilian JTF is located in Borno, North East Nigeria. It is a force of youths mobilised at the height of Boko Haram insurgency. Its formation could largely be attributed to the perceived failure of the formal security agencies in Borno State. The JTF typically works with the formal security
institutions (military in particular) and consists of between 15-30 youth who understand their context (local communities, language, culture and religion) better. The JTF is present in all 27 local governments of the state. They are recruited, supported, trained and provided with grants by the Borno State government.

THE O’ODUAH PEOPLE’S CONGRESS

The O’odua People’s Congress (OPC) is based in Lagos, South West Nigeria. OPC grew out of the controversy which trailed the annulment of the presidential election of 1993. It formed a vigilante wing to provide neighbourhood security, channel the energies of its restive youths and protect itself from the army but soon became more feared than the criminals it was designed to confront. The group is alleged to possess supernatural powers over bullets and can magically solve tough crimes. After the 1999 elections, leaders of the OPC were arrested and charged to court. This notwithstanding, OPC remained a very vocal political actor, but its security services have become less pronounced.

THE BAKASSI BOYS

The Bakassi Boys are based in Imo State, North East Nigeria. It was originally established in Aba, South-East of Nigeria to patrol, and prevent crime as well as investigate crimes within the market. The group soon covered Abia State and spread to Anambra and Imo States where it was backed by state-level legislation. The Bakassi Boys succeeded in controlling crime in the region but not in creating an atmosphere of safety as residents live more in fear of the Bakassi Boys than in fear of regular crime. They were equally feared for their alleged supernatural powers. However, complaints about their domineering tendencies pitched them against the formal police and the Federal Government stood to ban their operation and totally disband them.

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Despite the existence of these informal security providers and their collaboration with the formal security sector institutions, there has been a worrying observation from the National Crime and Safety Survey from 2010 to 2013 as depicted in the chart below. The level of trust of the citizens in vigilante groups is significantly higher than the levels of trust for the police. This pattern is sustained from 2010-2012, then came a steep drop in the trusts levels with that of the police falling from 65 - 49 and the vigilante groups fell from 80 – 55. Nevertheless, since the declining trust in the informal sector is not being compensated by a rise in trust of the police, it leaves room for further research into who Nigerians could really trust in terms of security provision.
The presentation further heightened the unique features of the urban poor communities in Nigeria as follows:

- Heterogeneity of urban centres create new cultural norms and practices influenced by the different cultural groups; ethno-cultural organisations, hometown associations, market unions and professional guilds and unions are crucial in maintaining order and cohesion in society.

- Urban areas present unique public spaces often susceptible to crime for example the markets and the motor parks. The smooth organization and conduct of business in these spaces necessarily requires internal security arrangement.

- Urban slums which are often agglomeration of shacks and poorly built/secured structures also require special mechanisms for internal crime prevention to ensure safety and cohesion as well as smooth running of possible public amenities.

In terms of securing urban Nigeria, the state has responded to hybridity in four key ways

- Opposition (Bakassi Boys and OPC)
- Incorporation (Civilian JTF)
- Codification (State level legislative backing)
- Competition (Hisbah)

The presentation concluded that the non-formal security sector in Nigeria has shown significant resilience and has remained in most cases where the supply of security has failed to meet demand. Its persistence consequently, calls for re-thinking of security provisioning in Nigeria along the lines of hybridity where what can exist would not be formal and non-formal, but both.

The research methodology to be employed will consist of the review of existing literature (including analysis of opinion surveys), structured and unstructured interviews with community members and actors from the formal sector as well as non-formal security sector. Focus Group Discussions with key informants from the research areas will also be conducted.
The following were identified as the major risks to the research work:

**Access to Data:** previous related work in all fields of study provide entry point for current research

**Escalation of Boko Haram conflict in Borno State:** resort to secondary literature; access to displaced persons in other locations; telephone interview etc.

**Forthcoming Nigerian General Elections in April, 2015:** careful planning to avoid conflict with elections dates.

Comments on this presentation are as follows:

- The selected non-state security actors are very good test cases that can best address the research questions.
- Considering the manner in which much of these non-formal security actors evolved, it would be good to further explore the motive behind their proliferation in the late 1990s especially, as it coincided with the end of military rule in Nigeria.
- Further deepening the research into what accounts for the legitimacy of these non-state actors as well as how their legitimacy is measured is equally worth exploring.
- Data on Trust as captured by the national survey has to be properly nuanced in order to reveal the reasons for the gaps
- The information provided on the research methodology appears rich on face value but is quite sparse in detail and has to be fleshed out.
- Deepen research into why non-state security actors turned out to be more feared than the state actors.
- Researchers should draw more on the literature that abound especially, on the Bakassi Boys.
- Pragmatically, it would be good to go on the ground, take a particular community and critically study what is unfolding in terms of safety and security on the ground.
- The focus on urban poor should be given a lot more clarity in the research.
- It would be interesting to include in the study (if available), the case of a non-state actor that did not evolve in the manner in which the majority have – populist phase, consolidation and abuse phase and demise.
- Include state perceptions of non-state actors
- Mapping security agencies and public authority structures should be an integral part of the research
• In terms of literature, the project on the privatisation of security by a university in Wales (contact person to be provided by Project Leader) offers a lot of information that can help analyse the research within a broader picture. CODESRIA also held a workshop on this which was led by Jeffrey Isima whom Hutchful knows well. The report should be available online.

• Establish if there is a nexus between the establishment of a non-state actor in a particular state and the eruption of similar actors in other states.

• Highlight CLEEN’s work on Code of Conduct for non-state security actors in Nigeria.

SOUTH AFRICA
Sexual Citizenship in South Africa
Xavier Livermon

This presentation gave insight into the political contestation around the subject viz-a-viz the constitutional provisions and supporting legislations that sought to remedy inequalities in the post-apartheid era. The Inequality Clause in the 1996 constitution states that “The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth.” This provision notwithstanding, Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgendered persons (LGBTs) continually suffer undue and extreme forms of violence related to the apparent lack of security and access to justice. This calls for further research into the insecurity issues as much of it can be blamed on cultural or customary perceptions of LGBT which considers it non-African and how these customs intertwine with the legal provisions that are meant to protect this vulnerable group. It is hoped that the research can influence policy, legislation, advocacy and attitudinal change in favour of the security of this group. Highlights of the presentation are as follows:

The motivation for carrying out the research on this subject stemmed from a) the lack of research on the disconnect between progressive legislation and quotidian life for Black LGBT population, b) the lack of research on Black LGBTs (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered) populations as active political agents and c) Lack of research on relationship between the South African state, non-state actors, and Black LGBT populations.

Historically, the negotiation that brought into being the equality clause in the South African constitution with respect to sexuality was generally a negotiation between two elite groups of male leaders. This process consequently, totally circumvented important LGBT stake-holders and activists on the ground. The divergence that increasingly began to exist in LGBT activism in South Africa and its uneasy alliance with ruling party elites was present in early initiatives that emphasized a gradualist, conservative strategy for obtaining “equality.” Pursuing a strategy that in many ways eschewed grass roots activism in favor of a series of court cases, LGBT leadership was able to successfully dismantle LGBT discrimination in post-apartheid. These developments occasioned a court case that culminated in South Africa becoming only the sixth country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage. Yet, even in the midst of these judicial victories, it was
becoming increasingly clear that for the majority of LGBT South Africans, black, poor, and living in townships and rural areas that much of the legislation was inoperable in their daily lives. Reports of discrimination, violence, and murder began to emerge and was on the ascendancy but the state seemed either unable or unwilling to bring this under control. Currently, there is a renewed LGBT movement that focuses on several strategies, recognizing both the necessity to struggle with state and non-state actors.

Key stakeholders to be involved in the research include:

- CONTRALESA (Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa)
- Religious Leadership (Christian and Muslim):
- Political Parties
- The Police and Court System
- NGO sector
- CBO’s: though this group are considered under the broad NGO umbrella, they are treated as a separate group for the purposes of this research.
- Media
- Micro Level Communities (Family, School)

In an attempt to connect the research to the main project, the research will encapsulate

- Customary law and its incorporation into legal code. Dual legal systems being recognized and deployed and also not deployed in the regulation of sexual citizenship.

- Customary actors, NGOs, Media, Black LGBT populations. Both how Black LGBT populations use formal law and security and bypass them.

- The impact of hybrid security creates possibilities and limitations for Black LGBT populations and

- Looking at creative solutions of how Black LGBT and their allies work within and against existing institutions to create equity and social justice.

The research will further seek to address four main questions among several sub questions:

1) How has hybridity with respect to sexual citizenship been codified in South Africa?

2) What has been the role of post-apartheid government in addressing sexual citizenship?

3) How has the addressing of sexual citizenship created both new opportunities and new exclusions for LGBT populations?

4) How do black LGBT South Africans address the continued forms of marginalization they experience?

The strategy for conducting this research will be one of an interdisciplinary approach involving archival research, participant observation, interviews (NGOs, Communities), focus groups, media analysis and data analysis on hate crimes.
The presentation ended with the envisioned challenges and risks to the research:

- **Access**: for example, since the researcher is a male, gaining access to the lesbian population will be challenging

- **Sampling**: the set of people involved in this research is quite diverse and access to all forms of LGBTs might be challenging

- **Time**: the researcher is not based on ground in South Africa and would have to schedule his time appropriately to meet the demands of this research

- **Safety and Security of both the researcher and the interlocutors**

- **Ethics**

Comments on this presentation are as follows:

The Project Leader, Eboe Hutchful recounted the initial skepticism about including the South African case study in the research and expressed his gratification about the section that carefully links it to hybridity which now situates the research appropriately within the larger proposal without doubt. He however, bewailed the embarrassing homophobia spreading across Africa in relation to LGBTs and lauded the diverse dimensions the researcher is bringing to the study (especially, the role of the media in creating security or insecurity) as the SSR community has completely shirked its duty in incorporating LGBT concerns in the Gender dimensions of SSR. He further laid emphasis on the need for a sexual orientation for Africans to begin to view gender more broadly. Other comments from participants included:

- Cover instances of how some of the LGBT cases have been handled by the traditional system.

- Though this case study was the most debated by the IDRC team prior to the approval of the grant, the presentation has given more clarification and understanding on the subject. However, the IDRC as a matter of principle, is concerned about the researcher's safety and security in the execution of the research.

- It will be of significant value to the research if the researcher links up with others working on not necessarily the same but similar subjects

- Capture how truth and reconciliation or forgiveness committees fit into the structures of the security system in South Africa

- Considering that both state and non-state actors have been involved in violence against LGBTs, it would be worthwhile documenting what the state's response to the situation has been.

- Provide in-depth information on the forms of violence experienced by LGBTs in South Africa
• Explore further, the manner in which policy processes address the abuses and also establish whether there is discrimination in the way LGBTs are handled by the police.

• Analysis about state of Black Lesbians in the South African Society will also add value to the research.

• It will be appropriate to make comparison of how black and white LGBTs are treated in South Africa.

• The case of LGBTs is clearly a gender issue and this should be highlighted in the analysis.

OVERALL COMMENTS FROM DISCUSSANTS

In this session, all discussants were given the opportunity to give their overall comments on the project without necessarily repeating what they have already contributed to the previous discussions. Boubacar Ndiaye was the discussant for this session which commenced with all discussants commending participants for the hard work they put in as well as their meaningful contributions. The following are the final comments gathered in this session:

• Participants should each note the comments made on their individual presentations as soon as practicable to guide them as they develop their cases further.

• More clarity should be given on the concepts of formal, informal and hybrid systems of security governance to give a better understanding to not only researchers but also the ultimate reader of the final publication(s).

• Researchers are encouraged to keep in touch with one another by e-mail to foster comparative thinking around the research issues.

• Similarly, the creation of a social media platform like a Google group where all researchers can log in at designated times to interact will also be helpful.

• Gender dimensions in the case studies should cover women’s capacity building and civil society. Thus, the research should document the involvement of women in specific fields where their presence or involvement has been less pronounced. For instance, women’s involvement in cult groups as in the case of Nigeria. It should also capture the experiences of women in security sector institutions as well as how families of women involved in the security sector respond to the situation. Further, gender should be covered in its broadest sense to capture all vulnerable groups. Again, considering that the project team is male-dominated, an orientation session on gender would be valuable in creating the gender consciousness needed to shape the research along those lines. Also, whilst some presentations mentioned UNSCR 1325, it is worth adding the subsequent 3 resolutions (UNSCR 1820, 1888 and 1889).

• Capacity building for junior researchers should be more targeted and based on a needs assessment. That is to say, senior researchers should work together with the juniors to
identify their research capacity gaps (as in research analysis for example) and focus more on filling such identified lapses through this research project. Correspondingly, the ASSN, subject to the availability of resources, could consider setting up a mentorship programme where junior researchers will be assigned to senior researchers for mentoring to help create the next generation of researchers in SSR/G.

- While training/capacity building as mentioned in the research proposal is good, there would be the need to spend time one-on-one with beneficiaries of such trainings to continually transfer knowledge and experience on a regular basis. Otherwise, one-off trainings might not yield the desired impacts.

- CSOs in Africa are very diverse in form, composition, mandate, expertise, size and modality, among other factors. Thus the manner in which the project defines CSOs will impact on the way issues around CSOs are analyzed so there is a need for a general consensus on how the project envisions CSOs.

  Again, the role of CSOs in this project, should not be limited to the dissemination of information only but rather as a repository of knowledge and experience the researchers can tap from since many of them are doing important hands-on work on the ground.

- Each case study should map hybrid political orders as a context for research and study how they influence hybrid security orders.

- The reference to viable and accountable institutions in the proposal should challenge the project team to come up with a new approach to governance that is more responsive to the specific security needs of those whom these institutions are protecting and more reflective of progressive African traditional cultures and practices.

- Be creative in engaging policy makers as part of the research process to create a sense of ownership of the process so that the final products of the research will attract their interest.

- Beyond the various media mentioned for the dissemination of the research, documentaries could also be created.

- All the case studies should deal with the nexus of knowledge, policy and capacity building in a manner that brings out policy implications as well as concrete recommendations

- **Methodology:** the organisers should be able to dictate methods to guide the researchers in terms of data gathering, analysis, etc. It is also absolutely crucial for the organisers to give an indicative sense of timelines within which researchers are expected to work as well as when certain milestones in the research process should be achieved. Related to this is a reporting outline which should capture what is expected in the report to allow for consistency in the final report. All these guidelines could be put together in a one-page document and made available to all researchers as soon as possible. Lastly, the conceptual paper should also be completed and circulated as a matter of urgency.
• The research should consider the role of young people in security process in the project countries.

• Given the sophisticated and unprecedented nature of this research, it will be good to tease out some theoretical statements at the end of the project.

• The research should have an international dimension that captures the role of the diaspora and the media (particularly the social media).

**IDRC REFLECTIONS ON THE PROJECT**

This session highlighted IDRCs motivation for the project which is to fill a gap and contribute to knowledge as well as understand the real economy of security on the African continent. The IDRC representatives noted that IDRC immensely values publications which is one of the key outputs of this research. However, currently, much more emphasis is on behavior change through research. Consequently, the research should not only be viewed in the light of producing reading materials that contribute to knowledge but the entire research process, should be able to influence behaviour change that helps in addressing the security concerns confronting the continent.

The theoretical and conceptual framework discussed is equally of great interest to IDRC as that guides the researcher to meet the expected outputs. Regular communication amongst the project team was also encouraged to share perspectives on critical issues that will emanate from the case studies. Again, if the capacity of Africans are to be requisitely built to tell their own stories, then networking should not be downplayed.

Of crucial importance to the IDRC project management team is the periodic reporting: technical and financial reports. Researchers were consequently encouraged to keep to timelines and provide the ASSN secretariat with progress reports for timely completion of the reporting templates for submission to IDRC.

The IDRC has a database of useful resources that would be helpful to researchers and would make them accessible to researchers by the creation of a password for the project team. Similarly, IDRC can also offer platforms for sharing knowledge and experiences when they hold events of mutual interest. Researchers will consequently, have access to avenues to make presentations or contribute to discussions in order to build the critical mass of researchers in the subject area.

The project team was finally encouraged to package different outputs for diverse audiences. For instance, policy briefs for parliamentarians and documentaries for training and research.

**WORKPLAN, RISK ASSESSMENT, TIMELINES, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, EXPECTED OUTPUTS, BUDGET**

This session was led by Eboe Hutchful who encouraged all researchers to take time to read the Memorandum of Grant Conditions the ASSN signed with IDRC to fully understand what IDRC requires of the project team. He noted that given the diverse schedules of individual researchers,
the ASSN will be flexible with timelines but every researcher must work within the period of achieving the milestones stated in the main proposal.

He explained that the figures quoted in the budget per case study will not necessarily all be awarded to researchers. Whilst the ASSN Secretariat will retain a chunk of it, some of it will also be given to the Centres to which researchers are affiliated particularly for building the capacity of young researchers.

He concluded that all researchers will soon sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ASSN which will detail what is required, reporting timelines, etc.

Members of the Project Advisory Group were noted as follows:

1. Prof Boubacar N'Diaye
2. Prof David Leonard
3. Prof Okechukwu Ibeanu
4. Dr Awino Okech
5. Dr Scott Straus

ZOTERO WEBSITE

The project team was introduced to the Zotero website by Robin Luckham who noted that Zotero is a website developed by some university students in the UK which provides links to valuable bibliographic resources in the area of peace and security in general. Whilst it is accessible on www.zotero.org, the computer needs to have downloaded firefox before the website can be accessed.
ANNEX 1: PRESENTATION ON CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Hybrid Security Governance in Africa: Research Questions

Overview: the Main Research Questions

• I. How does informality become embedded in formal security and justice provision; and how and by who is it instrumentalized?
• II. What are the roles of ‘non-State’, ‘informal’ and ‘customary’ security actors?
• III. What are the impacts of hybrid security provision on the security and entitlements of citizens, especially in situations of conflict, exclusion and inequity?
• IV. How can viable and accountable security and justice institutions be built in contexts of informality and hybridity
Mapping informalization: the socially embedded forms of reciprocity, which permeate leadership, promotions and social networks

- Extended family, kinship, clan and caste relationships and networks
- ‘Joking relationships’ and other forms of reciprocity
- Social bonds created through secret societies and initiation rituals
- Links to elders, chiefs and other local notables
- Gender relationships, patriarchal forms of authority
- Religious faith communities, sects and brotherhods
- Ethnic, ‘home town’ or regional solidarities
- Inter and intra-generational ties and networks, including informal peer groups within security institutions themselves
- Patron-client relationships: ‘big men and small boys’
- Criminal networks and warlord alliances
- Transnational including diaspora networks

I. How is Informality Embedded in Formal Security and Justice Provision and Instrumentalized?

Three sub-research questions to explore the ‘informal’ within the ‘formal’ and likewise the ‘formal’ within the ‘informal’

- I.1. How do informal norms, solidarities and networks become embedded in the official security, policing and justice institutions of African states?

- I.2. Which social bonds, identities or networks are most salient and how do they penetrate these official security and justice structures?

- I.3. How do political power-brokers and security elites instrumentalize social identities and informal networks so as to redefine security, cement their grip on power and navigate the contradictory terrain between formal and informal orders?
Mapping ‘Non-State’, ‘Informal’ or ‘Customary’ Security Actors

- Chiefs and other traditional authorities
- Customary courts and dispute resolution bodies, recognised and unrecognised
- Community and local policing bodies
- Secret societies, hunter’s associations, women’s associations, young men’s associations etc.
- Neo-traditional ethnic, community or home town bodies, offering various forms of protection (such as OPC in Nigeria)
- Community protection, militant or vigilante bodies
- Paramilitaries, militias and other non-state armed groups
- Criminal mafias and gangs offering protection in bad neighbourhoods and unsecured borderlands

II. What are the Roles of ‘Non-State’, ‘Informal’ or ‘Customary’ Security Actors?

Four sub-questions about the roles of non-state security actors in delivering security, including their interface with formal institutions

- II.1. What roles do ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors and institutions play in security, policing and justice; and how do they interface with the formal security institutions of the state?

- II. 2. How and by whom are non-state actors controlled and resourced; whom do they include and exclude; what are their sources of legitimacy and public support; what is nature of their claims to deliver security and justice; and what are their capacities to deliver on these claims?
II. What are the Roles of ‘Non-State’, ‘Informal’ or ‘Customary’ Security Actors? (continued)

• II. 3. Do these ‘non-state’ actors and state security and justice institutions cooperate with, complement or compete with official security and justice institutions?

• II. 4. How far do informal actors rely on negotiation and consensus to establish their authority and deliver security; and how far upon patriarchal authority, intimidation or violence? What are the implications of the latter for the rights of citizens and for legitimate public authority?

III. What are the Impacts of Hybrid Security Provision on the Safety and Entitlements of Citizens, Especially in Situations of Conflict, Exclusion and Inequity?

Four sub-questions on how ordinary citizens engage with and are affected by hybrid security arrangements

III. 1. What are the impacts of hybrid security provision on the security and entitlements of citizens in African states, especially those who are poor, vulnerable and excluded?

III. 2. How and for whom do hybrid security arrangements in reality work? Is there any accountability and to whom?

- III. 3. What gender biases arise in official and popular framings of security? How do these impact upon the rights and security of women and of sexually marginalized (LGBT) groups?

- III. 4. How do hybrid security arrangements draw upon and shape citizens’ own vernacular understanding and practical experience of security at grass roots?

IV. How Can Viable and Accountable Security and Justice Institutions be Built in Contexts of Informality and Hybridity?

Four sub-questions on how hybrid security arrangements can be built upon to assure more effective and accessible security provision

- IV. 1. How can effective, inclusive and accountable security, policing and justice be negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality, so as to foster new forms of public authority better suited to African realities?

- IV. 2. What can be learned from the shortcomings of previous experiences of security reform, for instance their lack of contextual understanding and of local roots?
IV. How Can Viable and Accountable Security and Justice Institutions be Built in Contexts of Informality and Hybridity? (continued)

• IV. 3. How can security governance mechanisms ‘work with the grain’ of informal institutions and relationships, and be reinforced by them – without diminishing the rights and day-to-day security of citizens?

• IV. 4. What can be learned from existing efforts to renegotiate security and justice institutions ‘from below’ around customary institutions or on the basis of vernacular understandings and popular framings of security?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How Informality is Embedded in Formal Security and Justice Provision and Instrumentalized?</th>
<th>1.1. How do informal norms, solidarities and networks become embedded in the official security, policing and justice institutions of African states? And in what ways does this influence their capacity to provide security and protect the rights of citizens?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Which social bonds, identities or networks are most salient and what ways have they penetrated the official security and justice structures of African states? (Mapping the processes of informalization, that is the socially embedded forms of reciprocity, which inform leadership, recruitment, promotion and social networks).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do political power-brokers and security elites themselves instrumentalize social identities and informal networks in order to redefine security, cement their grip on power and navigate the contradictory terrain between formal and informal orders?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-State, Informal or Customary Security Actors</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>What role do ‘non-state’ or ‘informal’ actors and institutions play in security, policing and justice; and how do they interface with the formal security institutions of the state?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembling a more complete picture of ‘non-state’ security and justice bodies. How and by whom they are controlled and resourced; whom do they include and exclude; what are their sources of legitimacy and public support; how far do they rely on consent, and how far on coercion as well as consent; what is nature of their claims to deliver security and justice; and what are their capacities to deliver on these claims?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do these ‘non-state’ actors and state security and justice institutions cooperate with, complement or alternatively compete with official security and justice institutions?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How far do these informal actors rely on negotiation and consensus to establish their authority and deliver security; and how far upon various forms of intimidation, patriarchal authority and violence? What are the implications of their use of violence for their popular legitimacy, for the rights of citizens and for the notion of legitimate public authority?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Impacts of Hybridity on the Security and Entitlements of Citizens, Particularly in Situations of Vulnerability, Exclusion and Inequity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the impact of hybrid security orders on the security and entitlements of citizens in African states and in particular on vulnerable and excluded people and communities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How and for whom do hybrid security arrangements in reality work? Who benefits, who loses? Is there any accountability and to whom?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What gender biases arise in official and popular framings of security? How do these impact upon the rights and security of women and of sexually marginalized (LGBT) groups?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do hybrid security arrangements draw upon and shape citizens’ own vernacular understanding and practical experience of security at grass roots?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Viable and Accountable Security and Justice Institutions in Contexts of Informality and Hybrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can effective, inclusive and accountable security, policing and justice be negotiated in contexts of hybridity and informality, and foster new forms of public authority better suited to African realities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What can be learned from the vicissitudes of previous experiences of security reform?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How can security governance mechanisms ‘work with the grain’ of informal institutions and relationships, and be reinforced by them – without diminishing the rights and day-to-day security of citizens?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What can be learned from existing efforts to renegotiate security and justice institutions ‘from below’ around customary institutions or on the basis of vernacular understandings and popular framings of security?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ANNEX 2: PARTICIPANTS’ MAILING LIST**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>COUNTRY/ORGANISATION</th>
<th>E-MAIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJAYI- MAMATTAH, TITILOPE</td>
<td>Ghana/WACSI</td>
<td><a href="mailto:tamamattah@wacsi.org">tamamattah@wacsi.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAGAYOKO, NIAGALE</td>
<td>France/OIF and ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:niagale@yahoo.fr">niagale@yahoo.fr</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOUBACAR, NDIAYE</td>
<td>USA/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:bcdniaye@gmail.com">bcdniaye@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GBLA, OSMAN</td>
<td>Sierra Leone/CEDSA</td>
<td><a href="mailto:osmangbla@gmail.com">osmangbla@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GONDYI, NENGAK</td>
<td>Nigeria/CLEEN Foundation</td>
<td><a href="mailto:nengak.daniel@cleen.org">nengak.daniel@cleen.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERSI, MOHAMED FARAH</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td><a href="mailto:xirsi_law@Hotmail.com">xirsi_law@Hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBEANU, OKECHUKWU</td>
<td>Nigeria/INEC</td>
<td><a href="mailto:oibeanu@yahoo.co.uk">oibeanu@yahoo.co.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIBRIL, ADAM MUSE</td>
<td>Somaliland/Somali Intellectuals for Peace and Development</td>
<td><a href="mailto:adamjibril@hotmail.com">adamjibril@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KARURU, NJERI</td>
<td>Kenya/IDRC</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Nkaruru@idrc.ca">Nkaruru@idrc.ca</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONE, FAHIRAMAN RODRIGUE</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rodriguefahiraman@gmail.com">rodriguefahiraman@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEONARD, DAVID</td>
<td>USA/University of California, Berkeley</td>
<td><a href="mailto:leonard@berkeley.edu">leonard@berkeley.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIVERMON, XAVIER</td>
<td>USA/University of Texas and ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:livermon@utexas.edu">livermon@utexas.edu</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUCKHAM, ROBIN ALEXANDER</td>
<td>United Kingdom/IDS and ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:robin.luckham@zen.co.uk">robin.luckham@zen.co.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’CORMACK, FREIDA</td>
<td>IDS/OIC UNMIL/LIBERIA</td>
<td><a href="mailto:freida@ids.ac.uk">freida@ids.ac.uk</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M’CORMACK-HALE, FREDLINE</td>
<td>Fourah Bay College/ Sierra Leone</td>
<td><a href="mailto:amaybel@gmail.com">amaybel@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEPE, MICHELE OLGAA</td>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire Foundation Serenti</td>
<td><a href="mailto:michpep@gmail.com">michpep@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMBO, AISHATU</td>
<td>Nigeria CLEEN Foundation</td>
<td><a href="mailto:aishatusambo73@gmail.com">aishatusambo73@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADESSE, MEDHANE</td>
<td>Ethiopia/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:mt3002et@yahoo.com">mt3002et@yahoo.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAME</td>
<td>COUNTRY/ORGANISATION</td>
<td>E-MAIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 THIOUNÉ, RAMATA MOLO</td>
<td>Kenya/IDRC</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rthioune@idrc.ca">rthioune@idrc.ca</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSN SECRETARIAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 HUTCHFUL, EBOE</td>
<td>Ghana/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:eboehutchf@aol.com">eboehutchf@aol.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 KHAUNBIOW, ELOM</td>
<td>Ghana/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:elom@africansecuritynetwork.org">elom@africansecuritynetwork.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 ABUBAKAR, JANE</td>
<td>Ghana ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:janet@africansecuritynetwork.org">janet@africansecuritynetwork.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 TSIVANYO, RHODA</td>
<td>Ghana/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:rhodavr@gmail.com">rhodavr@gmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 EUSA-MENSAH, ANTHONY</td>
<td>Ghana/ASSN</td>
<td><a href="mailto:Tony@africansecuritynetwork.org">Tony@africansecuritynetwork.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX 3: AGENDA

### DAY ONE (16 June)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Session Description</th>
<th>Discussant(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00</td>
<td>Welcome to participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.15 – 11.15</td>
<td><strong>First Session</strong>: Project outline, analytical framework and issues for research</td>
<td>Eboe Hutchful, Ramata Thioune, Niagalé Bagayoko and Robin Luckham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction to the project</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDRC expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presentation of the conceptual framework and research questions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:15 – 11:45</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11:45 – 13:00</td>
<td>Presentation: Gender and police reform in Liberia</td>
<td>Freida M’Cormack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant(s):</td>
<td>Titi Ajayi-Mamattah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00 – 16.00</td>
<td>Presentation: Bondo society, gender and police reform in Sierra Leone.</td>
<td>Fredline M’Cormack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant(s):</td>
<td>Titi Ajayi-Mamattah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Discussants</td>
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<tr>
<td>16.00 – 16.30</td>
<td><strong>Tea Break</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.30 – 18.30</td>
<td>Presentation: Civil Defence forces and Chiefdom security committees in Sierra Leone.</td>
<td>Osman Gbla, Eboe Hutchful and David Leonard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Discussants:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eboe Hutchful and David Leonard</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.00 – 11.00</td>
<td>Presentation: Somaliland</td>
<td>Adam Muse Jibril and Mohamed Farah Hersi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Discussants:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dozos in Cote d’Ivoire</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niaglè Bagayoko and Boubacar N’Diaye</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rodrigue Kone</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Niaglè Bagayoko and Boubacar N’Diaye</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>DAY TWO (17 June)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Discussants</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>11:00 – 11:15</td>
<td>Coffee Break</td>
<td>Medhane Tadesse and David Leonard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Discussant(s):</td>
<td>Okey Ibeanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:00 – 14:00</td>
<td>Lunch Break</td>
<td>Xavier Livermon</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General comments on the Project:</td>
<td>Eboe Hutchful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boubacar N’Diaye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>David Leonard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Titi Ajayi-Mamattah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Okey Ibeanu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00 – 18.00</td>
<td>Overall project management</td>
<td>Chair: Boubacar N’Diaye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDRC Reflections</td>
<td>Ramata Thioune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eboe Hutchful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplan, risk assessment, timelines, reporting requirements, expected outputs, budget.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy and operational implications.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zotero website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building partnerships and capacity</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Robin Luckham |

| Niagalé Bagayoko |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY THREE (18 June)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9.00-11.00 Any Other Business (AOB): this session will cover any unfinished business from the last session of Day 2. Discussion will be held at the premises of the hotel after breakfast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Programme (in the absence of AOB): Tour of Accra City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.00-16.00 Luncheon at McCarthy Hill Residence of Sandra and Eboe Hutchful</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Location: African Royal Beach Hotel |

| DEPARTURES |

| DAY FOUR (19 June) |
| DEPARTURES |

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