HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA:

Revised Proposal by the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) to the IDRC

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Summary of Proposed Research

Prevailing approaches to peacebuilding and SSR (and the associated policy literature) have tended to stress Westphalian notions of the state characterized by legal-rational norms and institutions. This project argues that such approaches are fundamentally at variance with the underlying realities of the African context, where many political and social transactions (not least in the security sector) take place in the context of informal norms and systems, and where a wide array of institutions operate alongside or within nominally formal political institutions. This may well account for many of the limitations (if not failure) of efforts to reform the security sector and its governance systems. The core hypothesis of this research project is that formal and informal systems overlap, interrelate, and interpenetrate at complex levels and that states and informal networks are not mutually exclusive but should rather be seen as embedded in each other. There is consequently a need to identify those informal networks, actors and processes which, alongside legally established structures, influence decision-making as well as policy implementation in the security sector.

We have used the term ‘hybridity’ in this context to capture these intersections of formality and informality, illuminate the complex nature of security governance in Africa, and provide a more informed and realistic understanding of decision-making processes and power distribution in the African security sector, where a variety of actors draw on varying sources of authority and legitimacy. In many African states, the security sector and its governance mechanisms reflect a complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions; however, the concept of ‘hybridity’ is particularly appropriate for understanding security systems in countries emerging from conflict, where customary, clan and non-formal institutions are often the only ones left standing after conflict, are thus widely implicated in delivery of security and provide resiliency to the community and (arguably) a basis for reconstructing the state.

By relying on the perspectives offered by sociology and anthropology in the daily functioning of state bureaucracies (both at the central and local levels), the project hopes to provide new and refreshing insights on networks and alliances as well as on competition, tensions, and conflicts within African defence and security services which may help to explain the failure of SSR processes, or at least difficulties in implementing them. It may also serve to explain how hybrid security systems are experienced at the grass roots by supposed beneficiaries, and in particular how they impact the lives of vulnerable groups and shape citizen expectations of security and security entitlements.

In addition to contributing to strengthening the research and evidence base of SSR, the proposed research carries important policy implications for how we approach security governance in Africa. In this regard, the ultimate intent behind the project is go beyond the use of ‘hybridity’ as an analytical tool to inquire as to the extent to which the concept can provide the underpinnings of an approach to building more effective security and security governance systems, hence more durable peace-building processes. This research project will scrutinize as well the less palatable Janus-face of local-level security arrangements, including in some cases the reinforcement of local and national-level inequalities, gender discrimination and linkages to patronage networks. These different strands of analysis need bringing together to provide warts-and-all diagnoses of how hybrid security arrangements work and for whom.

General information

Field research will be conducted overall in 6 African countries belonging to different regional areas: Liberia and Sierra Leone (Mano River Union), Côte d’Ivoire (Francophone Africa), Somaliland (Horn of Africa), South Africa (Southern Africa) and Nigeria (West Africa).
However, while some of these are case studies that seek to explore the dialectics of hybridity in national security sectors, others are thematic in nature, and seek to analyse particular facets (and impacts) of hybridity in those contexts (informal policing in Nigeria, gender and policing in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and sexual rights and citizenship in South Africa).

**Problem and justification**

Security sector reform (SSR) processes are more often than not focused on structural and formal institutional arrangements of the state, privileging largely tangible policy goals such as better budgetary management of security spending, training and professionalization, police and courts reforms, mechanisms of parliamentary accountability, or the provision of alternative livelihoods for ex-combatants. Dominant approaches to SSR have scarcely begun to touch upon the deep politics of reform or to draw in any systematic way upon the critical literatures on the state, hybrid political orders [HPOs] and security. References to the ‘informal’ security and justice sector have become a standard fixture in the global SSR and ‘state-building’ toolkit, but this has remained largely at the level of rhetoric, with little real understanding of how this sector actually functions, of the complex character of the intersections between formal and informal institutions, or the implications (importantly) for reform efforts that aim to build Weberian ideal-type institutions. Yet, in reality, security governance in Africa is based on a complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions, which together constitute the security sector.

The analysis of hybridity reflects as well an interest in the subjective beliefs and lived experiences of social actors affected by security arrangements. Diverse forms of hybrid political authority, in which formal chains of command and accountability have been supplemented or even superseded by informal patronage, have penetrated state security structures. Understanding “hybrid security orders” in Africa requires developing a thorough knowledge of the “socially embedded forms of reciprocity” which inform leadership, recruitment and promotion in the security sector, such as the role and influence of:

- So-called “joking relationships” (*sinankunya* or *rakiré* in West Africa);
- caste systems and social obligations deriving from them (reflected as well in the division of labour);
- secret societies and initiation rituals;
- Regional ties and solidarities (including those overlapping geographical boundaries);
- Kinship networks (extended definition of kinship such as godfather sponsorship);
- symbolic struggles for social positions and vertical and horizontal links among individuals of different ranks;
- Intergenerational relationships (eg. between elders and youngsters within the armed forces);
- Negotiation of internal hierarchies within the informal chains of command;
- Rejection of women by male colleagues based on cultural stereotypes of women’s roles in society.

Our approach is grounded in a neo-institutional theoretical framework, which defines institutions as the set of formal and informal rules, norms and standards by which decisions are made concerning the distribution of power and the organisation of a given society. Formal institutions can be defined as those structures grounded in the organisational and bureaucratic order derived from the constitutional and legal architecture established (and perpetuated) after independence, such as constitutions, laws, decrees, as well as corresponding administrative structures such as legislatures, ministries, rule of law institutions, political parties, and so on. In contrast, informal systems are based on implicit rules and unwritten understandings. They reflect socio-cultural routines and norms as well as underlying patterns of interactions among socioeconomic classes (for instance caste...
systems) and communities (different ethnic groups). The essence of these informal institutions can be summarised as follows: (1) actors share a common set of expectations; (2) they rely on simple forms of reciprocity; (3) rules are unwritten but understood by each actor; (4) exchanges are non-specified in terms of time; (5) they are implemented through unofficial channels and with no particular attention to detailed objectives or methods, and (6) they rely on enforcement by informal actors in case of a breach of the perceived agreement. To summarize, the word “formal” refers to codified institutions and the word “informal” refers to non-codified institutions. The value of historical and sociological institutionalism lies in recognizing that these distinctions (between the formal and informal) are hardly Manichean in nature, and that a wide variety of institutions operate alongside or within formal political institutions and are at play in decision-making processes and public policies, much of them informal in nature.

And indeed recently, a number of scholars have proposed to analyse and understand political orders in the Global South using the concept of ‘hybridity’\(^1\). The concept of “hybridity” is meant to capture the interpenetrations of different social spheres and the subsequent interactions between the formal state apparatus on the one hand, and informal institutions on the other hand (cf. literature review below). This concept is generally promoted to offer an alternative to concepts such as ‘fragile states’, and also to the legal-rational approach which underlies most of the public policies promoted by international donors and policymakers, particularly in peacebuilding processes.\(^2\)

Deriving from this stream of literature, the assumption underlying this research project is that Weberian legal-rational legitimacy has been over-emphasised in Southern countries and that the failure or limited impact of security reform processes suggests we also need to explore the significance of different types and sources of legitimacy. In our perspective, it is essential to recognize that much political activity in Africa (like most social transactions) takes place in the context of informal norms and systems. Decision-making processes are not exclusively nested in formal institutions, but also reflect influences emanating from traditional and customary socio-cultural institutions, norms and standards, which are, by their very nature, much less visible, particularly in the influence that they exert on ‘public’ conduct. Contrary to the assumptions of the ‘state-building’ literature, in Africa formal and informal systems overlap, interrelate, and interpenetrate at complex levels: the state and the informal networks are not mutually exclusive but should be seen as embedded in each other. The sum of formal and informal security institutions and networks is what we call “hybrid security orders”, which are situated in turn within larger “hybrid political orders”. Hence, studying “hybrid security orders” requires investigating the processes of informalisation and instrumentalisation of legally-established security structures as well as the ways in which these cohabit with traditional ones, both at the central and local levels, particularly in countries emerging from conflict.

**Research Objectives**

There are five objectives to this research project:

The *first* is to identify and analyse the networks and processes that span the divide between ‘formality’ and ‘informality’, and, as a result, provide a better and more realistic understanding

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\(^2\) Arguably, ‘hybridity’ also constitutes a reality check on (if not a retreat from) the ‘state-building’ paradigm with its rampant modernist (and unilinear) assumptions.
African Security Sector Network

of decision-making processes and power distribution in the African security sector.

The second is to clarify the role of nonstate/nonformal/customary security institutions (community security organs, militias, vigilante groups, etc), and the interactions and interface between these and the formal security institutions of the state. Hybrid security orders are characterized by the existence of multiple non-state providers of security, as the state shares ‘authority, legitimacy, and capacity’ with other actors, networks and institutions that transcend the formal/informal divide. Such a phenomenon requires analysts to gain empirically grounded knowledge. It also has undoubted policy implications: if the typical African security sector is in reality hybrid (and hence far removed from the ideal-typic conceptual understandings underlying current SSR and SSG initiatives), this would have significant implications for the way we understand and approach reform and governance of the security sector.

A third purpose is surely to better understand the ‘real economy’ of security provisioning in hybrid systems, and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion associated with such systems (in particular the role of gender and sexual orientation, where the notion of ‘double jeopardy’ may well apply). At a broader level, investigators will use the lens of social inclusion to begin to distinguish those HPOs that provide for workable public authority from HPOs that merely reinforce ‘elite bargains’, ‘coalitions’ or ‘pacts’, or only seek the capacity to contain violence and to secure the property, economic interests, and opportunities of pact members (recognizing at the same time that many HPOs may be inclusive in certain respects but also remain ‘limited access orders’ in many other respects).

Fourthly, we seek to investigate whether the concept of ‘hybridity’ cannot be more than an analytical tool (to explain functions and dysfunctions in African security systems) and become a guide to action. We will try to establish if ‘hybridity’ in its broadest sense can furnish a strategy for building effective security systems, and the extent to which these ‘crossover’ networks (or the values motivating them) can be mobilized (or not) as checks and balances to inform and reinforce African security governance.

Finally, an overarching objective of this proposal is to contribute to strengthening the (notoriously weak) research and evidence base of SSR, and addressing the many ‘research gaps’ in the discipline, at the same time building the research capacity of civil society groups and research institutions involved in the project, and thereby their ability to engage issues of security sector reform and governance in their respective countries.

In line with this, the proposal has formulated the following core research questions:

First, how is informality embedded in formal institutions, how does it influence the way the latter functions, and with what implications for reform efforts? This requires considering the extent to which the security institutions of the African state combine both formal (legal) and informal norms and networks in the way they function and are governed. It will entail investigating the penetration of non-formal norms, logics and solidarities into (nominally) formal structures and decision-making processes. Put differently, such a question will amount to exploring the “informal” in the formal and likewise the “formal” in the informal. Within the formal (codified) systems, actors are not necessarily (and in any case not exclusively) motivated by rational-bureaucratic logics, but take decisions which refer to norms and codes often rooted in customs or traditions. Indigenous informal solidarities embedded into state structures can become the subject of power struggles between competing social groups. Such contestations often explain the underlying politics (and hence failure) of SSR programmes. Particular attention will be paid in this part of the research to gender-related issues and on the ways in which gender promotion within the armed forces for example can be undermined by deeply rooted customs and traditional and religious practices.
Second, how do nonstate/nonformal/customary security actors interact with and seek to influence (openly or covertly) the formal security institutions of the state? There is a need to analyze the nature (and implications) of the local-level interactions between the security institutions of the state and the traditional and customary societal structures (such as extended families, clans, tribes, religious brotherhoods, village elders, religious leaders, headmen, clan chiefs, healers) as well as the ‘newer’ non-state actors (militias, vigilante groups, and so on) involved directly or indirectly in the delivery of security, including in some cases the mutual convergence of these actors with criminal and/or insurgent networks. Informal systems have a contradictory and paradoxical relationship with the formal organs of the state: while they undergird the state, supplement and subsidize the functioning of its institutions (in this case security delivery), and provide it with a modicum of resiliency, at the same time they erode its rational-legal norms. While this is testimony to the complexity of security governance in such contexts, the nature of such interactions (and their implications) remain little understood, particularly in relation to the security sector.

Third, how do political elites and other power-brokers instrumentalise security institutions to consolidate their grip on power and negotiate the contradictory political terrain between formal and informal orders? When and how do local-level institutions become co-opted by powerful and non-accountable interests? The issue at stake is to capture the role of political elites in the development of formal and informal security policies and the ways in which they influence the exercise of policing, power and representation. In Africa, both formal and informal institutions are often seen as functional by the politico-administrative elites and mobilised to legitimise their power and authority. What emerges are dual, overlapping hierarchies and systems of power in which both modern and traditional elites are invested, but which are almost certainly regulated (if at all) by norms emanating from outside the ‘rational-legal’ sphere;

Fourth, what is the impact of hybridity on the security and entitlements of citizens in African states and in particular, on populations in situations of vulnerability, social exclusion and inequity? Who benefits from hybrid security arrangements, to what degree, and in what contexts and/or arenas? In this regard, there is particular need to pay close attention to the subjective beliefs and practical experiences of social actors affected by such security arrangements, in other words, to investigate how ‘security’ and ‘insecurity’ are perceived and experienced at the ‘grass roots’ level. One aspect of this is to examine the manner in which citizens navigate (and even legitimize) these (complementary as well as contradictory) spheres in their daily lives. More often than not, informal relationships determine the ways citizens perceive, experience and respond to state and local security institutions in hybrid systems: both negatively (as informal relationships may reinforce national and local-level patronage, corruption, exclusion and disempowerment) and positively (insofar as informal relationships may enable citizens to identify with, and benefit from existing security arrangements, through for instance speedy and effective security and justice delivery and popularly accepted dispute-resolution mechanisms):

Fifth, how do international actors, with their own political and geopolitical agendas, norms and standards, tap into and/or influence hybrid African security systems, and how do their interventions affect the balance of power within both formal and informal spheres? This aspect will not form a central part of the research but will be considered in some case studies, particularly when local actors exploit international resources to consolidate their power and local control.

Finally, how does one build viable and accountable institutions in a context characterised by hybridity and informality? Indeed, how do oversight mechanisms work in situations where parallel channels of political influence and of distributing resources are in operation, and organised around informal networks and traditional relationships? Can the concept of
hybridity provide a new sensibility regarding the idea of legitimate and accountable authority, or does it wholly undermine this as a possible goal in the region? How (if at all) can oversight mechanisms ‘work with the grain’ and be reinforced through informal mechanisms? We explore the extent to which different forms of checks and balances, rooted in both traditional and modern sources of legitimacy (in sum, “hybrid security governance mechanisms”), can be mobilized (and indeed coalesced) to reinforce democratic oversight and accountability and guarantee “democratic and human security”. Thus, our purpose is to establish a linkage between a theoretical and practical conception of “hybrid security orders” and notions of accountability and legitimacy.

In addition to the core research questions identified above, the following subsidiary questions (as well as others to be identified) will provide additional guidelines for field research:

- Under what conditions do informal governance institutions contribute to or undermine the success and legitimacy of security sector reform processes?
- How does SSR function to address --and transform-- embedded cultural and political resistance to principles of gender equity?
- How can civil society organisations work effectively in an environment saturated by informal actors and channels of influence?
- In what ways do criminal and other networks spread and fund insecurity? When do they instead offer certain limited forms of protection? What is the nature of the relationship with ‘legitimate’ security institutions, both formal and informal?

**Literature Review**

The first part of the research will build on the literature review which has already been completed by some members of the team.

The policy and academic literature on both stabilization and security reform have been major growth areas. Yet to a large extent, they have been couched in the short-term language of statecraft rather than based on serious analysis of the way security institutions operate, sustain or transform power relations in ‘fragile’, or indeed ‘stabilized’, states. The voluminous policy literature on security sector reform (SSR) -- and on its place in stabilization and state-building processes – has been largely prescriptive (DFID 2002, 2010; OECD 2007, 2007b, 2011; World Bank 2011). Even when the political obstacles to reform are acknowledged, they tend to be discussed in terms of the absence of political will or the lack of ‘local ownership’ (Nathan 2007a, 2007b). At the same time, there has been some recognition of the downside to international action. The interventions of well-resourced international actors are recognised to be mediated through their reliance upon local (and oftentimes corrupt and unreliable) elites and armed groups. This can divert them from their mandates and damage the security and welfare of the local people and communities they are supposed to protect (Autesserre’s 2010; Veit 2010). Thus the internationals have arguably internalized some of the characteristics of the very hybrid political orders they are seeking to transform; international peacebuilders and humanitarian actors are all too often accountable only to their own agencies and governments, and not in any meaningful way to the people they aim to aid or protect.

So far, there has been little study of how security bodies and structures interact with the power and patronage structures of hybrid political orders, either locally or nationally. We still know very little about how the formal security arrangements interconnect with the parallel powers, including systems of patronage, and the manipulation of ethnic and religious identities as instruments of security policy (the work of Enloe 1980 on the latter remains unrivalled). There is a particular lack of detailed empirical micro-analysis of security institutions and practices, either in the state or in non-state security contexts. Terms like ‘hybrid political orders’ (HPO) or ‘hybrid governance’ have been introduced to capture the contested nature of governance and security arrangements in fragile and post conflict states.
In particular, it is argued that the state’s failure to provide public goods does not necessarily lead to an anarchic state, akin to Hobbesian reality. Actors, organizations, and institutions adhere to norms that merge informal, formal, and globalized codes, and this mixture results in hybrid modes of political order. Security provision in hybrid contexts is negotiated, bargained and enforced through both formal and informal processes that coexist, overlap, and intertwine. According to this stream of literature, reforms almost invariably imply shifts in the balance of power within governments and within security establishments.

The research literature we have surveyed includes a number of studies of local level security, policing and justice arrangements of somewhat variable empirical quality. Many of these studies aim to provide best practice examples of how these can and do provide alternatives to failing state security provision. Analyses of governance contexts juxtapose diverse political and social actors and aims to explain the interactions of traditional, personal, kin-based or clientelistic logics with modern, imported, or rational actor logics (Boege et al. 2009; Richmond 2009; Mallet 2010; MacGinty 2011). However, the literature’s use of hybridity does not denote the ‘grafting’ together of separate actors and institutions to make new entities (MacGinty 2011). Instead, it denotes the ‘(re)negotiation and transformation’ or ‘unmaking’ and ‘remaking’ of political orders (Mallet 2010). HPOs aim to uncover the deep tensions that often arise between the declared or manifest functions of security actors and institutions, and their undeclared or latent agendas. The invisible faces of power and security, are a major area of interest. For instance, Mallet (2010) uses Lund’s (2006) concept of ‘twilight institutions’ to describe the security and authority roles accorded to Northern Mozambique’s local chiefs through associations with state officials and international donor organisations; while Goodhand and Mansfield (2010) argue that Afghanistan’s warlords use their domination of illicit economies and patrimonial ‘joint extraction regimes’ to build political legitimacy through the provision of security and social services to client communities (Snyder 2006). Similarly, Menkhaus (2006) introduces the concept of the ‘mediated state’ to explain the manner in which the Somali government must partner, co-opt or sub-contract state security functions to localised coalitions of religious, clan and business leaders eager to create secure trading markets, set up local courts and maintain traditional patterns of domination. The ultimate object is to understand ‘how best to manage, exploit, and coexist’ with HPOs and to help public authorities ‘to provide human and national security to their populations’ (Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Thus, in countries dominated by corrupt or abusive institutions, such as Mexico and Uganda, those responsible for delivering security and justice are often the perpetrators of insecurity (Serrano et al. 2011; Baker 2010). Conversely the alleged agents of insecurity, such as warlords in Afghanistan or firebrand clerics in Somalia, may offer alternative forms of protection or even claim to act as liberators (Goodhand and Mansfeld 2010; Renders and Terlinden 2010).

All of these examples take place within hybrid political spaces in which international and national actors coexist, collaborate, and compete to achieve their ends. Thus, they are far from the neutral, uncontested and self-contained spaces found in the mainstream security literature. Moreover, policy analyses have a tendency to edit out the political interests and calculations of the major players, including the international ones. The most important contribution of the critical literature (Chandler 2006; Pugh et al. 2008; Richmond and Franks 2009, Richmond 2011; Keen 2006; Howell and Lind 2009) has been to place these external actors firmly into the analytical frame as objects of study - rather than taking their policy agendas as the starting point for inquiry, as in so much of the statebuilding and security reform literature.

These new modes of analysis are also increasingly influential in policy circles. For instance the OECD’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF) has called for deeper understanding of hybrid political orders (HPOs). In this context the World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report (WDR) represents an important step forward and potentially provides the basis for shifting the paradigm for understanding security. While it remains firmly within a
framework that insists on legitimate and capable institutions as the policy solution to citizen insecurity, the WDR also acknowledges building such institutions is a long-term exercise and need not necessarily follow a western model. The fact that the World Bank, as the premier multilateral development institution, is publishing such an argument is as significant as the substance of the argument itself. However, although there is good reason to be sympathetic to the arguments developed in the WDR, the research and analysis it presents falls short of rigorously demonstrating its conclusions.

The literature review shows that HPOs are difficult to empirically investigate and categorise. Furthermore, analysis of how the contests and negotiations within HPOs work, and for whom, must be carefully separated from assertions about their political or normative desirability. It has to be acknowledged that HPOs can include actors and institutions that reinforce insecurities or patterns of social or gender exclusion. Thus, the constitution of public authority and the provision of public goods rarely correspond to global normative standards for governance.

That is the reason why hybrid structures undoubtedly raise important and challenging questions: to whom are they accountable, and how is the ‘public interest’ protected in the face of patronage and the profit motive of private parties? Do they simply legitimize the inclusion of spoilers within government? Is it possible to institutionalize what may be fluid and personality-dependent structures?

The “Global Uncertainties: Security in an Africa of Networked, Multilevel governance” led by Professor David Leonard at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) has begun to answer some of these questions. The programme was built on the observation that all governance (especially in Africa) is multi-level and networked -- from the level of the village to that of the international organisation-- and well beyond what is specified in formal government structures. Thus the focus is not only on the ways in which key conflict-management institutions evolve themselves but also on the changing ways in which the networks in which they are embedded actually operate. The main objective is to improve the functioning of the various institutions responsible for the production of security and the management of conflict in Sub-Saharan African societies, particularly in the presence of violent conflict (Bagayoko, 2012; Leonard, 2013).

Based on this literature review (to be further enriched and deepened), a concept and theoretical paper will be issued from the very beginning of the research. Eboe Hutchful, Robin Luckham and N. Bagayoko will be responsible for writing this paper which will, inter alia, specifically test the relevance of this accumulated literature for the region(s) in question, and thereafter constitute a guide to research on the ground.

**Mentoring and research capacity building**

Developing rigorous research methods, based upon grounded understanding of the hybrid political orders and power networks shaping security and its modalities of delivery in African countries, we propose the following threefold methodology:

(a) Further deepening the review and analysis of the literature related to hybrid political orders;
(b) Investigating hybrid security orders on the ground through a number of case studies, utilizing a multidisciplinary approach to data gathering and analysis and drawing insights from such disciplines as political science, anthropology and sociology; and
(c) Building the skills and research capacity of African researchers who do have a thorough knowledge of informal institutions and actors;

The project will constitute a Working Group of junior and senior country and thematic researchers and experts who will work in close collaboration with mentors from the ASSN.
The ASSN and its research partners, as well as independent experts involved in the project have over the years been employed in similar projects. Because of their deep local knowledge and familiarity with social practices and traditions (including vernacular languages), African researchers from the case study countries will take the lead in gathering data on the ground. They will also be responsible for conducting desk research. In addition, community workshops and dialogue fora will be held wherever possible in the various research sites to solicit insights into the nature and functioning of customary security and justice institutions, their interactions with state security bodies, and resulting impacts (or lack thereof) on the security of local communities. The mapping of security structures will be attempted through desk research, augmented by field research and qualitative interviews, utilizing approaches customized to particular contexts.

Thereafter, the analysis of research findings will be carried out by senior researchers (mentors) from the African Security Sector network who will be responsible for drawing the necessary theoretical conclusions and converting the data gathered into easily accessible research outputs. The field researchers will be very much involved in this phase as well, both on an ongoing basis and through two brainstorming workshops, the first to be held at the beginning of the project, and the second prior to drafting of the final papers and publication of findings. Communications between mentors and researchers on the field will be held on a regular basis, especially via emails. The ASSN mentors possess multidisciplinary backgrounds in academic research on security institutions (several also have practitioner backgrounds), and are experienced in accessing high-level security and government officials and systems. So they will also assist field researchers with interviews of security and government officials wherever necessary, particularly where sensitive information may be required.

Furthermore, collaboration is expected with two potential partners: an SSRC project which seeks to expand African voices and research on peacebuilding as well as foster a New Generation of younger African researchers; and a CODESRIA project that will revisit earlier research on “The Military and Militarism in Africa”.

**Case studies**

Drawing upon perspectives offered by sociology and anthropology on the daily functioning of state bureaucracies (both at the central and at the local level), research will be conducted on the ground in order to better understand the ways in which African security governance is shaped and reshaped by the interactions of the heterogeneous norms, standards and procedures promoted by (or associated with) a variety of formal and informal actors and institutions. Actual case studies will be drawn from Somaliland, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa and Nigeria. Most of these countries are in various stages of transition from conflict and this has been the main selection criteria for case studies. Some of them have experienced SSR processes, largely supported and oriented by international donors (Liberia, Sierra Leone) but others not have not (Nigeria), or are in very early stages (Côte d’Ivoire). Somaliland is virtually unique in following its own home-grown model of security sector reform.

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3 See below, under Project Management

4 Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, based in Dakar, Senegal

5 Published as *The Military and Militarism in Africa*, ed Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, Dakar: Codesria Books, 1998
**Mano River Union: Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire**

As a country in transition from a fratricidal war to peace, Sierra Leone defies the logic of the traditional security thinking that the state monopolizes the legitimate use of force to protect its territory and citizens. The decade old rebel war that erupted in this small West African country (1991-2002) brought to the fore the role of informal security structures both in the prosecution of the war and in the post-conflict security landscape.

**Case study 1:**

Citizens at the height of the war in the country were all too often witnesses to the heinous role of the security services (particularly the armed forces) in wreaking havoc on civilians rather than protecting them. Subsequently, some members of the armed forces were popularly referred to as sobels. These human rights abuses and other excesses committed by some members of the armed forces bred mistrust between the civilians and the military. In attempting to assume responsibility for the security of their areas, ordinary citizens established Civil Defence Forces (CDFs). This was a combination of groups of local hunter militia. The best known of these included the Kamajohs in the Southeast; the Gbethis, Tamaboros and Kapras in the North and the Donsos in Kono. The emergence of these forces had substantial implications for post-conflict security governance in the country that were not adequately considered in the national post war -reconstruction agenda.

However, there is another respect where Sierra Leone represents an innovation: the deliberate (and pragmatic) effort to integrate customary institutions into the post-war national security and justice architecture, in part through a philosophy of ‘decentralisation’. In this sense, Sierra Leone is a good example of the formalisation of ‘hybridity’, harking back to the British colonial ‘indirect rule’ practice of co-opting and subordinating indigenous institutions to the service of the colonial state. The ‘newer’ form of this ‘decentralisation’ is the setting up of chieftdom security committees, which are in turn closely aligned to the PROSECS and DISECs (Provincial and District security committees), thus in essence integrating traditional chiefs into the national security and intelligence structure, where they are designed to act as the ‘eyes and ears’ of the national security dispensation, particularly in the border areas. A second, much older form of this philosophy is the ‘legal dualism’ that has characterised the colonial and post-colonial justice system in Sierra Leone. Alongside the formal security and justice bodies recognized by the country’s constitution are traditional and other authorities that exercise control over their areas based on cultural norms and practices. Over 70% of Sierra Leoneans reportedly, rely on family members, local chiefs, elders or leaders and Paramount Chiefs for dispute resolution. Other alternative justice providers include village and tribal headmen, Mammy Queens, youth chairmen, traditional society elders (poro and bondo), religious leaders (pastors and imams) and community leaders. Local courts are semi-formal institutions with jurisdiction over issues such as marriages, divorce, debt, and succession and land tenure. Determinations are made on the basis of customary law, which, under the constitution is part of the common law of Sierra Leone. Chiefs courts are held in the presence of the traditional council of elders (composed of tribal authorities, members of other ruling houses and respected members of the community). Plaintiffs approach the court and the chief decides the venue. Like the local courts, these courts are criticized on numerous grounds: limited supervision and oversight; adjudication of disputes outside their jurisdiction; imposition of arbitrary and excessive fines; allegations of violations of basic human rights principles (particularly in relation to gender equality); lack of systematic accountability and transparency with regard to budgets and expenditures; and lack of transparency in

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6 Sobel was the term used to describe those members of the armed forces of Sierra Leone who served as soldiers during the day and transformed into rebels at night.
recruitment procedures.

In its quest to address some of the injustices of the local and chiefs courts, the Sierra Leone Government recently took the bold step of passing the Local Courts Acts 2011 (Act No.10 of 2011), which now reintegrates the Local Courts into the mainstream legal system, bringing it back under the Office of the Chief Justice from the Ministry of Local Government and attempting to strengthen human rights protections.

Nevertheless, as with most other post-conflict restructuring exercises, security and justice sector reforms (SJSR) in Sierra Leone have focused essentially on statutory forces. This has not precluded the possibility of new modalities for delivering security emerging (and clearly the chiefs security committees is a case in point), particularly in the ‘twilight zones’ at the margins of the state, but this is often viewed through the prism of expediency (as a set of pragmatic decisions) rather than something which alters the fundamental thrust of SSR, which remains Westphalian in inspiration. This has not included serious efforts to address non-statutory forces in terms of their future development, capacity needs, and appropriate oversight. It is this gap that the proposed study tries to address.

The case study seeks to realize two interrelated objectives. Firstly, to identify and analyze the diverse networks and processes involved in both the formal and non-formal security and justice institutions in Sierra Leone with a view to generating a better and realistic understanding of the interface between formal and informal structures. Secondly, the study will try to analyze the nature of local level security and justice institutions (encompassing village and tribal headmen, Mammy Queens, youth chairmen, traditional society elders, religious leaders, community leaders, local courts and the chiefs courts and chiefdom security committees) and how these function in practice (alone or in tandem with those of the state) to reinforce or alleviate gender, class and ethnic disparities in access to justice and security at local and wider national levels.

Case Study 2

With its experience of ‘sobel’s, ‘kamajors’, Sierra Leone provides important parallels with and a relevant comparison to the role played during and after the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire by the so-called Dozos, hunters in the northern part of the country. The Dozos are members of a co-fraternity consisting of initiated hunters and sons of Dozo, called a Donzo Ton. The Dozo are not an ethnic group: they are drawn mostly from Mandé-speaking groups, but are also found among Dyula-speaking communities and most of the ethnic groups in Côte d’Ivoire. The influence of Dozo societies increased in the 1990’s when President Houphouët-Boigny called on citizens to assist the police in crime control; and as crime increased, local officials drafted in hunters into Korhogo and Ferkessédougou to help. The hunter militias proved to be very successful in suppressing crime, and their fame spread far beyond the north and rural areas. Dozo groups gained prominence (and potentially political influence) during the Ivorian Civil War when they were hired by locals and both sides of the conflict as combatants, as well as to guard vehicles, direct traffic, or patrol religious sites. This success fed into the growth of Benkadi groups (a network of Donzo Ton) in all parts of Côte d’Ivoire, as the civil war and fragile peace drove up demand for local security. The success of Dozos has been attributed to the magical abilities with which they are supposedly endowed. In Abidjan and Bouaké Donzo Ton leaders opened security offices. Unemployed men from around the country came to Korhogo and Odienné, home of Benkadi leadership, to be initiated into a Donzo Ton, and thus have access to work as well-paid security guards.

The problems associated with the Dozos (human rights abuses, extortion, etc) at the end of the war has been highlighted in various media, as have the ambivalent responses of the new
government to contain these groups while at the same time continuing to rely on them to keep the remnants of the insurgency at bay, particularly in the west of the country.

The experiences of both Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire speak to the fact that, in the same way as ‘security’ lies at the very core of the peacebuilding process, so the character of decisions about how to respond to the complex (and multilayered) landscape of force in post-conflict contexts can be critical to the success of efforts to restore or bring about ‘security’, particularly in the light of the security and ‘rule of law’ vacuum that tends to emerge at supposed ‘conflict’s end’. In this respect, the perspectives of end-users (ie the ground-level view) may diverge from the top-down perspectives of state and security sector managers, political elites and the international community that tends to inform the ‘state-building’ approach. It is not enough simply to dismantle ‘irregulars’ and informal force structures without addressing the fundamental dynamics (and deficits) that generated them in the first place; decisions about these structures (and their functioning) have to respond in some way to both demands for ‘security from below’ and for ‘force multipliers’ from above, and these will be as crucial as those regarding formal security structures. How and to what extent the state-building paradigm capitalizes in each particular case on (or alternatively moves consciously away from) this conjuncture of forces is a matter for empirical research. In responding to these common challenges, it is arguable the extent to which Cote d'Ivoire (and other Manu River Union states, with their rather different histories and political dynamics) will follow the pragmatic lead of Sierra Leone in seeking to integrate formal and customary/irregular forces; suffice it to say that there is a process of mutual learning and experience-sharing within the MRU which is at present limited (and even muted), and certainly needs to be accelerated.

Crucial issues and questions that the two case studies will try to address are :

- How have these informal security structures been handled in the two countries' post-war reconstruction agenda?
- What are the relationships between these informal security structures spawned by the conflict and the constitutionally mandated security structures?
- How have these hybrid security structures supported or undermined (a) elite political projects or (b) the safety and well-being of ordinary communities in the aftermath of the war?
- What are the constitutional implications of creating security structures that do not have a legal basis and yet are considered (at least by some groups and communities) to be vital for their security (if not necessarily an unmixed blessing), and by others as vectors of insecurity?
- What were the gender implications of these informal security structures, especially in the North of Sierra Leone where women are culturally and socially marginalised?

Research Team:
Field researchers:
Sierra Leone: researchers from the Centre for Development and Security Analysis (CEDSA);
Côte d'Ivoire: Rodrigue Koné from the CERAP and Michèle Pepe (independent researcher).

Supervision: Dr. Osman Gbla (Fourah Bay College) and Ismail Tarawali, Director of Provincial Security at the Office of National Security.

**Horn of Africa: Somaliland**

In terms of local and traditional peace and state building in Africa, the Somaliland experience stands out clearly. The all-inclusive Burao grand peace and reconciliation conference in May 1991 led to cessation of all violent activities in the Somaliland territories, declaration of reinstatement of Somaliland to its colonial borders prior to 26 June 1960 (the date of
unification), and the establishment of the Somali National Movement (SNM) interim government, which was obliged in turn to resign after two years in office, so that political power could be supervised by the traditional leadership. Hence, the transition in Somaliland was unique by African standards.\(^7\) The Burao conference was just the beginning of a series of peace and reconciliation such as: the Berbera conference in June 1991; Sheikh conference in July the same year and Eirigaabo conference in August the same year.\(^6\) The series of conferences set the stage for a new kind of peace and state building. One of the decisions involved mutual and equal demilitarization of the clans that shaped the nature of the security sector and its governance. The three major Isaq sub-clans: Haber Awel, Haber Yonus and Haber Ja'il'o agreed on the details of demilitarization including the type of fire power a given clan should surrender. This shaped the nature of the security sector in which monopoly of violence and legitimacy of security institutions began to have an inter-clan character.

The Borama grand peace conference in 1993, in which SNM voluntarily restored power to the people according to its pledge and constitution, marked the real political transition. A renowned politician Ibrahim Egal became the first civilian (non SNM) president. This was the first case of a liberation movement ceding power after an outright military victory. The process culminated in the Hargeisa peace conference in which the issue of more power sharing was introduced in favour of non Issaqi (minority) clans, and the demobilization of all clan militia was accomplished voluntarily, preparing the ground for Somaliland national army and police to be firmly established.\(^9\)

The process in Somalia thus departs consciously and deliberately from the case in many African countries where ‘state-building’ and corresponding security sector reform (SSR) processes focus on structural and formal institutional arrangements of the state, rather aiming in principle at a hybrid political and security order in which the security sector and security governance came to reflect a clan, customary, and state organisations and structures. Apart from the clan factor in the security services a body of traditional leadership known as the Guurti plays a key role in oversight. The political process in Somaliland resembles a marriage between Western ministerial values and the Somali traditional leadership, a highly innovative political solution probably unique in Africa.\(^10\) The clan elders have played a crucial role in the peaceful transition, and are now a similarly significant force in contemporary government, jointly with elected politicians.

Unlike the process in the rest of Somalia, which depends on foreign aid and military coercion, the process in Somaliland relied on home-grown institutions, processes and interest groups. Unlike Somalia, which followed top-down approaches of state and peacebuilding, Somaliland followed bottom-up approaches. Central to the peace process in Somaliland are traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, incorporating the role of traditional leadership, which is largely disregarded in Somalia.

And again contrary to developments in Somalia, the peace process in Somaliland was rooted in an inter-clan consensus on demilitarisation and clan-led DDR processes. The processes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding in Somaliland have followed a markedly different trajectory from that of many countries in the Horn of Africa and the results are glaringly evident. However, the approach of the international community to date indicates just how

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\(^9\) Ibid.

little has been learned about the region in the intervening years. So far, there has been little study of how security bodies and structures interact with the power and patronage structures of hybrid political orders in the region, locally and nationally.

Research Objectives

Among the case studies, Somaliland will function simultaneously as exemplar and counter-factual. “Exemplar” in the sense that Somaliland is expected to provide a particularly robust evidence base for some of the core propositions of the research proposal, in that it constitutes:

- a unique opportunity to observe a ‘hybrid’ political and security order in the making, and to insert researchers on the ground floor to observe its still-unfolding dynamics;

- a living context where the security sector and its governance mechanisms really do reflect a “complex amalgam of statutory and non-statutory actors and institutions”; and where customary, clan and non-formal institutions operate parallel to (and in conjunction with) formal state institutions. What tensions and trade-offs occur, how are these managed, and in whose interest(s) do these networked institutions actually operate?

- a laboratory for studying more specifically the role of non-state armed groups as legitimate and certified providers of security and justice, in a nominally independent state, where such groups are not regarded as an aberration and an indication of social dysfunction (to be ‘demobilized’ with all speed), but a permanent part of the institutions of social protection, and indeed of the constitutional order. What kinds of relationships have these groups developed with the ‘state’ and the populations in Somaliland, and what are the popular perceptions of this arrangement?

In these and other ways, Somaliland also provides opportunities to explore four of our policy-related questions:

- What evidence does Somaliland provide as to how one goes about building viable and accountable institutions in contexts characterised by hybridity and informality? How are notions of clan and clan identity (along with other informal arrangements) reconciled with broader conceptions of citizenship and citizenship rights?

- Is ‘hybridity’ Somaliland-style succeeding in furnishing a strategy for building effective and durable security and security governance systems, with lessons that can be transmitted to other African states?

- Is the reconstructed Somaliland state and society somehow more ‘resilient’ as it emerges from conflict because of its hybridity? Does it verify our proposition that ‘hybrid orders’ can ‘provide the underpinnings of an approach to building more effective security and security governance systems, hence more durable peace-building processes’?

- How have issues of gender been addressed in these ‘informal’, ‘neo-traditional’ (and all too often masculinized) arrangements?

At the same time, however, Somaliland is the glaring counter-factual to the other case studies, and indeed it is for this reason – in being a departure from the norm- that it holds out hope of imparting potentially useful lessons to other African countries. Somaliland has
followed its own distinctive trajectory of peace and state-building, perhaps less out of choice than force of circumstance: lack of embrace by the international and regional community has dictated (or encouraged) a more autarkic path. ¹¹ ‘Hybridity’ is oftentimes the result of political expediency or a reflection of the limitations of Westphalian state-building models in the context of the South (for how else does one interpret the sudden ‘rediscovery’ of traditional and customary governance forms in the state-building policy literature?); in the case of Somaliland by contrast it appears to be a principled and core ingredient to indigenous peace- and state-building.

First, of course, these processes require to be unravelled by researchers: what is the nature of peace and state building in Somaliland, how and why is it different from other African countries, and how has this influenced security sector development and reform?

A number of broader questions then arise: Have these indigenous processes –though widely ignored by the international and regional community -- resulted in more durable, accountable outcomes? Does this ‘principled’ hybridity function differently (and with qualitatively better governance outcomes) than in the more murky contexts of other African states? ¹² Do traditional and clan-based institutions –previously the ‘sergeant-majors of empire’ and now prone to being the handmaidens of urban-based political elites —wield any more power and authority in Somaliland than elsewhere? What is the place of gender vis-à-vis these traditional hierarchies? By implication, is the international community and its (ahistorical) concepts of state-building the problem rather than the solution? Has the negligible imprint of the international community actually worked to the benefit of Somaliland?

**Literature Review**

The peace and state building process in Somaliland has largely been ignored by academics and policy makers partly because the country remained at the margins of the regional interstate system and international recognition. We still know very little about the internal processes that led to peace and reconciliation and the nature of the ‘Hybrid Political Order’ in Somaliland. So far, there has been little study of how the political transition in Somaliland is different from others (except in the work of the likes of Iqbal Jhazbhay, Mark Bradbury, Ken Menkhaus, Mohamed Samantar and Medhane Tadesse).

There is a particular lack of information on the security sector and how security bodies and structures interact with the power and patronage structures of hybrid political orders, Somaliland included. Hence, literature review will form the first component of the research on Somaliland. In particular, little exists in terms of evidence-based, ‘ground-level’ research on how people ‘experience’ and ‘feel’ – positively as well as negatively– the impacts of hybrid governance and security systems. There is –correspondingly– little analysis and comprehension of the nature of these movements and of the non-statutory armed groups, as well as their relations with peace and security, or, for that matter, of the processes by which informal norms and practices have come to be embedded in formal security structures, and with what outcomes.

¹¹ Parenthetically: the refusal of the international community to recognize Somaliland in spite of the many positive lessons from its homegrown model –indeed the embarrassing contrast with Somalia, in which the international and regional community have invested massively—testifies to the extent to which ‘state-building’ today has become locked into ideological notions of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘inviolability of national borders’ (except of course in those instances–such as Kosovo–where the shakers and movers of the international community have a vested interest in reconstituting existing nation-states and national territories).

¹² Where arguably such networks function to foreclose transparency and accountability rather than better serve the public interest
Research Team

The research team will be drawn from among the following local researchers:

1. Adem Musa Jibril, Somaliland Intellectual Society, Hargiessa
2. Mohamed Farah Hersi, Researcher, Academy for Peace and Development
3. Dr. Adan haji Ali, a lecturer in the Hargeisa University.
4. Mohamed Samantar

Supervision: Medhane Tadesse, African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

Collaboration is being explored with two potential partners in Somaliland: the Center for Peace and Reconciliation in the Hargeisa University and the Academy for Peace and Development. This is important in terms of mentoring and local capacity building as well as research uptake.

Informal security from below

This case study will focus on end-users and will stem from an analytical shift away from state-centric security to the perceptions and experience of those at the receiving end of security arrangements. It will acknowledge the possibility that they may have the agency (power and resources) to shape the security agenda, as well as be subject to it, whether as creators of security or alternatively as agents of insecurity. The issue at stake will be ensuring that research not only addresses the policy concerns of security decision-makers but also taps the experience, perceptions and needs of end users. Policy interventions are all too rarely evidence-based or grounded upon proper consultation with those whom it is supposed to benefit. Policy-makers sometimes grumble that the social research that arrives on their desks does not address their most pressing policy concerns. Researchers for their part complain that policy makers disregard their findings in pursuing quick policy fixes in situations of great historical and social complexity. At the same time both researchers and policy-makers tend to be remote from the day-to-day lives and security concerns of poor and vulnerable people. These end-users have to cope with risks and insecurities that stem partly from global dislocations they may barely understand. They interact with a range of international actors, including researchers, who are accountable in the final analysis to those who mandate, fund or organise their activities, rather than those they study. End users cannot hope to hold either policy-makers or researchers to account without better empirical understanding of how and by whom their security is determined, including where possible access to the research upon which the framing of policy is based.

That said, the notion of ‘security from below’ should not be taken as face value, and if anything, requires substantial qualification. For one thing, these local/informal actors are as liable to dispense insecurity as security (easily bent, for instance, to sectarian and/or criminal ends), often have limited if any structures of accountability or regard for due process and human rights, and incorporate power hierarchies and networks of their own that do not necessarily serve the collective interest. As well, a common theme linking the case studies from Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria is the frequency with which initiatives from below have been co-opted and deflected into instruments of power brokers or shadowy enforcement arms of the state. They remind us that hybrid security systems have complex origins and political dynamics: suffice to say that they are not uniquely the product of striving for ‘security from below’, but oftentimes result from deliberate efforts by states, political elites and dominant orders to capture, mobilize and bend such subaltern structures (and their political and coercive resources) to their own designs, not inconsistent with the wider historical tendency of states and political elites to tap into or outsource to private circuits of
violence as a way of consolidating their own power. How do the forces of hybridity generated from below intersect with those generated from above? Equally notable is the tendency for an autonomous ‘enforcement cadre’ with its own separate and distinct interests to develop at the nexus of these networks, in some cases able to tap into resources and ‘legitimations’ from above as well as below, and (as both the Bakassi Boys and the OPC demonstrate in the Nigerian case) all too often posing their own problems of control.

The South African case study casts yet another (and much different) light on the dynamics of hybridity: relating in this case to the much neglected research theme of the safety and security of LGBT people. It is not usual to link ‘hybridity’ and issues of sexual orientation in the analytical literature (though a few nascent efforts do exist), but South Africa offers a strong case for establishing such a linkage. The 1996 Constitution of the post-apartheid Republic provides extensive guarantees and protections for both gender and sexual orientation (broadly interpreted to include transgender and intersex individuals) and through this for its LGBT citizens, to a degree unique by African (and indeed global) standards. Yet despite this constitutional protection, LGBT South Africans live in a state of insecurity; numerous rapes, bodily violations, sexual intimidation, and murders of LGBT South Africans have been documented since the passage of this constitution that ostensibly guarantees the safety and security of all citizens on the basis of gender and sexuality. To the extent that the violence primarily affects the black LGBT rather than the (archetypal) white LGBT community, there is undeniably a racial and ethnic dimension to this as well (and perhaps a spacial dimension also, as the violence appears to be concentrated more in rural and township as opposed to urban areas).

The key to this conundrum may lie, ironically, in another notable feature of the South African constitution, which is the emphasis it places on multiculturalism and multiracialism. All ‘multicultural’ and ‘multiracial’ societies are in principle ‘hybrid’ to some degree or other. Within the South African state, this hybridity is expressed in part in the recognition and empowerment of African traditional authorities in the public and governmental sphere, and the power that they have to determine and regulate African culture and custom. Many attacks on black LGBT people have been framed and justified in the name of ‘African tradition’ and ‘identity’, and derive from the opposition within the traditional sphere and among traditional authorities to LGBT rights, thus contributing to the disenfranchisement of black LGBT South Africans.

But this case-study also points to a broader issue: the need, in the context of hybrid arrangements, to interrogate the congruence (or not) of the various norms and values extant in the political arena, and how these may impact the access of particular groups and individuals to supposed rights and entitlements. It is possible that insufficient attention may be paid, in such contexts, to the potential for a ‘clash of values’, and for the emergence of different (and discriminatory) regimes of protection and security, in practice much at variance with the constitutional notion of equal protection for all. This stems from the exposure of individuals and groups to separate and distinct juridical and normative spheres (‘legal dualism’ or –better still—‘legal segmentation’), embodying interpretations of entitlements and rights that are not necessarily consistent with each other. Thus while ‘gender equity’ for instance has become the global norm, it remains deeply contested in everyday life in certain cultures and religions, and (as already clear from the operation of customary courts in Sierra Leone and Liberia) may tend to be undermined within hybrid arrangements. What emerges in the specific case of South Africa (and in the even more fraught context of sexual orientation) is that a homophbic popular culture and enactments of masculinity -- offered in the name of ‘African tradition’ and ‘identity’--- have generated exclusion and insecurity from below for those of different sexual orientation, undercutting freedoms and formal rights allegedly guaranteed by the state and acquired as a result of painful and protracted struggle. In this sense, ‘hybridity’ has the tendency to simultaneously produce security and insecurity, depending on one’s location in the order of things.
**Case study 1: Organisation of safety and security of urban poor communities in Nigeria**

Nigeria has been undergoing reform initiatives aimed at improving the safety and security of its people and this has been done with focus on the formal police institution. However, paralleling these efforts has been a notable growth in organs of ‘self-help policing’ in the aftermath of the transition to civil rule in May 1999, particularly in marginal urban and rural communities, suggesting that these efforts at police reform have been ineffective, irrelevant to the poor, or simply beside the point. These included the Bakassi Boys in South-eastern states and the Odua People’s Congress (OPC) in the South-western states and the so-called ‘yan bang’ in the Northern states. The 2006 National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by CLEEN Foundation showed that the satisfaction level of the services of informal policing systems was 76 percent, while that of the formal police was 38 percent. Despite the significant contribution of informal policing systems in addressing the safety and security needs of the Nigerian population, especially the poor, governments’ attention appeared to be focused almost exclusively on the formal systems of policing except when it comes to banning informal groups or driving them underground, a policy that has failed woefully in the past fourteen years of civil rule in Nigeria.

The literature has demonstrated that there tends to be proliferation of citizen crime watch and policing groups (IPS) when there are high incidence --and correspondingly widespread fear -- of crime, accompanied by public perceptions of police and other criminal justice agencies as ineffective. Under such circumstances, citizens have tended to resort to vigilantism and various modes of informal policing. Since the 1990s, there has been a growing concern about widespread criminality, especially armed robbery and homicides. At the same time, citizens and the government have expressed concern about the inability of the police and other security agencies to curb threats to security and safety in Nigeria, despite increased personnel and supply of arms and ammunition and other crime-fighting equipment.

There have been many instances where the extra-legal and harsh actions of these vigilante groups (such as reports of the Bakassi Boys and the Odua People’s Congress killing, maiming and burning suspects) have brought them into collision with the police and the authorities and provoked sanctions. At the same time, however, this represents only one facet of the complicated relationship between political authorities and vigilante groups in Nigeria. There have equally been situations where states have made common cause with private instruments of coercion, or where states have encouraged or actually gestated such ‘informal’ security structures. A number of Nigerian states (Anambra, Abia, and Delta) enacted laws creating state-financed and controlled vigilante services, with powers that appeared designed to circumvent the federal monopoly on policing that so irked some states and their Governors. The introduction of Sharia law in twelve northern states between 2000 and 2003 also led to the establishment of quasi-police forces known as hisba. Lagos state in turn established a Neighbourhood Watch system to assist the police in crime prevention and control, but this did not involve any significant police powers beyond what is historically imputed to citizens. Thus we find variations, not only in the character of the vigilante and other informal groups emerging across the country, but also their relationships with the police, the power structure, and social forces more broadly, as well as in their sources of funding and patronage. Hitherto, there has not been much systematic study of these aspects of vigilante groups and their wider social and political networking in different Nigerian states.13

This study will look at the prevailing informal security governance framework in 3 selected urban poor communities in Nigeria drawn from Lagos, Imo and the Federal Capital Territory.

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13 We recognize that the entire thematics of the informal security sector in Nigeria has shifted substantially as the landscape of violence and insecurity in Nigeria has morphed substantially in recent years with the proliferation of entrepreneurial, millennial and criminal forms of violence accountable to neither states nor local communities as groups like MENDS and Boko Haram have come to capture the media headlines.
Abuja. It seeks to answer the following questions:

1. How does the prevailing informal security governance framework affect men, women and vulnerable groups such as the disabled, the youth, the aged and minority communities?
2. Why are they affected differently?
3. How do the target groups access security and justice?
4. How are informal provisions of security linked to formal framework of security governance in the country?
5. How can the problems that hinder the collaboration between informal and formal security in the selected communities be resolved for improved security governance in the communities?
6. How can the findings be exported and transposed to the national level?

Research Team

This case study will be conducted by the CLEEN Foundation which has done extensive work on informal policing in Nigeria:
Researchers: Rapheal Mbaegbu and Napoleon Enayaba
Supervisor: Dr. Nwachukwu Orji

Police reform and gender policy: the influence of the women secret society in Sierra Leone and Liberia

While ‘gender equity’ has come to be widely accepted as a core principle of SSR and UNSCR1325, gender disparity and subordination tend to be perceived (however questionably) as the rule in customary and informal justice and security structures and networks. Traditionalist notions of the place of gender are actively being promoted as well by resurgent fundamentalist religions and groups, often as a backlash to the growing global consensus. Hybridity thus promises to be in every way a double-edged sword, furnishing institutional and ideational resources into which states can tap, on the one hand, and, on the other, carrying inestimable potential for cultural and ideological friction.

Case study 1: Sierra Leone

The Bondo Society in Sierra Leone is widely revered, if not feared, and therefore rarely interfered with. Known as Bondo in the North and in Freetown and Sande in the South, women secret societies play instrumental roles in all aspects of community life. These include education in both practical skills-based crafts and cultural and historical traditions, regulation of members’ activities as well as serve as a source of mutual insurance for members. A girl is initiated into the Bondo society through seclusion in the Bondo ‘Bush’, by way of a female circumcision and what are considered other rites of passage into womanhood. It is a common practice throughout Sierra Leone. It is also a highly political issue, demonstrated by the fact that despite international campaigns and pressure from rights activists in the capital to put an end to the practice, the strength of Bondo is such that politicians have been reluctant to oppose, and in fact have continued to endorse the practice, for fear of losing the support of its powerful champions. In rural areas female circumcision is not open to public discussion. Similarly, police forces have had to find a way to deal diplomatically with this very powerful traditional group when the SSR process was launched at the beginning of the 2000’s, especially since most members of the police force will also hold membership in these institutions, and are subordinate to them.

The primacy of these organizations questions assumptions of state control of the safety and security of citizens, especially in rural communities, where the absence of significant police
presence particularly in remote areas mean that these organizations are a significant source of alternative justice and play instrumental roles in keeping order. At the same time, the importance of these societies raises questions about the gendered nature of justice, and problematises dominant perceptions that customary and informal justice structures are the locus of gender disparity and subordination. On the one hand, the level of respect they command within society suggests they could serve as a more favourable source of justice for women. On the other hand, research suggests that power differentials between women in secret societies can also result in justice rulings that disenfranchise or impinge on the rights of women. For example, Charley and M'Cormack (2012) recount the difficulty that male police officers had in taking action to assist a mother who accused the Bondo Society of kidnapping her daughter and forcing her to undergo initiation as men are banned from the “Bondo Bush.” Bledsoe (1984) has argued that Sande elite women side with elite men, as well as exploit subordinate women.

Such contradictions illustrate the complexities embedded within formal and traditional notions of justice, as well as raise questions about how hybridity can and does function. This part of the research will seek to provide a gendered examination of how police systems interact with local notions of justice as exercised within female societies. Understanding the relationship between formal and informal justice processes as embodied within the Sande/Bondo and the police sector can influence both the idea as well as practice of police reform. Finally, given the largely negative dominant perception of non-formal dispute resolution sectors on women’s rights, this research can present a more nuanced picture of this relationship especially in light of the importance and significance of these institutions in the eyes of both male and female community members.

Case study 2: Liberia

Liberia’s Police force currently numbers only about 4,000 Police Officers – a ratio of about 1:850 citizens. In the face of limited reach and capacity the majority of Liberians continue to rely on traditional mechanisms of law enforcement and dispute resolution – various studies estimate that between 80-98% of all criminal justice cases are administered by Liberia’s customary justice system. While such arbitration by chiefs and elders is generally considered necessary for filling the void of an inadequate formal justice system, the Government has taken active steps to curtail, through prohibition, some traditional practices. This includes the ‘Sassywood’ or trial by ordeal, whereby guilt is determined or confession elicited primarily by ingesting poison but also oath-taking, burning and so on. Yet this and other statutory systems remain popular as the formal justice system remains partial, and inaccessible and unaffordable to the majority of Liberians. Liberians also rely heavily on secret society (mostly Poro and Sande) courts and mechanisms to maintain law and order. However, some seemingly benign practices also go against Liberian statutory criminal justice norms continue to be ‘normalized’ to the detriment of victims, particularly women. One example is the way rape and sexual violence – a rampant problem in Liberia – is dealt with; often, in traditional contexts it is ‘talked through’ in ‘palava hut’ settings with (cash or kind) settlements made between families, and considered more a social than criminal problem, leaving the victim with no recourse. Yet rape and sexual violence is recognized in the statutory system as a serious issue, reflected in the priority given to amendments in the laws governing rape and the establishment of a special court specifically for expediting rape cases.

While this speaks to an urgent need to strengthen formal police and justice sector processes, national and international actors recognize and indeed promote the importance of other informal initiatives for conflict resolution such as the Peace Huts, modelled on the traditional ‘Palava Hut’ system, which provide community level justice for non-statutory offences. As initiative largely driven by women (facilitated by international donors), they provide an example of informal and traditional spaces in which women’s leadership and conflict resolution skills are embraced. They are also intended to help prevent crimes and violence
against women. The success of these is so great that the model has attracted significant donor support and is even being transplanted to other West African countries. Yet they are adapted from the potentially problematic palava hut system.

In the context of such legal dualism this research will examine the implications for justice of ‘cherry-picking’ alternative dispute mechanisms, particularly of women. In doing so it will address the following questions:

- In a context where the legal justice system is under-resourced and under-capacitated, what are the prospects for complementary rather than competitive dispute resolution systems particularly for women who continue to be under-served by both customary and statutory systems?

- How are ongoing processes such as decentralization of security provision (e.g. Justice and Security hubs, funded by Peacebuilding Commission, and community policing forums and palava huts, funded by UNDP) influencing such practices, particularly women's access to justice?

Research Team:
Field researchers:
Liberia: Freida M'Cormack (Institute for Development Studies (IDS))
Sierra Leone: Fredline M'Cormack-Hale (Fourah Bay College)

Supervision: Osman Gbla

Hybridity and Sexual Citizenship in South Africa

Case Study 1:

Gay rights have become a matter of serious contestation in Africa in recent times, with various regimes, ‘traditionalists’, religious and fundamentalist groups making not only concerted efforts to deny gay rights in any form, but openly advocating violent homophobia, in opposition to currents in the international community. The issue of gay rights has become a faultline between the international and donor community and a number of African governments.14

In contrast with the situation in much of Africa, however, the South African constitution contains some of the most liberal and progressive provisions on gay rights in the world. Yet suspected gays and lesbians are daily humiliated, attacked, and even killed in many areas of the country. How do we reconcile these liberal provisions with the reputation of South Africa as one of the rape and homophobic capitals of the world, and the violence and insecurity daily (and almost casually) visited on the LGBT community? To the extent that ‘African traditions’ have been invoked to promote homophobia as well as women's subordination and to undercut constitutional rights supposedly guaranteed by the state, it speaks to certain (nationalist/ideological) constructions of ‘African identity’ and problematizes South Africa’s multicultural/hybrid dispensation. Paradoxically respect for ethnic and racial identity and cultural diversity entrenched in the South African constitution has at the same time promoted conflicted and contested conceptions of sexual citizenship (within and between the various racial and cultural communities), and arguably complicated (if not undermined) the realization of the sexual rights embodied in that same constitution. Given this context of hybridity, the analysis challenges the notion of the state as the sole arbiter of rights, and points rather to the need to take on board the social and cultural context in which those rights are ‘lived’ as everyday experience.

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14 As recently demonstrated in the public exchange between President Obama and President Mackey Sall during the former’s state visit to Senegal
Over the last two decades, sexuality has emerged on a global scale as a primary means through which citizenship is policed/regulated, contested, and conferred. In vivid contrast to the combustible passions surrounding the issue of gay citizenship and rights in Africa is the extremely limited scholarship surrounding the lived experiences of black LGBT people. Most of the scholarship on sexual citizenship focuses on gender and sexual politics in the West, particularly given the advent of same-sex/gay marriage debates and politics throughout the western world. The fervent and rife politics of gender, sexuality, and the emerging categories of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa have received limited attention.

This contribution responds to this lacunae in the way in which it seeks to reconfigure queer politics in a Black South African context. The importance of this endeavor cannot be underestimated since, too often, white queer politics and experience in the West and abroad, are viewed as universal, therefore excluding from focus the particular experiences of Black gender and sexual marginals globally, and certainly in the African context. The analysis bemoans the over-reliance and sole emphasis on the State to confer citizenship, and thus rights and privileges to gender and sexual marginals. It argues that, while the post-apartheid South African legal system has indeed construed laws that protect and grant rights and privileges to South African LGBT people, the State is limited in its ability to fully account for the vast differences between such legal codes and the lived experiences of common people. Alternative modes of analysis are key to understanding the South African context where hybridity is built into the legal system and constitutional respect for cultural difference supports forms of interpretation that simultaneously empower and disempower citizens on the basis of gender and sexuality.

In this project, an attempt is made to develop and apply a Black queer theoretical framework as a way to analyze Black queer experiences and politics on the ground in South Africa. It employs ethnographic work to document and analyze the quotidian performance/performative practices of Black gender and sexual marginals in post-apartheid South Africa, and through this highlights how everyday people engage gender and sexual politics. Through modes of cultural production and performance such as kwaito music, gender and sexual marginals negotiate and forge alternative spheres of sexual freedom that function both within and outside the regulatory reach of the heteronormative State. Importantly, such modes of performance activate forms of cultural labor that create alternative spheres of politics central to alleviating the disconnect between progressive legal structures and quotidian experiences of exclusion.

The following questions will frame the research:

- How can greater acceptance of LGBT rights be encouraged within African traditional and religious communities, consistent with global trends? And how can protection of gays be mainstreamed into the discourses of ‘equal protection’ and ‘responsibility to protect’?15
- How is the contestation over LGBT rights in post-apartheid South Africa reflective of the hybrid nature of the South African state and normative tensions within that hybridity, and how can this conundrum be addressed?
- How do black LGBT South Africans construct their own sense of belonging in their

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15 For us this is not a theoretical question. ASSN has been contracted to produce an ‘Operational Guidance Note on Gender and SSR’ for the African Union, the objective of which is to render SSR (and specifically the new AU SSR Policy Framework) more effective in promoting gender equality and security. Incorporating LGBT rights as a legitimate component of ‘gender’ is, to say the least, a challenge in the present climate in Africa.
communities?

- How does the cultural labor (a broad term used to encompass both everyday and artistic performances and interventions) of black LGBT South Africans reveal the possibilities and limits of legal-juridico rights claims in South Africa?

- What kinds of LGBT visibilities work to create and enhance safety and security for black LGBT South Africans?

**Researcher:**

Xavier Livermon (Wayne State University)

Mentor: Dr. Sandy Africa, University of Pretoria

**Comparison and synthesis**

ASSN’s research programme is committed to ensuring a central body of comparative and comparable outputs. This will have methodological implications. Research locations are individual research projects, yet they are connected to each other through overarching themes and contribute to a comprehensive and consolidated response to the overall ASSN research agenda by providing a solid evidence base and feeding into larger theoretical debates.

At the same time, a comparative exercise on this scale also encourages reflections on the role of research per se in peacebuilding, and particularly in responding to the imperatives of ensuring peace, security and justice for the most vulnerable groups. These are some of the pertinent questions for collective reflection at the conclusion of this project:

- How can research be deployed so as to identify entry points where international as well as national policy interventions can make a real difference to the security and welfare of end-users?

- What is the appropriate balance between research aiming for empirical rigour, research supporting evidence-based policy, and research aiming to benefit and empower local communities? How does this balance change when researchers work in violent or politically contested neighbourhoods?

- What is the response of policy makers to research which casts a critical light on their policies and programmes, especially on SSR? Are they willing to take such analysis on board and if not how can they be encouraged to be more self-critical?

- How can researchers, security policy makers, civil society organisations and end-users work together to foster relevant research and ensure its dissemination, for instance through commissioned research, policy dialogue, networking, information-sharing etc?

- How can researchers build convincing and sufficiently accurate accounts of the deep state and of the informal networks of power through the gathering and triangulation of scraps of information from a variety of sources? How can this bricolage of sources be made more rigorous?

**Project Management**

Overall management and coordination of the project (resource mobilisation, financial administration, reporting, etc) will be managed centrally by the ASSN HQ in Accra. Administration will be under a Project Director assisted by a Programme Officer. The Project Director will have the responsibility of providing overall research direction, and will act (in close collaboration with the Working Group) as the intellectual focal point. The Programme Officer will be charged with ongoing administration and coordination of the project,
preparation of periodic reports, and with facilitating monitoring and evaluation (internal and external) of the project.

Management of and responsibility for individual research projects will lie directly with the partner research centres. At the moment, these are:
1. The Centre for Development and Security Analysis (CEDSA) (Sierra Leone);
2. The Centre for Peace and Reconciliation (Hargeisa University)(Somaliland)
3. The Academy for Peace and Development (Somaliland); and
4. The Centre for Law Enforcement Education of Nigeria (CLEEN Foundation) (Nigeria);

Each of these in turn will be under the guidance of a senior academic colleague who will act as mentor as well as overall research director (see note on Mentoring and Research Capacity-Building above). An MOU will be agreed with each researcher/research centre that will incorporate agreed guidelines, goals, expectations and timelines.

The project will also constitute an Advisory Group (AG) of established and reputable African and Africanist scholars, independent of the Project Director and Working Group. The AG will act in an advisory capacity and will overall work to ensure the integrity and relevance of the project, including undertaking its own project monitoring and review (on the basis of quarterly reports prepared jointly by the research centres and the Programme Officer), and commissioning the final external evaluation of the project. The AG will be invited to comment on interim and final drafts of scholarly works, and will participate in the inaugural, interim and final meetings of the Working Group.

The following have been tapped for the AG:

Cyril Obi  Social Science Research Council/SSRC
Funmi Olonisakin  African Leadership Centre/ALC
Awino Okech  Independent researcher and Consultant
Boubacar N'Diaye  Wooster College, Ohio
David Leonard  Institute for Development Studies/IDS
Khalilou Sidibe  Bamako University
Alex de Waal  London School of Economics/LSE
Janine Rauch  Independent Consultant
Dylan Hendrickson  Conflict, Security and Development Group/ Kings College London

Risk assessment

Such a research proposal has clearly to take into account security and safety considerations. By the very nature, the research sites are inherently or potentially dangerous environments, in which researchers and research are not a familiar part of the landscape or necessarily welcome. It is a challenge in many of these contexts to penetrate and understand the deep state and its security apparatuses; secrecy is not just endemic, it is often the way the state itself works. On the other hand, already insecure and marginalised individuals and communities are wary of researchers from outside the community (or researchers, period) who tend to ask intrusive questions but whose activities at the end of the day do not improve their situation in any tangible way. At the end of the day, however, it is the element of personal safety of researchers that has to be paramount.

The project will respond to perceived or potential risks in a number of ways: first, local and contextual knowledge is embraced as a frontline risk management strategy. Wherever possible, the research relies on local researchers and research centres with intimate local knowledge and connections, and solid grounding in their particular research environments. Second, as part of the inception phase of the project there will be a detailed collective risk assessment and discussion of mitigation strategies at the first workshop, in recognition of the
fact that the research environments are not homogenous and that each has its own local dynamics that require careful consideration and customized responses. Third, at each site, research will commence with community fora that will introduce and explain the nature of the research and encourage community involvement. Key stakeholders and local interlocutors will also be brought onside. At the level of the state, the ASSN will rely on practitioner backgrounds and connections of its senior cadre to open doors (as their own individual research and publications clearly show, this cadre has a long history of working deep inside African security apparatuses).

The following matrix summarises the project’s initial approach to risk assessment and management:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk</th>
<th>Mitigation Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Inception Phase</td>
<td>Inaugural workshop will undertake detailed collective risk assessment and develop comprehensive mitigation strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research environments perceived to be potentially dangerous</td>
<td>The project relies on local research centres and researchers with intimate local knowledge and connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile or deteriorating environments render research unsafe or impractical</td>
<td>Immediate stop to research until deemed safe to continue (or abandon and move to alternative research location)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile environments threaten physical safety of researchers</td>
<td>Evacuation plans to be in place for researchers felt to be exposed to excessive or unacceptable levels of danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official approval is not granted to undertake research</td>
<td>Alternative case study location to be identified if authorisation cannot be secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal and customary security and justice actors are reluctant to engage</td>
<td>Community workshops and dialogue fora will be held wherever possible in the various research sites to explain the project and its potential benefits and solicit local support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to marginalised groups is inhibited in fragile and insecure contexts</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insecure and marginalised groups are unwilling to engage with research.</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart funds fail to materialise to support the research</td>
<td>Research project will be scaled down or realigned if additional funding cannot be located after discussion with sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project management and evaluation capacity of Secretariat proves inadequate</td>
<td>Project staff to include Project Director, Assistant Programme and resources of the ASSN Secretariat, and thus should be more than adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner organisations (research centres) fail to deliver</td>
<td>A system of mentorship will be in place to provide advice and early warning; analysis of the problem will be undertaken and additional support provided or other local researchers solicited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Further risks to be identified)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Expected policy outcomes

Hopefully, the value of the research will go well beyond the academic products. Our ambition is to contribute to a change of reality in a feasible way and to create a strong linkage between research results and SSR-related agendas by:

- Determining how hybridity of security orders can be converted on the ground into syncretism of security governance, based on best practices of both informal and formal security systems;
- Providing insights to further shape conceptual debates and improve SSR agendas, targeting African decision-making circles as well as the donor community; and
- Enhancing civil society research capacity and capacity to engage SSR/G issues

At its most specific level, however, this research will feed directly into ASSN’s extensive training work on security governance (mainly with African parliaments), as well as implementation of the new AU SSR Policy Framework, with which ASSN is intimately involved, by *inter alia*:

- Elucidating the ‘real economy’ of African security systems through the analysis of ‘hybridity’. A key point of departure in the AU SSR framework is the ability to address African contextual realities, a challenge given the paucity (or absence) of evidence-based research into the character of African security systems. This project will help to close that research gap;
- Identifying ways in which formal norms, such as the draft ‘Code of Conduct for African Security Institutions’ that the ASSN is developing for the AU, can be extended to informal/traditional/customary security actors, and vice versa;
- Contributing to African SSR ‘Lessons Learned’ (again an important component of the work that ASSN is producing for the AU), as well as supporting ASSN’s core mandate of experience-sharing in African security transformation and governance, particularly in cases like the Mano River Union, where there has been a great deal of discussion about experience-sharing between member states but little action so far; and
- Strengthening the evidence base of the various policy instruments and Operational Guidance Notes (OGNs) that the ASSN has been commissioned to produce for the AU and UN.

Results and dissemination strategy

Research outputs will take the form of:

- Major book publication with reputable publisher. This publication will cover all case studies but will also develop a methodological and theoretical framework to address hybridity in the security realm. The target audience will be: African governments, African multilateral organisations (AU and REC), bilateral and multilateral donors involved in SSR-related policies; African civil society organisations and of course academic circles;
- Book chapters and journal articles
- Publications in other relevant publication outlets (academic and peacebuilding journals and blogs, etc)
- Policy Briefs and Op eds
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- Policy workshops for the African Union as well as other international, regional and national clients (such as the Mano River Union)
- Postings to ASSN website (and websites of partner organizations) and Newsletter.

In this respect, the project will add to a long list of publications by ASSN members on the theme of security and security governance

Dissemination will additionally occur through

- Policy input application (in terms of informing the AU’s ‘African-centred’ SSR policy framework which places particular emphasis on understanding African contexts and realities, including in particular the role of traditional and customary mechanisms in delivering security and justice.
- Policy advice aimed at improving approaches to peacebuilding and SSR in target countries and contested environments such as Somalia
- dialogues with development partners and external actors
- devolution of research findings to local and civil society actors.
- training work with international, regional and national SSR institutions and African parliaments

**Timetable**

The project would span a 36-month period as follows:

Completed by (Month)

- Framing of Concept Paper 3
- First meeting of Working Group 4
- Field research 24
- First Draft (research findings) 30
- Second Meeting of Working Group and other Experts (Review Team) 31
- Final Draft of Research Reports 34
- Policy Briefs and Op Eds 18-36
- Final Drafts for Book Publication 36
- Dissemination (Workshops, Conferences) 30-36

**Bibliography**


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